PLACE: Held via Videoconference

DATE: Wednesday, September 16, 2020

TIME: 1: 31 P.M. - 4: 25 P.M.

DOCKET NO.: E-7, Sub 1214

E-7, Sub 1213

E-7, Sub 1187

BEFORE: Chair Charlotte A. Mitchell, Presiding

Commissioner ToNola D. Brown-Bland

Commissioner Lyons Gray

Commissioner Daniel G. Clodfelter

Commissioner Kimberly W. Duffley

Commissioner Jeffrey A. Hughes

Commissioner Floyd B. McKissick, Jr.

IN THE MATTER OF:

DOCKET NO. E-7, SUB 1214

Application of Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, for Adjustment of Rates and Charges Applicable to Electric Utility Service in North Carolina



DOCKET NO. E-7, SUB 1213

Petition of Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC,

for Approval of Prepaid Advantage Program

DOCKET NO. E-7, SUB 1187

Application of Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC,
for an Accounting Order to Defer Incremental Storm

Damage Expenses Incurred as a Result of Hurricanes

Florence and Michael and Winter Storm Diego

VOLUME 26

| ī | | |
|----|--|--------|
| | | Page 6 |
| 1 | APPEARANCES Cont'd: | |
| 2 | FOR NC WARN: | |
| 3 | Matthew D. Quinn, Esq. | |
| 4 | Lewis & Roberts PLLC | |
| 5 | 3700 Glenwood Avenue, Suite 410 | |
| 6 | Raleigh, North Carolina 27612 | |
| 7 | | |
| 8 | FOR VOTE SOLAR: | |
| 9 | Thadeus B. Culley, Esq., Regulatory Counsel | |
| 10 | Senior Regional Director | |
| 11 | 1911 Ephesus Church Road | |
| 12 | Chapel Hill, North Carolina 27517 | |
| 13 | | |
| 14 | FOR NORTH CAROLINA LEAGUE OF MUNICIPALITIES: | |
| 15 | Deborah Ross, Esq. | |
| 16 | Fox Rothschild LLP | |
| 17 | 434 Fayetteville Street, Suite 2800 | |
| 18 | Raleigh, North Carolina 27601 | |
| 19 | | |
| 20 | FOR NORTH CAROLINA CLEAN ENERGY BUSINESS ALLIANCE: | |
| 21 | Karen Kemerait, Esq. | |
| 22 | Fox Rothschild LLP | |
| 23 | 434 Fayetteville Street, Suite 2800 | |
| 24 | Raleigh, North Carolina 27601 | |
| | | |

| 1 | | | | |
|----|---|--------|--|--|
| | F | age 11 | | |
| 1 | EXHIBITS | | | |
| 2 | I DENTI FI ED/ADMI TTED | | | |
| 3 | DEC Bednarcik Rebuttal Redirect 24/51 Examination Exhibit Number 1 | | | |
| 4 | | | | |
| 5 | Public Staff Bednarcik Rebuttal /49 Cross Examination Exhibits 1 Through 3 | | | |
| 6 | | | | |
| 7 | Confidential Public Staff /49 Bednarcik Rebuttal Cross Examination Exhibits 4 and 5 | | | |
| 8 | Examination Exhibits 4 and 3 | | | |
| 9 | AGO Bednarcik Rebuttal Cross /50 Examination Exhibit Number 1 | | | |
| 10 | Bednarcik Rebuttal Exhibits 1, 2, /50 and 4 | | | |
| 11 | | | | |
| 12 | Confidential Bednarcik Rebuttal /50 Exhibit 3 | | | |
| 13 | Bednarcik Supplemental Exhibits 1 /50 through 4 | | | |
| 14 | Si orra Club Dodnaraik Dabuttal /F1 | | | |
| 15 | Sierra Club Bednarcik Rebuttal /51 Cross Examination Exhibit 1 | | | |
| 16 | Public Staff Fetter Rebuttal 125/156 Cross Examination Exhibit Number 1 | | | |
| 17 | | | | |
| 18 | | | | |
| 19 | | | | |
| 20 | | | | |
| 21 | | | | |
| 22 | | | | |
| 23 | | | | |
| 24 | | | | |
| | | | | |

1

PROCEEDINGS

2 3

4

5

6

7

8

10

11

12 13

14

15

16 17

18

19

20 21

22

23

24

CHAIR MITCHELL: Let's go back on the record, please. Ms. Bednarcik, Mr. Marzo, we are at redirect of your witness.

> MR. MARZO: Thank you, Chair Mitchell.

Whereupon,

JESSICA L. BEDNARCIK,

having previously been duly affirmed, was examined and testified as follows:

REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. MARZO:

Q. Ms. Bednarcik, you were asked -- and I think we'll go in reverse order with Ms. Cralle Jones being the last cross examiner from Sierra Club.

You were asked several questions from Ms. Cralle Jones regarding prior testimony for witness Kerin, and in that regard I think she tied it to the Company's historical practices as well as some questions on industry standard. Do you recall those?

- Α. Yes, I do.
- 0. And I think Ms. Cralle Jones had asked you, even more specifically than that, regarding your -- I think she said your experience, in terms firsthand knowledge of the historical practices of the Company. And I want to ask you some questions related to that.

Page 13

0kay?

- A. Okay.
- Q. Now, can you describe for me how you reviewed the historical documents in this case to assess the prudence of the Company's historical practices as it pertains to coal ash management?
- A. So, specifically on the historical documents, same documents I know that the intervenors looked at as well, I read through them. I read through them trying to understand what is the purpose of the document, what was the goals of the document, and the type of people who actually produced those documents. And really -- did not really look at taking out points here and there, but understand the entire context of the document, and why it was written, and what it was being used for at that time.

I mean, a great example is there was -- in the 1984 document, there was some discussion on that, I know, a couple of days ago. There was a discussion on the placement of the wells and were they screened in the perched water or below the perched water. When I read that document -- I think that was Joint Exhibit Number 9. I read through that document and said, what is the purpose? The purpose of this document was to

Page 14

Session Date: 9/16/2020

determine is there groundwater contamination. And the wells, the placement of the wells, is supposed to be where we can gather groundwater data in order to make sure and determine if we have contamination.

And I remember there was a lot of discussion on what the placement of one well, and it was below the perched water table right where you can grab groundwater. And reading further, I saw that well was perfectly placed, because it was confirmed that that well actually was in the groundwater plume. It was in the leachate plume.

So it's reading through and connecting all the dots in the document for the purpose, the how they did what they did, why they did what they did, and what the conclusions were.

Another great example is there was a lot of discussion on filter versus unfiltered samples.

Digging in and going -- I know now, today, we do take unfiltered samples. That is the standard today. But reading through the documents and going, why; why in the 1980s would they be taking filtered samples? Did some research online. Talked to Ms. Williams who is going to be coming up. And it was clear to me that in the 1980s, 1990s, there was a lot of discussion on, do

you filter the sample, or do you not filter the sample.

And understanding that that was something that was an evolving science during that time period. A lot of good discussion on why you would or why you would not.

So yes, today, today's standards on filtered samples is what you do. But back in the '80s, that was one of the things that was done. So putting everything into context, and that is how I attacked and researched each and every one of these documents. I know that one of the witnesses said, I think they were --

MS. CRALLE JONES: Your Honor -Chair Mitchell, I'd like to object. This response
has gone way past any questions that I asked.

MR. MARZO: Chair Mitchell, if I can respond. This is exactly what Ms. Cralle Jones asked. She asked about Ms. Bednarcik's knowledge, her ability to speak to both the industry standard and historical practices of Duke Energy. And that's exactly what she's explaining, is what she's done, what she's read to be able to talk authoritatively on those two things that she was questioned about.

CHAIR MITCHELL: All right. I'll allow the witness to proceed.

1

2

4

5

6 7

8

_

10

11

12

14

13

15

16

17

18 19

20

21

22

23

24

THE WITNESS: So I think where I was. was that it's -- looking at the documents, it's very hard not to think about what we know today and apply what we know today in the history. think there was even a comment made that I wouldn't have changed anything in the past based upon what I know today. Well, that's not true. Based upon what I know today, if I could have transport myself back with today's knowledge, of course I would have made changes. But I did the research based upon what I could find online, what I could find in these historical documents. Looking at objectives, looking at what they did what they did, what were the conclusions. Who are the people who are actually doing these studies?

The A. D. Little study is a great one.

A. D. Little was a highly respected consulting

firm. That A. D. Little study, which is Joint

Exhibit 10, 49 people worked on that project,

including people from universities and highly

respected engineering and consulting firms.

Looking at all that and putting it in perspective

and going, are these people reputable? Are these

people leaders in the industry at that time looking

at what they did over the years? Putting all that into context, understand historical aspects, what the Company had done in the history based upon the information available to us.

Q. And you just mentioned the Arthur D. Little report, the 1985 report the EPA commissioned, and you said something about the credibility of those who put together the reports.

In looking at the Arthur D. Little report, you thought about that credibility; is that --

MS. CRALLE JONES: Objection.

Chair Mitchell, we're going into a line of questioning now that is more appropriately -- they're trying to rebut witness Quarles' testimony. I didn't mention the A. D. Little report, and he's providing an opportunity for her to dig deeply into that. She's answered with great care and specificity as to what she did to review the documents. That's been asked and answered, and this is just going way beyond the scope of any question I requested.

MR. MARZO: Chair Mitchell, I would reiterate that this is well within the scope of what was asked. She was asked about how she can

make the determinations that she's making in her testimony. I would add to that, you know, that there had been several things said since even, you know, rebuttal testimony was filed in this case.

And the Company, having the burden of proof, should have the ability to respond to that.

Now, with that said, the questions that I have asked Ms. Bednarcik are squarely in line with showing her expertise in this particular area and her ability to give an opinion.

CHAIR MITCHELL: All right. Mr. Marzo, I will overrule the objection, but I'll say this: We're on redirect. Please limit your questions to those appropriate for redirect examination of your witness. And, you know, when you can, help us remember, you know, the cross examination question or line of questions that you're -- that you are responding to with your questions to your witness. All right. You may proceed.

MR. MARZO: Thank you, Chair Mitchell.

And I only have a couple -- a few more related to this area.

Q. You said you looked at a lot of historical documents.

Α.

Α.

Session Date: 9/16/2020

1

3

Did you look at means and methods when you reviewed those documents?

4 5 6 And again, a great one was that filtered/unfiltered that I talked about, trying to understand why the means and methods were used in each one of the documents based upon the objectives, conclusions, why they did what they did.

Yes, I did look at the means and methods.

8

10

11

7

Q. And there are a number of documents that you referenced that are related to the joint exhibits in particular, and I want to ask the question that I was going to ask before I got interrupted with Arthur D. Little.

1213

Did you look at who produced those documents?

1415

Did you -- did that affect how you reviewed and gave

Yes, it did. There -- a lot of people were

16

credit to the opinions in those documents?

17 18

part of those documents. It was also done under the

19

direction of the U.S. EPA Office of Research and

20

Development who was overseeing the work that was being

21

done. So as a utility engineer in the 1980s, of course

22

I would have given credence and credibility to the U.S.

23

EPA, the Office of Development and Research, and the

24

consultants that they hired to do their research for

them.

- Q. And one last question. The Company has done its own research in some of these historical documents that you've looked at; is that correct?
 - A. Yes.
- Q. Okay. For example, the 1987 Duke Power report, can you tell me a little bit about that report and how that may have affected your determinations including the --

MS. CRALLE JONES: Objection. This is not at all part of the line of cross examination.

MR. MARZO: Chair Mitchell, if I could just quickly respond. This is one of my last questions in this line. I'm simply asking -- we asked about historical documents that were not produced by the Company. I'm asking her how she reviewed historical documents that were produced by the Company to make sure that we have both those views out, including the providers of those reports. I'm just asking the same question. I'm just asking it in context of the Company reports.

CHAIR MITCHELL: I'm going to overrule the objection. But, Mr. Marzo, stick to redirect. You may proceed with your question.

Q. Do you want me to ask that again,

Ms. Bednarcik? And what I was asking -- did you understand the question?

- A. Please do.
- Q. Okay. What I was asking you was about the -in particular, I talked about the 1987 Duke Power
 report, but I'm generally asking you, in terms of
 reviewing these reports, and in particular maybe that
 report. One, did you review the Company reports? How
 did you review the Company reports? And how did the
 opinions in those reports and who provided those
 reports affect your determinations of your review?
- A. So reviewing those reports, I did take into account the people that the Company hired also to produce those reports. The Kilkelly report I believe is the one that you are referencing. It's -- I think it's either 12 or 13 in the joint exhibits. One of the gentlemen that is the author of that report is Harry LeGrand. When I took my -- I went a couple days to take some hydrology courses --

MS. CRALLE JONES: Your Honor -Chair Mitchell, I just want to object again. We're
going into documents that were not even addressed
on direct. This is an opportunity -- he's taking

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

Session Date: 9/16/2020

this as an opportunity to rebut again, and --MR. MARZO: Chair Mitchell, she's only talking about how she reviewed this specific -- the specific Duke Power documents that she reviewed to do her testimony. I think it's a fair question. Ms. Cralle Jones asked a question about how she can make an opinion if she doesn't have firsthand She shouldn't have asked the question knowl edge. if she didn't want the answer. And the answer is, this is how she knows what she knows to be able to give testimony in this case. MS. CRALLE JONES: I did not ask a question about what documents she reviewed. CHAIR MITCHELL: All right. I'm --MS. CRALLE JONES: She responded to my questi on. CHAIR MITCHELL: All right. Ms. Cralle Jones, I'm going to overrule the objection. I'm going to allow Ms. Bednarcik to complete her sentence so that she can answer her attorney's redirect question, and then, Mr. Marzo, move on. MR. MARZO: Thank you, Chair Mitchell.

THE WITNESS:

So I was discussing the

1

2

4

3

5

6 7

8

10

11

12

13

1415

_ _

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

Kilkelly report. And one of the authors of that is a gentleman named Henry LeGrand [sic], who, when I went and took a hydrology course on -- a conference on hydrology, that was actually the textbook they gave me was by -- he was one of the authors.

So I do include all of that in understanding of are these people to -- to rely upon on their history when I reviewed the reports in order to determine can I account -- can I look at these and rely upon these and say yes, that what the Company did and who they relied upon were appropriate.

Q. Thank you, Ms. Bednarcik.

Ms. Bednarcik, you were asked several questions yesterday by the Public Staff related to groundwater wells and receptors; do you recall those?

- A. Yes, I do.
- Q. And I'm going to ask you, do you have DEC Cross Exhibit 19 available?
 - A. Yes, I do.
- Q. Okay. And just for the record, this is the senior management committee report from January 13, 2014, the ash basin closure update report?
 - A. That is correct.

| | 1 | |
|---|---|--|
| | 2 | |
| | 3 | |
| | 4 | |
| | 5 | |
| | 6 | |
| | 7 | |
| | 8 | |
| | 9 | |
| 1 | 0 | |
| 1 | 1 | |
| 1 | 2 | |
| 1 | 3 | |
| 1 | 4 | |
| 1 | 5 | |
| 1 | 6 | |
| 1 | 7 | |
| 1 | 8 | |
| 1 | 9 | |
| 2 | 0 | |
| 2 | 1 | |
| 2 | 2 | |

23

24

MR. MARZO: And, Chair Mitchell, I guess, for the record, I would just go ahead and mark this as Bednarcik Redirect -- Rebuttal Redirect Exhibit Number 1.

CHAIR MITCHELL: The document will be marked DEC Bednarcik Rebuttal Redirect Examination Exhibit Number 1. And just for purposes of the record, Mr. Marzo, there is a handwritten notation at the top that says the document is not confidential. That notation does not occur on every single page. So I just want you to confirm that the document is not confidential, does not contain confidential information.

MR. MARZO: I can confirm for the Chair it does not.

CHAIR MITCHELL: Okay. Thank you, Mr. Marzo.

(DEC Bednarcik Rebuttal Redirect

Examination Exhibit Number 1 was marked

for identification.)

Q. Ms. Bednarcik, would you mind turning to docket exhibit page 6283, which they're marked at the top of the page. First I just ask you, now, on 6282, the title of this slide, what is the title?

Okay. And if I look at that table, that's a

table of various exceedance samples. And if I look

0.

23

24

| 1 | |
|---|--|
| | |
| 2 | |

down at the bottom into the notes, there is a sentence that begins with the word "primary standard." Do you see that?

3

4

A. Yes. It says:

5

6

7

"Primary standard violation are in downgradient wells that does not have a receptor between the well location and any drinking water receptors."

8

9

10

11

Q. Okay. Thank you. And all results are communicated -- are all results communicated as required to state agencies in that next note; is that what that reads?

12

13

A. Yes. It goes on to say:

14

"And no remedial actions are currently outstanding."

1516

Q. Okay. Thank you. Just one more. If you would turn to -- or maybe two more. Would you turn to page 693? And could you read the title of that first slide on 693?

18 19

17

A. "River Bend Station."

21

20

Q. Okay. And if you flip over to 694, once

22

again, there's a picture and then there are some notes

23

below the slide. And I'm looking at -- specifically at

24

the notes that begin with the highest groundwater

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

Session Date: 9/16/2020

1 indications; do you see that?

A. I do. It says:

"Highest groundwater indications, iron, manganese, are at well MW13 circled in red," which my picture is in black and white, so it doesn't show up the red, but "boron starting the show" -- "boron starting to show up in MW11 downstream of ash pond just before groundwater enters the Catawba River. No receptors."

- Q. Okay. And if you would, for me, would you turn to -- well, it also ends with all receptors in pink boxes and all upgradient; is that the last bullet there?
 - A. Yes, are all upgradient of ash ponds.
 - Q. Okay. Could you turn to page 709 for me?
 - A. I am there.
- Q. Okay. And could you read that slide for me. What is the title of that slide? Not the bullets but just the slide title.
 - A. "Receptor Impacts and Actions."
- Q. And is this whole section, as far as you know, is that related to receptor impacts and actions that have been taken by the Company?
 - A. Yes.

Company's was in terms of reviewing and understanding

the impacts from groundwater; is that correct?

23

24

A. Yes, that is correct. We take our neighbors -- they're our neighbors, and so we wanted to make sure that groundwater impacts were not going towards receptor wells. And as you can see in this table, there are some stations where we were providing a permanent water solution because of that potential sometime in the future something might be going towards there, let's connect them.

Q. Thank you, Ms. Bednarcik.

MR. MARZO: Chair Mitchell, that is all the redirect that I have.

CHAIR MITCHELL: All right. Questions from Commissioners, beginning with Commissioner Brown-Bland.

COMMISSIONER BROWN-BLAND: Yes, I have just a couple.

EXAMINATION BY COMMISSIONER BROWN-BLAND:

Q. Ms. Bednarcik, I think this has been the second time we've had an opportunity to go over how you've learned what you've learned. And first I just commend you. I think that you have mastered a great deal of information in a relatively short period of time and be able to be so conversant on it, so that's just a compliment to your good work.

1
 2
 3

But along those lines, what I would like to know is whether -- for example, when you were discussing with Mr. Marzo the reports that you looked at and those who authored them, and I know in many cases people may now be unavailable, but did you or -- and/or to your knowledge, Mr. Kerin, if you know, did you have an opportunity to check or do investigation and actually converse with or contact those people who are either with the Company were hands on with the CCR handling, making decisions, and/or those who may have been consulted or were contracted to advise and work on such matters?

A. Commissioner Brown-Bland, first of all, thank you for the compliment. While I -- the -- we were not able to find the authors of the documents that are included in the joint factual agreements, or the joint factual exhibits. But I will say that -- I think it was Joint Factual Exhibit 11 which talked about water quality at Belews Creek, and specifically related to some selenium impacts that were in the surface water.

One of the authors was actually my boss at one time, so I did know him. I worked under him for a number of years. So as much as I could say that I knew him, worked with him, and reading through that

document, that is the only person that I know personally.

- Q. And did you go back and, as part of your becoming conversant and familiar with all of this in the terms of the coal ash, the Company's response in handling of coal ash and dealing with environmental, did you go back and have discussions with him about this?
- A. Unfortunately the gentleman, William McKay, passed away a number of years ago, so I was unable to.
- Q. And in that regard, did you -- I think my question was a little broader.

Beyond just the reports, but just in general, as part of your coming up to speed in these matters and preparing yourself for dockets such as this, did you have occasion to check or do investigation to determine those who handled and worked with CCRs, basins, ponds, those kinds of things?

A. Commissioner Brown-Bland, we tried. We tried to find some people that we could talk to to get more information. But Ms. Williams, who's coming up in a panel in a little bit, that's one of the reasons why -- because we got a lot more questions about historical through data requests. We said let's -- who can we

find, and we were able to find Ms. Williams who was with U.S. EPA in the 1980s. So that is one of the reasons we have her as a panelist, to make her available for you.

- Q. Did you speak with anyone, you know, internal to Duke that you knew had actual experience, whether it's through -- I mean, as far back as you could go, but at least from the '80s up through 2015?
- A. So for -- Mr. Immel, who was on earlier, has been with the Company for a very long time, so I did have conversations with him based upon his knowledge of operations at the plants, specifically related to when we went dry ash in certain locations at certain times to understand what was the thought process behind that, why it was done. But beyond that, when we were going back through the records trying to understand the history, we were not able to find anyone on that historical knowledge going back many, many years.

Of course, as I mentioned earlier, there are people who are current operators of the basins that I did have conversations with, but not for operations historical.

Q. With regard to the current operators, are you able to recall, or do you have information where you

could provide their names, titles, and periods of employment? Is that something you could provide?

- A. We could provide that. A lot of the people who are managing the basins, of course, in the last number of years are in the coal combustion products organization. People that actually report to me and through my organization and now are fossil hydra. So the current operators, we could provide those names to you.
- Q. And specifically the ones that you spoke with to become educated about things that had transpired and the reasons for those.

So what about former employees, or contractors, or consultants, or people of that nature; did you reach out to anyone? Did you attempt to?

- A. We attempted to find people that we could talk to, and were unable to locate former employees or former consultants that we were able to talk to. So no, I did not talk to anybody formally.
- Q. So were you able to determine, or could you not, whether, you know, internal to Duke, people with different -- different opinions or unanimous opinions about the Company's handling of CCRs and what should have been done and what was done?

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

10

11

12 13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

So, Commissioner Brown-Bland, I think you're asking internal to Duke, talking to different people, is there different ideas.

0. And then when I say internal, that includes anybody that you spoke to with the Company. Just in terms of the Company's coming to decisions and positions, how well were these issues examined and, you know, whether it was thorough discussion back and forth, and whether there was differences or unanimous opi ni ons?

Α. Well, Commissioner Brown-Bland, as you can imagine, pulling together information for this case, pulling information together to answer all the data requests that we received that was going into the historical information, I did talk to a lot of people in our environmental health and safety organization, our fossil hydra organization to try and be as responsive as we possibly could to all the data And that is also how I came up to speed on what the past practices were.

And one of the things that I -- I'm inquisitive, so I asked lots of questions, and I -over, and over, and over again until I can understand what is going on. And I did ask the question that I

think that you're getting at, is was there anything different; should we -- I mean, where are we going with this? And I could not find anybody in the Company that said no. No -- everyone that I talked to in the Company, based upon looking at all the documents we have available to us, came up with anything that said different than what I'm saying today, which is the Company's practices were prudent. We followed what we knew at the time based upon the information at the time.

So I would say I've asked lots of questions of lots of people within the Company. I have not found anybody in the Company that would disagree with the position I'm taking here and the Company's position based upon our practices.

- Q. And I appreciate that. And am I understanding correctly, though, that these are still conversations with current employees or people who were current as you went about the business of trying to learn?
 - A. You are --
 - Q. Not former?
- A. You are correct. They are people that are current employees. Because we were unable to track

. .

down former employees who would have been operating at that time. As I said, the one gentleman I know passed away, unfortunately, a number of years ago.

- Q. But was -- do you know -- if you know, was the effort made by you and those in your organization to reach out to some of the former -- I mean, you know, the 1990s are not that far away, speaking as one who lived through it.
- A. Yes, there was an effort made. I know that, as we were looking back through -- I've been with the Company since 2005, so I was going through who I knew who was over the fossil hydra organization. And we tried through LinkedIn, through internet searches; we tried to find those people to be able to sit down and talk to them, and we were unable to.
- Q. All right. I think with regard to the current employees, I would ask, if you could, if you could provide -- to the extent you're able to be as complete as possible, provide a list of those current employees that you consulted in your -- in your bringing yourself up to speed on these coal ash matters. I'd like to have their name, their title, and at least assuming they are all still current, but something that indicates their time period of

20

21

22

23

24

employment. All right. So I'll request that as a late-filed exhibit.

COMMISSIONER BROWN-BLAND: That's all the questions I have, Madam Chair. Thank you,

Ms. Bednarcik.

CHAIR MITCHELL: All right.

Commissioner Gray?

COMMISSIONER GRAY: No questions.

CHAIR MITCHELL: Commissioner

Clodfel ter?

you.

COMMISSIONER CLODFELTER: Yes, thank

I hit the wrong button.

Q. Ms. Bednarcik, welcome back. I know you're probably tired of this. Last year, I asked you a couple of questions that you didn't know the answers to immediately, but were going to check into, and we agreed we would talk about them again when you came back.

EXAMINATION BY COMMISSIONER CLODFELTER:

One of those questions was with respect to the W.S. Lee plant. And the question was whether any of the costs for which the Company is seeking recovery in this case were costs that related to activities in connection with the inactive ash basin or the ash fill 1 2

3

4

5

6

7

8

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

Session Date: 9/16/2020

area at the W.S. Lee plant. Have you been able to determine that?

- Α. Yes, Commissioner Clodfelter.
- 0. Great.
- And my recollection was -- what I believe I Α. told you last time is that we did have some small amounts related to report writing and final reports that were going to the Department of Environmental Health down in South Carolina. And so that is true, they're small, but the dates of when excavation was completed for the inactive ash basin and the ash fill area, the IAB, inactive ash basin, was completed in 10 -- October of 2017; and the ash fill area was completed in November of 2017. So those costs are not included for the excavation costs in this case.
- 0. Great. Thank you for that. And the second one was with respect to Dan River.

Were there any portion of the costs for which recovery is being requested in this case were related to excavation and off-site transportation for off-site disposal? Or was all that work done before the costs that are involved in this case?

Α. The off-site disposal that we discussed last time, I dug into that, what that off-site disposal was

for, and it was, again, what I remember, but a little bit more. So there was vegetation. There was about 30,000 tons for vegetation that had to go offsite because we could not put it in our landfill. And about 4,000 tons of what we call foreign material. It had some petroleum, latent CCR, and some discharge material that couldn't go to our landfill, but not ash that was going for offsite disposal. It was only for that material that could not be placed in our landfill.

Q. Thank you for that also. I appreciate confirming those answers, and thank you for that.

You've been asked a lot of questions in the last half hour or so about your homework, and so I got to get on the train too. So I want to ask you just a few.

In connection with the work you did and the review you did, did you talk to the authors of the 2012 plant retirement comprehensive program plan?

A. So the -- I don't have that in front of me.

There are a few people I do know, I remember names on there. One was a gentleman we talked about, I believe, before Mr. Issa Zarzar.

- Q. You did talk with him?
- A. I did talk to him.
- Q. Great.

23

- A. And I also talked to, I believe,
- Mr. Paul Draovitch's name is on there as well.
 - Q. Yes.
 - A. I did talk with him.
 - O. You talked with Mr. Draovitch too?
 - A. Yes.
- Q. Okay. What about the authors of the May 29, 2017, environmental management program for coal combustion products; did you talk to the authors of that study?
- A. I don't know if I have that in front of me.

 I would have to look and see who the people are. I

 believe -- what was date of that document again?
 - Q. May 29, 2007.
- A. I would have to go back through. If they are people that are still employed with the Company, then I would have talked to them. If they are not employed, then, of course, I would not have talked to them. But all those historical documents, if people are still around. A few, I think, are people that either -- some of them, there was -- I think a gentleman named Tony Mathis may have been on that document. He actually reported to me for a while before he retired, so, of course, he would have been someone I talked to.

| Pag | e | 4 | 1 |
|------|--------|---|---|
| · uu | \sim | | |

- Q. I don't see Mr. Mathis' name on the document. Perhaps he was part of it, but you would know if you talked to him. What about the authors of the 2008 coal combustion products 10-year plan; did you talk to the authors of that 10-year plan?
- A. I would say it's the same thing, Commissioner Clodfelter.
 - Q. Okay.
- A. I don't have it in front of me. But if they're still with the Company, I talked to them.
- Q. Okay. And so they would be on the list that you're going to provide in response to Commissioner Brown-Bland's questions, I assume?
 - A. We will include them on the list.
- Q. Okay. And what about the 2003 10-year coal combustion products plan? Do you recall talking to anyone about that plan?
- A. It would be the same as the other plans. I don't know the -- I don't have the list in front of me, but if they were in the Company, I would have talked to them.
- Q. Okay. Thank you, Ms. Bednarcik, I appreciate that.

COMMISSIONER CLODFELTER: Madam Chair, I

will confess that, because of a lot of the questioning about who said what to whom when and who did what, and who read what when, I'm a little And so I want to renew, in this case again, Lost. the request that the Commission made in the last rate case, for the production of all of these reports and studies, especially including the ones Ms. Bednarcik reviewed -- may have reviewed.

22

23

24

Additional documents have appeared in this case, additional exhibits have been provided in this case that were not furnished in response to that request in the prior case. And so just for the interest of completeness, I don't want to have to guess as to whether I've got a complete set or not of the documents Ms. Bednarcik may have studied as part of her historical review. I don't want to have to guess on that, I don't want to have to make assumptions about whether the record in the last case was or was not complete, or whether these new documents may have been produced somewhere in the last case and I can't find them.

I'd just like to review the request again, and this time I'll work with Commission counsel to formulate that request in written form

Page 44

Session Date: 9/16/2020

Any

Thank you,

1 questions at this time. 2 CHAIR MITCHELL: All right. 3 questions on Commissioners' questions, beginning with the Public Staff? 4 5 MS. JOST: No questions from the Public Staff. Thank you. 6 7 CHAIR MITCHELL: Okay. Attorney 8 General's Office? MS. TOWNSEND: No questions. 10 CHAIR MITCHELL: Sierra Club? 11 MS. CRALLE JONES: Yes. 12 Chair Mitchell. 13 Okay. CHAIR MITCHELL: **EXAMINATION BY MS. CRALLE-JONES:** 14 Ms. Bednarcik, you recall 15 Q. 16 Commissioner Brown-Bland just asked you about efforts 17 to talk with folks with firsthand knowledge, and I 18 wrote down in my notes that, quote, we tried to talk 19 with folks with firsthand knowledge, but we were, 20 quote, unable to track down former employees. 21 Are you aware that the Company was involved 22 in the deposition of Steve Townsend, the former manager

of Dan River site in January of 2019? And was also

involved in the deposition of Don Faulkner, the vice

23

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

Session Date: 9/16/2020

Page 45

president for fossil fuels in January of 2019?

MR. MARZO: Objection. Just relevance.

I'm not sure where this question is going from Ms. Cralle Jones.

MS. CRALLE JONES: Ms. Bednarcik testified that the Company tried to track down former employees with firsthand knowledge and said they were unable to. Yet, at the same time, the Company was involved in the deposition of these two former employees.

CHAIR MITCHELL: All right. I'm going to overrule the objection. I'll allow the question to proceed. It responds to a question from Commissioner Brown-Bland, so please proceed, Ms. Cralle Jones.

- Q. The question, were you aware that the Company was involved in the deposition of these two former employees of Duke Energy in January of 2019?
 - A. I was not aware of that.

MS. CRALLE JONES: No more questions.

CHAIR MITCHELL: All right. Questions for the witness on Commissioners' questions from any other intervening party?

(No response.)

Page 46

Session Date: 9/16/2020

Mr. Marzo?

1

2

3

4 5

6

7

8

9

10 11

12

13

14

15

16 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

Chair Mitchell.

EXAMINATION BY MR. MARZO:

Q. Ms. Bednarcik, first off, I want to ask you.

You were asked several questions by

Commissioner Brown-Bland and I think some follow-ups by

Commissioner Clodfelter referring to persons you talked to.

CHAIR MITCHELL: All right.

MR. MARZO: Just a couple,

And I believe, for clarity, you have reached out and talked to some people within the Company that you identified in those conversations, I believe, with Commissioner Clodfelter; is that -- did I hear that right?

- A. Yes. As I read through the documents, if was there was a name that I knew was still with the Company, I reached out to them.
- Q. Okay. And, Ms. Bednarcik, you're testifying today as an expert witness in this case. And is it your understanding that, as an expert witness, you are able to get up to speed on a topic and to understand that topic without having lived through the era that that topic occurred?
 - A. Yes. And that is what I tried to do by

| - | |
|--------|--|
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| \sim | |
| ン | |
| _ | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| _ | |
| 3 | |
| ר. | |
| _ | |
| | |

1

reviewing the documents and understanding what we had talked about before of looking at the history of the Company and reviewing the documents and talking to those that I was able to talk to. But looking at the documents on hand.

5

4

- Q. And did you respond to over thousands of data requests in this case?
- 8

- A. Yes.
- 9
- 10
- 11
- 12
- 13
- 14
- 15
- 16
- 17
- 18
- 19
- 20
- 21
- 22
- 23
- 24

- Q. Okay. And did that expose you to a breadth of the Company's history around the ash management systems that comprehensively covered several decades?
 - A. Yes, it did. Absolutely.
- Q. Okay. And in reviewing the history in that format in preparing both for this case and for your job, is it -- can I ask this, do you have several decades of understanding the Company's coal ash management practices?
- A. After reviewing all the data requests and the requests that came through, yes, I would say that I have -- I have experience and the knowledge of multiple years of the Company's practices.
 - Q. Okay. And you visited sites, correct?
- A. Yes. I visited all the sites. Many of them
 I had visited before in my current role, but I visited

Page 48

Session Date: 9/16/2020

1

all the sites that are included in this DEC case.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

0

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

work under you who have been involved in coal ash management for some time.

And do you have significant employees that

A. Yes.

Q.

- Q. Okay. And so you have -- have you learned through oversight of those employees about the history of coal ash management by Duke Energy Carolinas?
 - A. Yes.
- Q. Okay. And is it fair to say in -- on top of all that you learned internally, have you also reviewed a multitude of papers? And I think

 Commissioner Clodfelter quite -- put it frankly that there is continuing production of papers that can be found if one were to continue to look and try to find papers and assert the relevance of this case; you have reviewed a number of those, correct?
- A. Yes. I have reviewed the documents that are available that have been produced, the historical documents, I have reviewed those.
- Q. Do you believe that gives you an expertise regarding coal ash management practices of Duke Energy Carolinas, unlike any other individual, in regards to what you know as occurred over the history of this

22

23

24

Examination Exhibit Number 1 was admitted into evidence.)

CHAIR MITCHELL: All right. If there is nothing further, Ms. Bednarcik, we appreciate your being here with us today and your testimony today. You may step down, and you are excused. Thank you, ma'am.

All right. At this point I would ask --I believe, Mr. Robinson, you moved for the -for -- you made the motion regarding excusing witness Oliver.

MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Chair Mitchell, I di d.

CHAIR MITCHELL: And this would be an appropriate time for you to move that testimony into the record.

MR. ROBINSON: Sure, Chair Mitchell. So, at this time, I ask that witness Oliver's supplemental rebuttal testimony consisting of four pages be moved into the record.

CHAIR MITCHELL: All right. Hearing no objection, Mr. Oliver's testimony will be -supplemental testimony will be copied into the record as if given orally from the stand.

| 1 | Q. | PLEASE STATE | YOUR NAME | , BUSINESS | ADDRESS, AND | CURRENT |
|---|----|--------------|-----------|------------|--------------|---------|
| 2 | | POSITION. | | | | |

- 3 A. My name is Jay W. Oliver. My business address is 400 South Tryon Street,
- 4 Charlotte, North Carolina. I am employed by Duke Energy Business Services, LLC
- 5 ("DEBS") as General Manager, Grid Strategy and Asset Management Governance
- for Duke Energy Corporation ("Duke Energy"), the parent holding company for
- 7 Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC ("DE Carolinas" or the "Company").

8 Q. WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF YOUR SUPPLEMENTAL REBUTTAL

- 9 **TESTIMONY?**
- 10 A. I am responding to the Supplemental Testimony of Jeff T. Thomas filed on behalf
- of the Public Staff regarding transmission and distribution ("T&D") assets placed
- in service from February 1, 2020 thorugh May 31, 2020 for DEC ("Update
- 13 Period").
- 14 Q. WITNESS THOMAS NOTED IN HIS TESTIMONY THAT DE
- 15 CAROLINAS HAD COMPLETED CONSTRUCTION ON 30 CIRCUITS
- 16 THAT WERE PENDING SOG "ENABLEMENT." WHAT IS THE
- 17 COMPANY'S TARGETED TIMEFRAME FOR COMPLETING THE SOG
- **"ENABLEMENT" WORKSCOPE?**
- 19 A. Currently, the timeframe is longer than we would like between construction
- 20 completion and SOG enablement. As noted in witness Thomas's testimony,
- 21 prior to this year the Company had been proceeding at a slower pace; however,
- as the number of circuits targeted for SOG has increased, the demand for more
- 23 highly skilled personnel to perform the enablement work has increased. Once

fully staffed we anticipate it will take approximately 12 weeks between the point construction work is complete and full SOG enablement. This 12-week timeframe is needed for scheduling multiple interdependencies between the reliability engineers who create the device settings; the ADMS Model Builders who will program the devices into the software and facilitate testing and validation; and coordination with the with the Grid Management technicians to ensure devices are showing up correctly in the Distribution Control Center (DCC).

1

2

3

5

6

7

8

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

9 Q. WHAT ARE THE COMPANY'S PLANS FOR ACHIEVING THE 10 TARGETED TWELVE WEEK SOG ENABLEMENT TIMEFRAME?

A. As COVID restrictions ease, we intend to begin building the staff required to reach the targeted 12-week timeframe. Modelling resources are a highly specialized skill set, but we are confident in our ability to find those resources with the additions likely being a combination of company and contract personnel. Training the resources will include sitting with our experienced team, reviewing the work of others and being productive along the way as they complete the needed training which we anticipate will take approximately four months.

18 Q. WILL SOG ENABLEMENT BE INCLUDED AMONG THE KEY 19 METRICS FOR GIP REPORTING?

20 A. Yes. As noted in the Second Agreement and Stipulation of Partial Settlement 21 in this case, DE Carolinas, in conjunction with the concurrent commitment of 22 DE Progress, and the Public Staff will work together to develop biannual 23 reporting on scope, schedule, costs, and benefits on the programs agreed upon for GIP deferral. Today the company's project management team is already tracking on a circuit by circuit basis the 1) Capacity and tie work completed;

2) Reclosers installed; 3) Reclosers commissioned (programmed and verified the recloser can safely operate in switch mode; and 4) Enablement of the self-healing team. The timeframe for how long it is taking from construction complete to SOG enablement can be an additional metric.

7 Q. DOES THIS COMPLETE YOUR TESTIMONY?

A. Yes.

A. I have my own energy advisory firm called Regulation UnFettered, and I am the president of that Company.

Q. And do you have prior experience that you bring to bear in connection with your testimony in this case?

A. I served as commissioner and then chairman of the Michigan Public Service Commission between 1987 and 1993. I then worked at Fitch Ratings and ended up as head of the utility ratings practice at that credit rating agency. In 2002, I went on to the board of Central Hudson Gas and Electric at the same time I started my energy advisory firm. And during the past 18 years, I have participated in over 100 administrative and judicial proceedings -- and legislative proceedings, mostly on behalf of regulated utilities, but also I'm somewhat unusual as a consultant in that I've also been hired by public

CHAIR MITCHELL: Mr. Mehta, you're muted. We're picking up a little feedback on the line when Mr. Fetter speaks, so, Mr. Mehta, we're going to mute you as soon as you're finished speaking so that there is -- just in an effort to

utility commissions and also consumer advocates.

Chair Mitchell, I move that

No. I do not.

MR. MEHTA:

Α.

23

Session Date: 9/16/2020 Page 60 Mr. Fetter's prefiled rebuttal testimony, including 1 2 Attachment A, and the summary of his testimony be 3 admitted into evidence and copied into the record in this proceeding as though given orally from the 4 5 stand. 6 CHAIR MITCHELL: All right. Mr. Mehta, 7 hearing no objection, your motion is allowed. 8 (Whereupon, the prefiled rebuttal testimony with Attachment A and summary of the testimony of Steven M. Fetter 10 11 were copied into the record as if given 12 orally from the stand.) 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24

I. <u>INTRODUCTION</u>

- 1 Q. PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME, POSITION AND BUSINESS ADDRESS.
- 2 A. My name is Steven M. Fetter. I am President of Regulation UnFettered. My business
- address is 1240 West Sims Way, Port Townsend, Washington 98368.
- 4 O. ON WHOSE BEHALF ARE YOU TESTIFYING?
- 5 A. I am providing rebuttal testimony on behalf of Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC ("Duke
- 6 Carolinas" or "the Company") before the North Carolina Utilities Commission
- 7 ("Commission" or "NCUC").
- 8 O. PLEASE DESCRIBE THE ISSUES UPON WHICH YOU ARE PROVIDING
- 9 **REBUTTAL TESTIMONY.**
- 10 A. Utilizing my past experience as a state utility commission chairman and head of a major
- 11 utility credit rating practice, my rebuttal testimony responds to Public Staff witnesses
- 12 Charles M. Junis and Michael C. Maness who recommend an "equitable sharing" of coal
- 13 combustion residual ("CCR") compliance costs, as well as Public Staff witness John R.
- Hinton who testifies that financial positions incorporated into the overall Public Staff filing
- will not result in a downgrade for the Company. I note that with regard to responding to
- Public Staff's arguments related to specific instances of alleged imprudence and
- 17 unreasonableness related to CCR compliance activities, I defer to the rebuttal testimony of
- 18 Company witnesses Jessica Bednarcik, James Wells and Marcia Williams.

II. BACKGROUND

2 Q. BY WHOM ARE YOU EMPLOYED AND IN WHAT CAPACITY?

- 3 A. I am President of Regulation UnFettered, a utility advisory firm I started in April 2002.
- 4 Prior to that, I was employed by Fitch, Inc. ("Fitch"), a credit rating agency based in New
- 5 York and London. Prior to that, I served as Chairman of the Michigan Public Service
- 6 Commission ("Michigan PSC"). I am also an attorney, having graduated from the
- 7 University of Michigan Law School in 1979.

1

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

A.

8 Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE YOUR SERVICE ON THE MICHIGAN PSC.

I was appointed as a Commissioner to the three-member Michigan PSC in October 1987 by Democratic Governor James Blanchard. In January 1991, I was promoted to Chairman by incoming Republican Governor John Engler, a designation that I retained following reappointment in 1993. During my tenure as Chairman, timeliness of commission processes was a major focus, and my colleagues and I achieved the goal of eliminating the agency's case backlog for the first time in 23 years. While on the Michigan PSC, I also served as Chairman of the Board of the National Regulatory Research Institute ("NRRI"), the research arm of the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners ("NARUC"). After leaving regulatory service, I was appointed to the NRRI Board as a public member. I have also served as a lecturer at Michigan State University's Institute of Public Utilities Annual Regulatory Studies Program ("Camp NARUC") and at NARUC's New Commissioner Regulatory Orientation.

1 Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE YOUR ROLE AS PRESIDENT OF REGULATION

2 UNFETTERED.

- A. I formed a utility advisory firm to use my financial, regulatory, legislative, and legal expertise to aid the deliberations of regulators, legislative bodies, and the courts, and to assist them in evaluating regulatory issues. My clients have included investor-owned and municipal electric, natural gas and water utilities, state public utility commissions and consumer advocates, non-utility energy suppliers, international financial services and consulting firms, and investors.
- 9 Q. WHAT WAS YOUR ROLE IN YOUR EMPLOYMENT BY FITCH?
- I was Group Head and Managing Director of the Global Power Group within Fitch. In that role, I served as group manager of the combined 18-person New York and Chicago utility team. I was originally hired to interpret the impact of regulatory and legislative developments on utility credit ratings, a responsibility I continued to have throughout my tenure at the rating agency. In April 2002, I left Fitch to start Regulation UnFettered.
- 15 Q. HOW LONG WERE YOU EMPLOYED BY FITCH?
- 16 A. I was employed by Fitch from October 1993 until April 2002. In addition, shortly after I
 17 resigned to start Regulation UnFettered, Fitch retained me as a consultant for a period of
 18 approximately six months.
- 19 Q. HOW DOES YOUR EXPERIENCE RELATE TO YOUR TESTIMONY IN THIS
- 20 **PROCEEDING?**
- A. My experience as Chairman and Commissioner on the Michigan PSC and my subsequent professional experience with financial analysis and ratings of the U.S. electric and natural gas sectors in jurisdictions involved in restructuring activity as well as those still

following a traditional regulated path – have given me solid insight into the importance of a regulator's role vis-à-vis regulated utilities, both in setting their rates as well as the appropriate terms and conditions for the service they provide. In addition, for the past 20 years I have been a member of the Wall Street Utility Group, an organization comprised of debt and equity analysts assigned to cover and make assessments of companies within the utility sector.

Q. HAVE YOU PREVIOUSLY GIVEN TESTIMONY BEFORE REGULATORY AND

LEGISLATIVE BODIES?

A.

Since 1990, I have testified before the U.S. Senate, the U.S. House of Representatives, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, federal district and bankruptcy courts, and various state and provincial legislative, judicial, and regulatory bodies in more than 100 proceedings or hearings on the subjects of credit risk and cost of capital within the utility sector, electric and natural gas utility restructuring, fuel and other energy cost adjustment mechanisms, regulated utility mergers and acquisitions, construction work in progress and other interim rate recovery structures, utility securitization bonds, and nuclear energy. I have previously testified and been accepted as an expert witness before this Commission on behalf of Duke Energy Carolinas in Docket Nos. E-7, Sub 828 and E-7, Sub 909. My full educational and professional background is presented in Attachment A hereto.

III. CREDIT RATINGS AND THEIR IMPORTANCE TO REGULATED UTILITIES

Q. WHAT IS A CREDIT RATING AND WHY IS IT IMPORTANT?

A. A credit rating reflects an independent judgment of the general creditworthiness of an obligor or of a specific debt instrument. While credit ratings are important to both debt and

equity investors for a variety of reasons, their most important purpose is to communicate to investors the financial strength of a company or the underlying credit quality of a particular debt security issued by that company.

Credit rating determinations are made by rating agencies through a committee process involving individuals with knowledge of a company, its industry, and its regulatory environment. Corporate rating designations of S&P and Fitch have 'AAA,' 'AA,' 'AA,' and 'BBB' category ratings within the investment-grade ratings sphere, with 'BBB-' as the lowest investment-grade rating and 'BB+' as the highest non-investment-grade rating. Comparable rating designations of Moody's at the investment-grade dividing line are 'Baa3' and 'Ba1,' respectively. In addition, the agencies seek to make their rating judgments even more precise by dividing each of the rating categories into three levels ('+,' 'neutral,' and '-' at S&P and Fitch, and 1, 2 & 3 at Moody's). The following chart illustrates the comparability of ratings among the three agencies.

CHART 1

Ratings Categories – Comparability Between Agencies

| Investment | t Grade |
|---------------------|------------------|
| S&P and Fitch | _ <u>Moody's</u> |
| AAA | Aaa |
| AA+ | Aa1 |
| AA | Aa2 |
| AA- | Aa3 |
| A+ | $A1(^{1})$ |
| A | A2 |
| A- (²) | A3 |
| BBB+ | Baa1 |
| BBB | Baa2 |
| BBB- | Baa3 |

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

| Below Invest | ment Grade |
|---------------|------------|
| S&P and Fitch | _ Moody's |
| BB+ | Ba1 |
| BB | Ba2 |
| BB- | Ba3 |
| B+ | B1 |
| В | B2 |
| B- | В3 |
| CCC | Caa |
| CC | Ca |
| C | C |
| D | [C] |

Corporate credit rating analysis considers both qualitative and quantitative factors to assess the financial and business risks of fixed-income debt issuers. A credit rating is an indication of an issuer's ability to service its debt, both principal and interest, on a timely basis. It also at times incorporates some consideration of ultimate recovery of investment in case of default or insolvency. Ratings can also be used by contractual counterparties to gauge both the short-term and longer-term financial health and viability of a company, including decisions related to required collateral levels, with higher-rated entities facing lower requirements.

Moody's rating of Duke Carolinas is A1 with a Stable outlook.

S&P rating of Duke Carolinas is A- with a Stable outlook.

| 1 | Q. | HOW WOULD YOU DESCRIBE DUKE CAROLINAS' CREDIT RATINGS |
|----------|----|--|
| 2 | | STATUS? |
| 3 | A. | Duke Carolinas' corporate issuer credit ratings span between the highest level (A1, Stable |
| 4 | | outlook at Moody's) and the lowest level (A-, Stable outlook at S&P) of the 'A' category. ³ |
| 5 | | I have long testified that a regulated utility should endeavor to hold ratings no lower than |
| 6 | | 'Baa1 / BBB+', with a longer-term goal of moving into (or maintaining in) the 'A' |
| 7 | | category. Accordingly, I encourage both the Commission and the Company to seek to |
| 8 | | maintain those credit ratings in the 'A' category after the conclusion of this proceeding. |
| 9 | Q. | WHY ARE CREDIT RATINGS IMPORTANT FOR REGULATED UTILITIES |
| | | |
| 10 | | AND THEIR CUSTOMERS? |
| 10 11 | A. | AND THEIR CUSTOMERS? A utility's credit ratings have a significant impact on its ability to raise capital on a timely |
| | A. | |
| 11 | A. | A utility's credit ratings have a significant impact on its ability to raise capital on a timely |
| 11 12 | A. | A utility's credit ratings have a significant impact on its ability to raise capital on a timely basis and upon reasonable terms. As economist Charles F. Phillips states in his highly- |

Corporate or issuer utility credit ratings reflect the intrinsic financial strength of the utility being rated, with no backing from or recourse against specific utility assets. At times, regulated utilities issue secured debt, representing utility borrowings that are backed by collateral, usually in the form of utility real property. In almost all instances, secured credit ratings are higher than corporate/issuer credit ratings because, in the case of a utility defaulting on its bond payment obligations, secured debtholders have recovery priority on the defined collateral as compared to the claims of unsecured debtholders.

Phillips, Charles F., Jr., The Regulation of Public Utilities, 250 (3rd Ed. 1993)(Emphasis supplied). See also Public Utilities Reports Guide: "Finance," Public Utilities Reports, Inc., 6-7 (2004)("Generally, the higher the rating of the bond, the better the access to capital markets and the lower the interest to be paid.").

Thus, a utility with strong credit ratings is not only able to access the capital markets on a timely basis at reasonable rates, it is also able to share the benefit from those attractive interest rate levels with customers since cost of capital gets factored into utility rates. Conversely, but of equal importance, the lower a utility's credit rating, the more the utility must pay to raise funds from debt and equity investors, and those higher capital costs get factored into the rates that consumers are required to pay. Electric utilities like Duke Energy are among the most capital-intensive industries. As such, maintaining Duke Carolinas' credit profile is especially important in view of its need to access substantial amounts of debt and equity, on a near daily basis, to fund its ongoing operations, including capital investments. This includes coal ash remediation activities, along with capital investment related to day-to-day maintenance and infrastructure enhancement related to its ongoing duty to serve customers in a safe and reliable manner. Significantly, a regulated utility is required to raise funding even if the markets are in turmoil and costs are escalating wildly. Strong credit ratings, like those currently held by the Company, limit the negative effects of having to finance at times of great volatility within the capital markets, as was seen back during the 2008-2009 recession when 'BBB'-rated utilities were subject to significantly higher interest rates than 'A'-rated utilities, along with more restricted access, if available at all, along with stricter financing terms.

Q. WHAT QUALITATIVE FACTORS ARE USED BY THE RATING AGENCIES TO ESTABLISH UTILITY CREDIT RATINGS?

A. The most important qualitative factors are regulation, management and business strategy, and access to energy, gas and fuel supply with timely recovery of associated costs.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

Q. WHAT ARE THE KEY QUANTITATIVE MEASURES?

1

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

- A. The major rating agencies use several financial measures within their utility financial analysis. S&P currently highlights the following two core financial ratios as its key indicators: Funds from Operations to Debt (FFO / Debt), which focuses on cash flow; and Debt to Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation and Amortization (Debt / EBITDA), which provides a comparative profitability measure.⁵
- 7 Q. WHY IS REGULATION A KEY QUALITATIVE COMPONENT OF THE UTILITY CREDIT RATING PROCESS?
 - A. Regulation is a key factor in assessing the financial strength of a utility because a state public utility commission determines revenue levels (recoverable expenses including depreciation and operations and maintenance, fuel cost recovery, and return on investment) and the terms and conditions of service that affect a utility's cost of service. As Moody's has noted, "A utility's ability to recover its costs and earn an adequate return are among the most important analytical considerations when assessing utility credit quality and assigning credit ratings."

The quality and direction of regulation play a key role in shaping investors' expectations of how these factors may change in the future. With the era of restructuring now in its third decade, regulation has had to evolve as the nature of a utility's responsibilities in providing energy services to customers has undergone dramatic change.

S&P Research: "Corporate Methodology," November 19, 2013 (republished with nonmaterial changes December 7, 2018).

Moody's Research: "Cost Recovery Provisions Key to Investor Owned Utility Ratings and Credit Quality: Evaluating a Utility's Ability to Recover Costs and Earn Returns," June 18, 2010.

| The regulatory environment affects utility investors' decisions because, before they are |
|---|
| willing to put forward substantial sums of money, they must assess the degree to which |
| regulators understand and accommodate the economic requirements and the financial and |
| operational risks of a rapidly changing industry. Utility investors understand and accept the |
| role of extensive regulation, but they seek from the regulatory process decision-making |
| that is fair, with a significant degree of predictability. |

For these reasons, rating agencies look for the consistent application of sound economic and regulatory principles by utility regulators. If a regulatory body were to encourage a utility to make investments based upon an expectation of the opportunity to earn a reasonable return, and then did not apply regulatory principles in a manner consistent with those expectations, investor interest in providing funds to the utility would decline, debt ratings would likely suffer, and the utility's cost of capital would increase, to the detriment of ratepayers.

Q. AT THE CORE OF SUCH REGULATORY REVIEW IS THE CONCEPT OF PRUDENCY. WOULD YOU EXPLAIN "PRUDENCY" WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF UTILITY REGULATION?

- The concept of "prudency" is present in the legislative and/or administrative rules of every utility commission across the U.S. In their reference book <u>Fundamentals of Energy Regulation</u>, authors (and Ph.D. economists) Lesser & Giacchino discuss prudence both in terms of the deference accorded utility management decisions, as well as the review process before imprudent behavior is found to have occurred:
 - "...utility management is given the benefit of the doubt, and management's decisions are presumed reasonable unless the facts show otherwise.

A.

| 1 2 3 4 | | Moreover, the prudence of managerial decisions must be judged on their reasonableness at the time those decisions were made and based on information then available. Prudence is not meant as an exercise in hindsight regulation. In essence, a prudent decision is one that a reasonable |
|---|----|--|
| 5 | | person could have made in good faith, given the information and decision tools available at the time of the decision." |
| 7 | | In support of that position, economist Charles F. Phillips in his utility regulation treatise |
| 8 | | referenced above quotes the views of the Massachusetts and New York commissions: |
| 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | | "A prudence review must determine whether the company's actions, based on all that it knew or should have known at the time were reasonable and prudent in light of the circumstances which then existed. It is clear that such a determination may not properly be made on the basis of hindsight judgments, nor is it appropriate for the [commission] merely to substitute its best judgment for the judgments made by the company's managers." [In re Western Mass. Elec. Co., 80 PUR4th at 501.] "The company's conduct should be judged by asking whether the conduct was reasonable at the time, under all the circumstances, considering that the company had to solve its problems prospectively rather than in reliance on hindsight. In effect, our responsibility is to determine how reasonable people would have performed the task that confronted the company." [In re Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y. Inc., Opinion No. 79-1 (N.Y. 1979), 5-6.]8 |
| 24 | Q. | OTHER ASPECTS OF UTILITY REGULATION THAT YOU HAVE OFTEN |
| 25 | | TESTIFIED ABOUT ARE THE "REGULATORY COMPACT" AND ALSO |
| 26 | | "CONSTRUCTIVE UTILITY REGULATION." COULD YOU PROVIDE A |
| 27 | | DESCRIPTION OF WHAT THESE KEY CONCEPTS ENTAIL? |
| 28 | A. | There is an unwritten but core concept within the regulatory process known as the |
| 29 | | "regulatory compact." Since there is no hard and fast universal rule or regulation |
| 30 | | delineating the "regulatory compact," it has been described in many different ways. In the |

Jonathan A. Lesser & Leonardo R. Giacchino, <u>Fundamentals of Energy Regulation</u>, 42 (1st Ed. 2007).

Phillips, <u>The Regulation of Public Utilities</u>, 340-341.

above-noted reference book, Lesser & Giacchino describe that under the "regulatory compact:"

... the regulator grants the company a protected monopoly, essentially a franchise, for the sale and distribution of electricity or natural gas to customers in its defined service territory. In return, the company commits to supply the full quantities demanded by those customers at a price calculated to cover all operating costs plus a "reasonable" return on the capital invested in the enterprise. The first half of this "compact" protects the company from would-be competitors and secures for the public the substantial economies of scale available in the large-scale production of electricity. The second half of the "compact" counteracts the injurious tendency of monopolies to raise prices above the level that would prevail in a competitive market.⁹

In my experience advising a range of utility industry stakeholders across the U.S., I have found that every utility commission adheres to some conception of the "regulatory compact" in concert with the constitutionally-and-statutorily-mandated prudency standards.

In addition, my own conception of "constructive utility regulation" is that which aligns the seemingly competitive interests of utility investors and utility customers in a manner that is consistent and steady over time, so that all parties have reasonable expectations about how regulatory policy will be effectuated. Importantly, it supports a utility's ability to provide safe and clean utility service to its customers with a high level of reliability at reasonable rates. Constructive regulation is efficient and predictable with a long-term focus on stable rates, while also recognizing the need for timely recovery of costs and the value to customers of a financially-strong utility with ready access to the capital markets at attractive rates, even when the financial markets are under stress. It recognizes that utility

⁹ Lesser & Giacchino, Fundamentals of Energy Regulation, 43-44.

| 1 | investors react negatively to major, frequent or sudden changes in regulatory policy and |
|--|--|
| 2 | that such uncertainty ultimately has an adverse effect on customers. In sum, longstanding |
| 3 | constructive regulatory policy should provide a utility with the confidence to make capital- |
| 4 | intensive investments and incur O&M expenses for the benefit of its customers, with the |
| 5 | reasonable expectation that those costs would be recovered in a timely manner, including |
| 6 | a fair return on investment, consistent with that stable and consistent regulatory policy. |
| 7 Q. | HAVE THE RATING AGENCIES DISCUSSED THE IMPORTANCE OF |
| 8 | "CONSTRUCTIVE REGULATION" IN THEIR ASSESSMENT OF UTILITY |
| 9 | CREDIT PROFILES? |
| 10 A. | Yes. I saw firsthand how important constructive regulation is to agencies when Fitch |
| 11 | recruited me to provide regulatory analysis after I had decided to move on from the |
| 12 | Michigan PSC. Moody's has highlighted the critical role that regulators play in a June 23, |
| 13 | 2017 report entitled "Rating Methodology: Regulated Electric and Gas Utilities:" |
| 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 | An over-arching consideration for regulated utilities is the regulatory environment in which they operate. While regulation is also a key consideration for networks, a utility's regulatory environment is in comparison often more dynamic and more subject to political intervention. The direct relationship that a regulated utility has with the retail customer can lead to a more politically charged rate-setting environmentOur views of regulatory environments evolve over time in accordance with our observations of regulatory, political, and judicial events that affect issuers in the sector. ¹⁰ |
| 23 24 | And S&P has long held the same view: |
| 25 26 27 28 29 | Regulatory advantage is the most heavily weighted factor in [S&P's] analysis of a regulated utility's business risk profileAn established, dependable approach to regulating utilities is a hallmark of a credit-supportive jurisdictionMajor or frequent changes to the regulatory model invariably raise risk due to the possibility of future changes. Steady |

Moody's Research: "Rating Methodology: Regulated Electric and Gas Utilities," June 23, 2017.

application of transparent, comprehensible policies and practices lowers risk. ... We adjust the assessment downward if the development of the framework was contentious due to policy disputes or legal actions, indicating that the political consensus regarding utility regulation is fragile. ... [A] regulatory approach that allows utilities the opportunity to consistently earn a reasonable return as a positive credit factor in our regulatory assessments. ... We measure the timeliness of rate decisions, the obsolescence of the costs on which the rates are based, the timing of interim rates, and other practices (such as allowing rates to automatically change in a future period based on inflation) that affect a utility's ability to earn its authorized return. ... Practices such as legislative or regulatory recognition of the need for preapproval of [large capital projects], periodic reviews that substantively involve the regulator in the progress of the project, and rolling prudence determinations during construction can reduce the general level of risk...[W]e consider financial stability to be of substantial importance [with cash taking] precedence in credit analysis. ...We assess a jurisdiction most strongly if all large expense items are recoverable through an automatic tariff clause that is based on projected costs, adjusts frequently, and has no record of any significant disallowances. ... [A] primary factor ... is the political independence of regulators. 11

IV. FINANCIAL COMMUNITY PERCEPTIONS OF THE NCUC

Q. HOW IS THE COMMISSION VIEWED BY THE FINANCIAL COMMUNITY?

The financial community's view of the North Carolina Utilities Commission has been relatively positive. Probably the most objective and respected commentator on regulatory policy and activities from a financial community perspective is Regulatory Research Associates ("RRA"). RRA currently rates the North Carolina regulatory environment (which goes beyond the Commission to also include legislative and executive branch policies) as Average 1, among the top one-third of the 53 regulatory jurisdictions upon which RRA currently opines. RRA's view of the state's regulation as overall relatively constructive from an investor viewpoint serves as a positive factor in the credit rating analytical process.

1 2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12 13

14

15 16

17

18 19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

30

31

S&P Research: "Assessing U.S. Investor-Owned Utility Regulatory Environments," January 7, 2014.

| 1 | Q. | DOES MOODY'S SHARE THE FAVORABLE ASSESSMENT OF NORTH |
|----------|----|---|
| 2 | | CAROLINA REGULATION? |
| 3 | A. | Yes. Specifically, Moody's states that its "stable rating outlook considers the utility's |
| 4 | | relatively low business risk profile and primarily credit supportive regulatory frameworks." |
| 5 | | Of note, the agency cautions that a downgrade could occur if there is a "decline in the credit |
| 6 | | supportiveness of Duke Carolinas' regulatory relationships, particularly with regards to |
| 7 | | coal ash remediation recovery in North Carolina."12 |
| 8 | Q. | AND HOW DOES S&P VIEW REGULATION IN NORTH CAROLINA? |
| 9 | A. | S&P assesses Duke Carolinas' rate-regulated utility assets as lower-risk, and views that the |
| 10 | | Company has effectively managed its regulatory risk. Similar to Moody's, S&P stated that |
| 11 | | the agency could lower the ratings if Duke Energy's business risk increases because of |
| 12 | | additional regulatory lag, more stringent environmental rules related to its coal exposure, |
| 13 | | [or] if we conclude that the company's regulatory risk management has weakened." ¹³ |
| 14 | | V. REBUTTAL OF PUBLIC STAFF TESTIMONY |
| 15 | Q. | WOULD YOU DISCUSS THE "EQUITABLE SHARING" PROPOSAL OF |
| 16 | | PUBLIC STAFF WITNESSES JUNIS AND MANESS? |
| 17 | A. | Yes. First, let me provide an excerpt from the testimony of Mr. Junis which, together with |
| 18 | | Mr. Maness's testimony, recommends the adoption of an equitable sharing of CCR |
| 19 | | compliance costs between the Company and its shareholders: |
| 20 21 | | The Public Staff did not conduct a prudence review of DEC decision-making at the time the ash basins were constructed Instead, the Public |
| | 12 | Moode's Research "Duke Energy Carolines LLC" October 21, 2010 |

Moody's Research, "Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC," October 31, 2019.

S&P Research, "Duke Energy Corp. and Subsidiaries Outlooks Revised to Stable on Announced Equity Offering; Ratings Affirmed," November 20, 2019.

Staff focused its investigation on the area where the Company's performance has been measured against its legal duty... Even where some Company actions or omissions appear imprudent,...quantification of costs directly resulting from the acts or omissions would be speculative. Also, even where DEC's management was arguably prudent in light of the knowledge they had at the time, the Company bears some degree of responsibility for its extensive environmental violations. In this situation, an equitable sharing of those costs is reasonable and appropriate, both as a reflection of DEC's culpability for environmental violations and as a proxy for costs of violations that exist but cannot be precisely quantified. An equitable sharing is particularly appropriate in light of the extent of the Company's failure to prevent environmental contamination from its CCR impoundments, in violation of state and federal laws. (Junis at 65)

Q. WHAT ARE YOUR CONCERNS WITH THE RATIONALE FOR EQUITABLE

SHARING PUT FORWARD BY THESE PUBLIC STAFF WITNESSES?

First off, it is inconsistent with the principle that prudently-incurred costs should be recovered in rates. That principle is fundamental to the regulatory compact that undergirds investor willingness to provide needed funding for public utilities in exchange for a fair return on their investment. Indeed, the Commission's Order in Docket No. E-7, Sub 1146 expressly reaffirms that understanding as it pertains to the CCR costs that are at issue in this proceeding. On page 257 of that Order, the Commission stated explicitly that "A central operating principle underlying utility rate regulation in North Carolina (and virtually all other jurisdictions) is that the utility's costs are recoverable in rates." The Commission's Order goes on to quote from the above-referenced Fundamentals of Utility Regulation to expand upon this principle:

As two of the leading modern commentators on utility regulation put it in the opening paragraphs to a chapter (titled "The Role of the Revenue Requirement") in their treatise on utility regulation:

No firm can operate as a charity and withstand the rigors of the marketplace. To survive, any firm must take in sufficient

| revenues | from | customers | to | pay | its | bills | and | provide | its |
|-----------|--------|-------------|------|-------|------|---------|--------|---------|------|
| investors | with a | reasonabl | e ex | pecta | atio | n of pi | rofit. | Regula | ited |
| firms are | no exc | ception. Th | ney | face | the | same | cons | traints | |

A basic concept underlying all forms of economic regulation is that a regulated firm must have the opportunity to recover its costs.... Without the opportunity to recover all of its costs and earn a reasonable return, no regulated private company can attract the capital necessary to operate.

Jonathan A. Lesser & Leonardo R. Giacchino, <u>Fundamentals of Utility</u> <u>Regulation 39</u> (Pub. Utils. Reports, Inc., ed., 2007) (Lesser & Giacchino).

Q. HOW DOES THE CONCEPT THAT PRUDENTLY-INCURRED COSTS SHOULD

BE RECOVERED FIT WITHIN THE JUNIS-MANESS SHARING PROPOSAL?

It does not. Such prudent cost recoverability is a fundamental principle as the NCUC noted in its order, and it is a key aspect of the business relationship between investors (those with the funds) and regulated utilities (those who require those funds). For almost 40 years, initially as a gubernatorial and legislative counsel, later as a utility chairman and commissioner, and more recently as a consultant to regulated utilities, utility commissions and consumer advocates, I have been involved with the concept of prudency. In everyday language, I view a prudent decision as one that is made by a person with skills appropriate for the subject matter that falls within a range of reasonable results based upon the circumstances that exist at the time the decision is made. It does not need to be a perfect decision or one that ultimately turns out to be correct. There can be more than one prudent alternative. Witnesses Junis and Maness have abandoned that standard, and instead propose that the Commission adopt an arbitrary cost recovery standard that would allow for disallowances without any finding of imprudence.

Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN.

Mr. Junis admits that Public Staff did not conduct a prudence review, and acknowledges that it is possible that no imprudence occurred back when the Company's decisions were made. Moreover, whether imprudence occurred or not, Mr. Junis indicates that any quantification of costs related to such decisions "would be speculative." Nevertheless, Mr. Junis proceeds to offer his opinion that environmental violations under other state and federal laws did occur. Then, while ignoring any relevant sanctions that might exist under those statutes, he calls on the Commission to take action on its own accord within its own defined authority. Mr. Junis encourages the Commission to order ratepayers and shareholders to share in paying for CCR costs, not because imprudency can be identified – which it cannot -- nor that improper costs can be quantified – which they cannot, but because "an equitable sharing of those costs is reasonable and appropriate."

| Q. | WHAT DO YOU BELIEVE WOULD BE THE LIKELY REACTION FROM THE |
|----|---|
|----|---|

FINANCIAL COMMUNITY IF THE PUBLIC STAFF'S PROPOSED STANDARD

WERE TO BE ADOPTED BY THE NCUC?

A.

- Stark movement away from traditional ratemaking principles, including the well-established prudency standard, would not be received well by either the credit rating agencies or equity and debt investors. Investors deciding where their funds should flow will take into consideration the increased level of risk that would accompany adoption of a regulatory standard that sidesteps prudency reviews and allows for disallowances based upon speculation and concerns about cost levels rather than findings supporting inappropriate decision-making related to spending. Such a policy would certainly increase the costs of both equity and debt capital, an impact that ultimately lands at the doorstep of the customer.
- Q. HOW DOES THE MANNER IN WHICH OTHER SOUTHEASTERN
 JURISDICTIONS HAVE BEEN ADDRESSING COAL ASH RECOVERY
 INFORM CREDIT RATINGS AND INVESTORS?
 - To the extent that neighboring jurisdictions to North Carolina have been actively addressing coal ash remediation cost recovery constructively and with predictable consistent regulation, NCUC deviation from both traditional ratemaking principles and constructive regulation here would be viewed negatively by the financial community. For example, legislative efforts in Virginia resulted in the 2019 coal ash statute that delineated procedures for closing and remediating CCR units, along with instructions for the utility's recovery of costs through a rate adjustment clause with some deferral ability for any underrecovery amount and for carrying costs. Under the Virginia statute, recoverable costs are

| allocated to all Virginia customers served by the utility as a non-bypassable charge. 14 Ir |
|---|
| addition, the Commission in Georgia recently considered Georgia Power Company's 2019 |
| rate case, which also included significant spending for CCR compliance. In that |
| proceeding, the Commission allowed for recovery of Georgia Power's CCR Compliance |
| costs, as well as a full weighted average cost of capital return during the 3-year amortization |
| period approved by the Commission for such costs. 15 |

Q. DOES PUBLIC STAFF WITNESS HINTON SIMILARLY DISCUSS THE IMPORTANCE OF TRADITIONAL RATEMAKING PRINCIPLES?

Yes, he does. While I differ with Public Staff witness John Hinton on some issues, I do find support within Mr. Hinton's testimony for my conclusion about the importance of regulators not moving away from traditional ratemaking principles. Mr. Hinton states:

The ability to recover costs and earn returns on its investments relates to the assurance that the regulated rates will be based on prescriptive and clear ratemaking methods." (Hinton at 6)

Thus, Mr. Hinton has described the very process for rate-setting that both investors and customers rely upon. In addition, my description earlier in this testimony about what motivates investors to support a specific utility's funding needs – regulatory predictability, consistency, transparency, and a positive outlook with regard to constructive utility regulation – would not seem to be present within the predicate Mr. Junis and Mr. Maness provide for this Commission to order this unprecedented sharing plan.

¹⁴ Va. Code Ann. § 10.1-1402.03 (July 1, 2019).

Order Adopting Settlement Agreement as Modified, *In re: Georgia Power Company's 2019 Rate Case*, Docket No. 42516, Georgia Public Service Commission (February 6, 2020).

| 1 | Q. | NOTWITHSTANDING MR. HINTON'S APPARENT SUPPORT FOR YOUR |
|-------------|----|---|
| 2 | | POSITION ON SHARING, YOU ALSO REFER TO DIFFERENCES YOU HAVE |
| 3 | | WITH OTHER OF HIS VIEWS? |
| 4 | A. | Yes, I do. In commenting about potential credit rating impacts flowing from this case, Mr. |
| 5 | | Hinton states: |
| 6 7 8 | | I believe that unexpected financial developments would have to occur that reduced DEC's cash flow from operations or cause the Company to issue more debt to trigger a downgrade. (Hinton at 5)(Emphasis supplied) |
| 9 | | I respectfully disagree with Mr. Hinton. I have already noted the letdown investors would |
| 10 | | feel if the Commission were to order the Public Staff sharing plan. Let me add that I expect |
| 11 | | that since Mr. Hinton's testimony was part of an overall Public Staff package of proposals |
| 12 | | in this case, he would not characterize any positions put forward by Public Staff as |
| 13 | | "unexpected financial developments." Accordingly, Mr. Hinton is testifying that a |
| 14 | | downgrade would not occur, notwithstanding the following Public Staff positions: |
| 15 | | ■ a reduction in return on equity from the current 9.90% to 9.00% (Woolridge); |
| 16 | | a reduction in equity layer from 53% to 50% (Woolridge); |
| 17 | | ■ EDIT refunding over five years rather than 20 years (Hinton); |
| 18 | | limitation of return for some CCR expenditures (Maness); |
| 19 | | significant coal ash basin closure disallowances (multiple witnesses); |
| 20 | | an unprecedented CCR cost sharing program between ratepayers and |
| 21 | | shareholders that would deny recovery of a substantial amount of coal ash |
| 22 | | remediation costs with no finding of imprudence (Junis and Maness); and |

 potential adoption of a landmark utility regulatory standard of review that a finding of imprudency would not be required for the ordering of disallowances based upon speculation or the size of the expenditures under review.

I respectfully disagree. To the contrary, I believe that if this package of Public Staff positions were to be adopted by the Commission, it would lead to an immediate reassessment of the North Carolina regulatory climate in a downward direction by the financial community. Both Mr. Hinton and I agree that virtually 50% of weight is given to qualitative factors within the credit rating analytical process, primarily related to regulatory climate. Where I disagree with Mr. Hinton, however, is that I believe that a reduction in regulatory support on the qualitative side would amplify the negative effects of the Public Staff case on the quantitative side, and undoubtedly would lead to a downgrade, even if the cash flow numbers migrated near the borderline between "A" and "BBB" category status. I am in good company in holding this view – as discussed above, both S&P and Moody's have stated that a weakening in regulatory support could lead to a downgrade.

VI. <u>CONCLUSION</u>

Q. DO YOU HAVE CONCLUDING THOUGHTS?

A. Yes. As I have testified to utility commissions across the U.S., I believe that utilities and their regulators should strive to attain corporate / issuer credit ratings no lower than 'BBB+' / 'Baa1,' with a longer-range strategy to achieve ratings within the "A" category. A utility that holds "A" category rating status, as Duke Carolinas now does, should possess sufficient financial strength to access the capital markets even under the most stressful of

¹⁶ Testimony of John Hinton at 5-6.

- conditions. Accordingly, my recommendation in this testimony is that the Company should seek to achieve excellent operational performance going forward, and the Commission should sustain the ongoing constructive regulatory environment, which together should maintain the Company's credit ratings no lower than their current levels within the "A" category.
- 6 Q. DOES THIS CONCLUDE YOUR REBUTTAL TESTIMONY?
- 7 A. Yes, it does.

STEVEN M. FETTER

1240 West Sims Way Port Townsend, WA 98368 732-693-2349 RegUnF@gmail.com www.RegUnF.com

Education University of Michigan Law School, J.D. 1979

Bar Memberships: U.S. Supreme Court, New York, Michigan University of Michigan, A.B. Media (Communications) 1974

April 2002 – Present

President - Regulation UnFettered -- Port Townsend, Washington

Founder of advisory firm providing regulatory, legislative, financial, legal and strategic planning advisory services for the energy, water and telecommunications sectors, including public utility commissions and consumer advocates; federal and state testimony; credit rating advisory services; negotiation, arbitration and mediation services; skills training in ethics, negotiation, and management efficiency.

Service on Boards of Directors of: Central Hudson (Fortis Inc. subsidiary) (Chairman, Governance and Human Resources Committee); and Previously CH Energy Group (Lead Independent Director; Chairman, Audit Committee, Compensation Committee, and Governance and Nominating Committee); National Regulatory Research Institute (Chairman); Keystone Energy Board; and Regulatory Information Technology Consortium; Member, Wall Street Utility Group; Participant, Keystone Center Dialogues on RTOs and on Financial Trading and Energy Markets.

October 1993 – April 2002

Group Head and Managing Director; Senior Director -- Global Power Group, Fitch IBCA Duff & Phelps -- New York / Chicago

Manager of 18-employee (\$15 million revenue) group responsible for credit research and rating of fixed income securities of U.S. and foreign electric and natural gas companies and project finance; Member, Fitch Utility Securitization Team.

Led an effort to restructure the global power group that in three years' time resulted in 75% new personnel and over 100% increase in revenues, transforming a group operating at a substantial deficit into a team-oriented profit center through a combination of revenue growth and expense reduction.

Achieved national recognition as a speaker and commentator evaluating the effects of regulatory developments on the financial condition of the utility sector and individual

Attachment A

companies; Cited by <u>Institutional Investor</u> (9/97) as one of top utility analysts at rating agencies; Frequently quoted in national newspapers and trade publications including <u>The New York Times</u>, <u>The Wall Street Journal</u>, <u>International Herald Tribune</u>, <u>Los Angeles Times</u>, <u>Atlanta Journal-Constitution</u>, <u>Forbes</u> and <u>Energy Daily</u>; Featured speaker at conferences sponsored by Edison Electric Institute, Nuclear Energy Institute, American Gas Assn., Natural Gas Supply Assn., National Assn. of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC), Canadian Electricity Assn.; Frequent invitations to testify before U.S. Senate (on C-Span) and House of Representatives, and state legislatures and utility commissions.

Participant, Keystone Center Dialogue on Regional Transmission Organizations; Member, International Advisory Council, Eisenhower Fellowships; Author, "A Rating Agency's Perspective on Regulatory Reform," book chapter published by Public Utilities Reports, Summer 1995; Advisory Committee, <u>Public Utilities Fortnightly</u>.

March 1994 – April 2002

Consultant -- NYNEX -- New York, Ameritech -- Chicago, Weatherwise USA -- Pittsburgh

Provided testimony before the Federal Communications Commission and state public utility commissions; Formulated and taught specialized ethics and negotiation skills training program for employees in positions of a sensitive nature due to responsibilities involving interface with government officials, marketing, sales or purchasing; Developed amendments to NYNEX Code of Business Conduct.

October 1987 - October 1993

Chairman; Commissioner -- Michigan Public Service Commission -- Lansing

Administrator of \$15-million agency responsible for regulating Michigan's public utilities, telecommunications services, and intrastate trucking, and establishing an effective state energy policy; Appointed by Democratic Governor James Blanchard; Promoted to Chairman by Republican Governor John Engler (1991) and reappointed (1993).

Initiated case-handling guideline that eliminated agency backlog for first time in 23 years while reorganizing to downsize agency from 240 employees to 205 and eliminate top tier of management; MPSC received national recognition for fashioning incentive plans in all regulated industries based on performance, service quality, and infrastructure improvement.

Closely involved in formulation and passage of regulatory reform law (Michigan Telecommunications Act of 1991) that has served as a model for other states; rejuvenated dormant twelve-year effort and successfully lobbied the Michigan Legislature to exempt the Commission from the Open Meetings Act, a controversial step that shifted power from the career staff to the three commissioners.

Attachment A

Elected Chairman of the Board of the National Regulatory Research Institute (at Ohio State University); Adjunct Professor of Legislation, American University's Washington College of Law and Thomas M. Cooley Law School; Member of NARUC Executive, Gas, and International Relations Committees, Steering Committee of U.S. Environmental Protection Agency/State of Michigan Relative Risk Analysis Project, and Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Task Force on Natural Gas Deliverability; Eisenhower Exchange Fellow to Japan and NARUC Fellow to the Kennedy School of Government; Ethics Lecturer for NARUC.

August 1985 - October 1987

Acting Associate Deputy Under Secretary of Labor; Executive Assistant to the Deputy Under Secretary -- U.S. Department of Labor -- Washington DC

Member of three-person management team directing the activities of 60-employee agency responsible for promoting use of labor-management cooperation programs. Supervised a legal team in a study of the effects of U.S. labor laws on labor-management cooperation that has received national recognition and been frequently cited in law reviews (<u>U.S. Labor Law and the Future of Labor-Management Cooperation</u>, w/S. Schlossberg, 1986).

January 1983 - August 1985

Senate Majority General Counsel; Chief Republican Counsel -- Michigan Senate -- Lansing

Legal Advisor to the Majority Republican Caucus and Secretary of the Senate; Created and directed 7-employee Office of Majority General Counsel; Counsel, Senate Rules and Ethics Committees; Appointed to the Michigan Criminal Justice Commission, Ann Arbor Human Rights Commission and Washtenaw County Consumer Mediation Committee.

March 1982 - January 1983

Assistant Legal Counsel -- Michigan Governor William Milliken -- Lansing

Legal and Labor Advisor (member of collective bargaining team); Director, Extradition and Clemency; Appointed to Michigan Supreme Court Sentencing Guidelines Committee, Prison Overcrowding Project, Coordination of Law Enforcement Services Task Force.

October 1979 - March 1982

Appellate Litigation Attorney -- National Labor Relations Board -- Washington DC

Attachment A

Other Significant Speeches and Publications

- Filing for Bankruptcy Isn't the Right Solution for Puerto Rico (Forbes Online, November 2015)
- The "A" Rating (Edison Electric Institute Perspectives, May/June 2009)
- Perspective: Don't Fence Me Out (Public Utilities Fortnightly, October 2004)
- Climate Change and the Electric Power Sector: What Role for the Global Financial Community (during Fourth Session of UN Framework Convention on Climate Change Conference of Parties, Buenos Aires, Argentina, November 3, 1998)(unpublished)
- Regulation UnFettered: The Fray By the Bay, Revisited (<u>National Regulatory Research Institute Quarterly Bulletin</u>, December 1997)
- The Feds Can Lead...By Getting Out of the Way (<u>Public Utilities Fortnightly</u>, June 1, 1996)
- Ethical Considerations Within Utility Regulation, w/M. Cummins (<u>National Regulatory</u> Research Institute Quarterly Bulletin, December 1993)
- Legal Challenges to Employee Participation Programs (American Bar Association, Atlanta, Georgia, August 1991) (unpublished)
- Proprietary Information, Confidentiality, and Regulation's Continuing Information Needs: A State Commissioner's Perspective (Washington Legal Foundation, July 1990)

Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC Summary of Rebuttal Testimony of Steven M. Fetter Docket No. E-7, Sub 1214

Utilizing my past experience as a state utility commission chairman and head of a major utility ratings practice, I respond to Public Staff's recommendation for an "equitable 50-50 sharing" of coal combustion residual compliance costs and discuss how the adoption of such a recommendation would be inappropriate and would be viewed negatively by the credit rating agencies and investors.

To begin with, there is no dispute that strong credit ratings are beneficial for both utility customers and investors. Thus, I have long testified that a regulated utility should endeavor to hold ratings no lower than 'Baal' / 'BBB+', with a longer-term goal of moving into (or maintaining in) the 'A' category. Accordingly, with the Company now holding S&P and Moody's ratings in the 'A' category, I encourage both the Commission and the Company to seek to maintain those ratings at current levels after conclusion of this proceeding.

Support for Duke Energy Carolinas' credit ratings comes from both quantitative and qualitative factors, both of which are positive factors in the agencies' assessments of the Company's ratings. Unfortunately, the Public Staff's "sharing" recommendation undercuts both of these aspects of the Company's credit profile. The "equitable 50-50 sharing" proposal is inconsistent with the core regulatory principle that prudently incurred costs should be recovered in customer rates. That principle is fundamental to the regulatory compact that undergirds investor willingness to provide needed funding for public utilities in exchange for a fair return on investment. Public Staff witnesses would abandon that principle, and instead propose that the Commission adopt an arbitrary cost recovery standard that would allow for disallowances without any finding of imprudence, and with the quantification of what they view to be inappropriate costs being "speculative." Based upon my background as a regulator and member of the financial community, I believe that stark movement away from traditional ratemaking principles, which

Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC Summary of Rebuttal Testimony of Steven M. Fetter Docket No. E-7, Sub 1214

would be a clear break with past Commission precedent, would shake the perceptions of investors and increase the costs of both equity and debt capital, an impact that ultimately lands at the doorstep of the customer.

Since the filing of my testimony in this case, several Parties have reached partial settlements on several issues. Although settlements are often viewed positively by the rating agencies, the key issue of cost recovery treatment of coal ash remains unsettled. The financial community will continue to closely watch and assess the resolution of that issue. An adverse decision on coal ash recovery would weigh against the positive views afforded the partial settlements that have been executed between the Parties. If Public Staff's equitable sharing recommendation were to be coupled with the negative impact from the current pandemic on the utility sector, I see a weakening in both quantitative measures and qualitative confidence that would likely jeopardize the Company's current ratings status, as the rating agencies have so indicated.

Accordingly, my recommendation is that the Company should seek to achieve excellent operational performance going forward, and the Commission should sustain the ongoing constructive regulatory environment, which together should maintain the Company's credit ratings no lower than their current levels within the 'A' category.

Page 90

| 1 | |
|---|--|
| | |
| 2 | |

3

5

6

7

8

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

MR. MEHTA: Chair Mitchell, Mr. Fetter is available for cross examination and examination by the Commission.

4 CROSS EXAMINATION BY MR. GRANTMYRE:

- Q. Mr. Fetter, this is Bill Grantmyre with the Public Staff. If you could turn to page 19 of your testimony.
 - A. I am there.
- Q. Could you read the first sentence -- full sentence into the record, please?
- A. "Mr. Junis admits that Public Staff did not conduct a prudence review and acknowledges that it is possible that no imprudence occurred back when the Company's decisions were made."
- Q. Can you point to the exact page and line number in Mr. Junis' testimony where he states it is possible that no imprudence occurred back when the Company's decisions were made?
 - A. (Witness peruses document.)

Okay. On page 16 of my testimony, I give a response about the equitable sharing proposal. And I say:

"First let me provide an excerpt from the testimony of Mr. Junis, which together with Mr. Maness'

1

3

4

testimony, recommends the adoption of an equitable sharing of CCR compliance costs between the Company and

its shareholders."

testi mony?

And then I go to the quote:

5

6

"The Public Staff did not conduct a prudence review of DEC decision-making at the time the ash

7

basins were constructed."

8

9

10

. .

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

Q. But where in Mr. Junis' testimony does he state that it is possible, or acknowledges that it is possible that there was no imprudence? That's the part I'm looking for. And if I could help you, I could go through Mr. Junis' testimony with you, and I would direct you to -- sorry, do you have Mr. Junis'

- A. I do not have it right in hand. But I think the sentence I read matches what I said in my answer on page 19.
- Q. Well, you said that Mr. Junis acknowledges that there was no imprudence, and I'm looking for where he said that.
- A. I'm sorry, sir. "Mr. Junis admits that

 Public Staff did not conduct a prudence review." And
 then I go back to Junis' words, "the Public Staff did
 not conduct a prudence review."

Q. But he did not acknowledge that there was no imprudence. Okay. Let me read to you out of Mr. Junis' testimony, and perhaps you could tell me which one of these clauses that he says there was no imprudence.

Now, I'll start on page 7, lines 13 through 19. It says:

"DEC," that is Duke Energy Carolinas, "has culpability for environmental violations, even without a traditional imprudence. The Company had a duty to comply with long-standing North Carolina environmental regulations, and it failed that duty many times over many years at every coal-fired power plant it owns in North Carolina. The Company should not be able to claim, in order to generate electricity, it had to create groundwater contamination."

Now, where in that statement does it say that there was no imprudence -- he acknowledges there was no imprudence?

A. I think in the words you said, that he came up with the standard of culpability, and he pointed to other environmental regulations or statutes. Nowhere in that sentence that you read indicates that they found imprudence. They found this thing called

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

culpability. And when Mr. Junis was on the stand, I listened. And since I was not familiar with the concept of culpability, I went to my -- one of my reference volumes, "The Process of Ratemaking," and this is volume 2. There are two volumes of this size. And I looked in the back on prudent investment and prudent management in the index, and there were 35 subcategories discussing various means of assessing prudence and what it means. And I found nowhere in the two-volume text any mention of culpable or culpability.

So it appeared to me that Mr. Junis had not thought to do a prudence review, and indeed admitted that he did not do a prudence review, and that he had this new theory of culpability. And since prudence -- the concept of prudence began in 1923 in a dissent from Justice Brandeis of the US Supreme Court, and so in three years we're going to have the centennial of commemorating prudence reviews.

Culpability would be a new concept. And if the Commission were to adopt that concept, it would be movement away from what I was familiar as chairman of the Michigan Commission where produce was a bright line standard, and I believe all of the other Commissions across the country.

1

2

3

4 5

6

7

8

10

11

12 13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

Well, I'll read you another quote he has, and 0. it's on page 13, and he says:

"I note that the equitable sharing recommendation is not based on the imprudence standard, which would result in 100 percent disallowance. But instead is based in part on DEC's culpability for failure to comply with environmental regulations for the protection of groundwater and surface water. Therefore, a summary of those environmental regulations is important for understanding how DEC has been cul pabl e. "

Now, don't you agree that failure to comply with environmental regulations and contaminating the groundwater is imprudence?

Α. Mr. Junis did not find that it was imprudent. He cited other environmental statutes and tried to bring them into a ratemaking process. And I know yesterday Public Staff counsel pointed to statutory citation 62-133(d) and stated which does not require a showing of imprudence.

And so I went back -- I went to that statute, because I was kind of surprised at that statement, and (d), which is a catchall at the end of the statute, says:

"The Commission shall consider all other material facts of record that will enable it to determine what are reasonable and just rates."

I read that sentence to mean reasonable and just rates falling in both directions, toward consumers and also the utility. And then I went to the very first provision of that statute:

"In fixing the rates for any public utility subject to the provisions of this chapter," and then I leave out language that doesn't apply, "the Commission shall fix such rates as shall be fair both to the public utilities and to the consumer."

And so ever since I started reading the documents in this proceeding, beginning with Garrett and Moore, this floating idea that counsel has told the witnesses -- that Public Staff has told the witnesses that prudence doesn't matter in coming to the determinations here, I felt uncomfortable. And now, looking at the statutory cite that Ms. Luhr gave yesterday, to me, the specific language of provision (a) carries much more weight than the catchall of provision (d) at the end of that statute. And to go in another direction would be a departure from what virtually every Commission is doing in the country.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

10

11

12

13 14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

0. And I will also read to you from page 65, lines 10 to 13 where it states -- Mr. Junis states:

"Even where some Company actions or omissions appear imprudent, such a failure to employ a comprehensive groundwater monitoring system at a much earlier date, quantification of costs directly resulting from the acts or omission would be specul ati ve. "

- Α. Yes, I understand. I have a problem with that as well.
- Q. Now, in this case, there was 0kay. presentation, and he cites in his testimony the EPA studies in the early 1980s showing that there was leachate from the coal ash ponds and they recommended increased monitoring. But yet Duke Energy Carolinas did not do any additional monitoring, install any monitoring wells. Now, wouldn't you call that imprudent that they didn't -- when they knew that this was an issue, that EPA had presented it, and they had not taken any action and instead continued to put ash into unlined ponds?

Objection, Chair Mitchell. MR. MEHTA: I mean, again, this witness is not here with respect to whatever the EPA or -- in fact,

| l | |
|---|--|
| | |
| | |
| _ | |

3 4

5

6

7

8

10

11

12 13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

Mr. Grantmyre's question really, I think, deals with EPRI. But regardless, he's not here for that purpose. We have other witnesses here for that purpose. One of them we just heard from. Two of them are coming up. I don't believe that it is a proper question to be posed to this witness.

MR. GRANTMYRE: Well, I'll move on to my other lines of testimony.

- Q. Could you go to page 7 of your testimony.
- Α. (Witness peruses document.) I'm there.
- Q. Now, at the top, you have the chart. It says "comparability between agencies' rating categories"; do you see that?
 - Α. Yes, sir.
- 0. And would you agree that Duke Energy Carolinas, under Moody's, has an Aa2 rating for senior secured; would you agree to that?
- I believe that's true. But when I do my analysis, I look at the unsecured rating because that tells the true intrinsic financial strength of a utility. And so that rating on an unsecured basis would be the A1 rating.
 - Now, in North Carolina, you heard -- you may Q.

or may not have heard testimony, but there was earlier testimony from one of the witnesses on cross examination that Duke Energy Carolinas has 81 percent of its long-term debt as first mortgage taxable bonds. Were you -- did you hear that?

- A. I listened or read a lot of testimony, but I will accept -- I mean, the record speaks for itself, so if that's what the record says, I'll accept that.
- Q. Now, if there was 81 percent first mortgage bonds, wouldn't the fact that the first mortgage bond rating be very important if that's what they're issuing?
- A. Well, here's the situation. The difference between a secure debt like you described, the first mortgage bonds, versus the A1 rating I talked about is that, if the Company were to go into bankruptcy, then the individuals who hold the first mortgage bonds have collateral that they can go after. The bondholders who do not have a secured interest and bought based on the A1 rating would have -- would get online as a creditor behind that 81 percent of first mortgage bondholders.

And that's why, in the hundred proceedings
I've been in, if they relate to ratings, I look at the unsecured rating because it tells the intrinsic

1 2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

Page 99

Session Date: 9/16/2020

financial worth of that entity and the odds that it might someday go into bankruptcy or default.

- Q. Would you accept, subject to check, that, in Duke Energy Carolinas' E-1, Item 34, which they filed in this case, when they listed the first mortgage bond ratings that were all their debts, that they listed the AA -- Aa2 rating which is the first mortgage bond rating for senior secured rather than the issuer rating?
- Α. They listed that as the rating for the first mortgage bonds?
 - 0. Yes.
 - That was very accurate what they did. Α. Yeah.
- 0. 0kay. Now, you will admit that, if Aa2 --Duke Energy -- Duke Energy Corporation has a Baa1 Moody's rating for issuer; would you agree to that?
 - Α. This is the parent company, you're saying?
 - 0. Yes.
 - Α. Yes, I believe that's accurate.
- 0. And your Duke Energy Carolinas issuer rating at A1 on Moody's is three ratings above Duke Energy Corporation; would you agree to that?
 - That would be accurate. Α.
 - Q. Now, isn't it true that Duke Energy Carolinas

23 24

Page 100

Session Date: 9/16/2020

__

has an advantage over some other electric utilities in issuing bonds because, in not every state, utilities are able to issue first mortgage bonds?

- A. Well, I think utilities are able to issue first mortgage bonds. Over the past 10 or 15 years they've moved away from that because it allows them greater flexibility with regard to internal structuring. So Duke has made a strategic decision to issue first mortgage bonds for its own reasons. But almost every utility can issue a first mortgage bond. Most of them choose not to at this point.
- Q. The -- as I understand it, Duke Energy
 Kentucky does not have a senior secured credit rating;
 are you aware of that?
- A. I didn't look at -- I didn't look at Duke Energy Kentucky.
- Q. Now, with respect to -- I know that you'll be testifying next week or thereafter on Progress Energy, but Progress Energy has a senior secured rating of Aa3; are you aware of that?
- A. Yeah. One notch below on all the ratings except for the S&P rating, I think.
- Q. And their issuer rating is A2, which again is one rating below Duke Energy Carolinas; are you aware

Page 101

Session Date: 9/16/2020

| 1 | of | that? |
|---|----|-------|
| | | |

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

- A. Yes, I agree with you.
- Q. And would you accept, subject to check, that the stipulation -- stipulations entered into by the Public Staff and Duke Energy Carolinas and Duke Energy Progress show that Duke Energy Carolinas has a 4.27 percent embedded cost rate of debt in this case as of May 31, 2020?
 - A. I'll accept that.
- Q. And Duke Energy Progress has a 4.05 percent embedded cost to debt; would you accept that?
 - A. I will accept that.
- Q. And based on my lawyer math, that's a 22 basis-point differential; would you agree? 27 minus 5 is 22?
- A. Well, I'm a lawyer too, so you better say those numbers slowly so I can keep up.
 - Q. Okay. We'll work on it.

And can you explain why Duke Energy Progress, even though it has a lower credit rating, has a, significantly, 22 basis-point lower cost of debt?

A. So that's a good question, because it -- the difference turns on when the debt has been issued. And that's why, when I talk about trying to avoid a

Page 102

Session Date: 9/16/2020

1

234

6

5

7

9

10 11

12

14

13

15

16 17

18

IC

19

20

21

22

23

24

downgrade. Because after the downgrade has occurred, any debt that is issued keeps its cost for the life of the debt, even if the credit rating is then once again upgraded. And so you provided the classic example where timely -- when you -- the time that you issue debt, that's the cost of debt from anywhere from 5, to 10, to 30 years.

- Q. Well, if Duke Energy Carolinas was downgraded one grade, it would be the same grade, whether it's first mortgage debt or issuer rating, as Duke Energy Progress; is that correct?
- A. If it was downgraded one notch on the Moody's scale, that is an accurate statement.
- Q. And will you accept, subject to check, that, although Duke Energy Progress is one grade lower, in late August of this year they issued \$600 million in first mortgage bonds at a 2-and-a-half percent interest rate?
- A. I mean, I haven't checked it, but if you tell me that, I'll accept that.
 - Q. Excuse me just one minute.
 - A. Yes, sir.
- Q. Now, this is not in the cross examination package in this case, but you'll see it in your

Page 103 Progress case, and I'll just go through it very 1 2 briefly. It is the credit ratings that -- listed by 3 Dr. Woolridge in the Progress Energy case being 4 Rebuttal Exhibit RBH-15, page 1 of 2. And what it does 5 is --MR. MEHTA: Chair Mitchell, if 6 7 Mr. Grantmyre is going to be asking Mr. Fetter 8 about a document, he needs to put the document in front of Mr. Fetter. And if the document is in the 10 Progress case or in the Progress exhibits, it's 11 still got a number, we can still find it, we can 12 still send it to Mr. Fetter. There's actually a 13 process that the Commission set up for this very 14 purpose which the Public Staff seems to have 15 forgotten about. And it's time that the Public 16 Staff actually followed the process that the 17 Commission established for getting documents in 18 front of witnesses. 19 MR. GRANTMYRE: Okay. It's Public Staff 20 Number 96 for Progress Energy. 21 MR. MEHTA: Would you send it to --22 well, you can send it to me, I'll --23 MR. GRANTMYRE: I believe you already 24 have it, don't you?

1

2

3

4 5

6 7

8

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19 20

21

22 23

24

MR. MEHTA: I'm not sure I've got it set up the way that it's that easy to send. But I will find it or try to find it.

MR. GRANTMYRE: In 30 seconds I'm going to be finished with the exhibit.

CHAIR MITCHELL: All right. Let's --Mr. Grantmyre, ask your question, and then we can determine if the witness needs to see the document.

- Q. Okay. Will you accept, subject to check, that on this, Duke Energy Carolinas has an issuer rating of A1, which we've already talked about?
- I believe that Duke Energy Carolinas has an Α. issuer rating for Moody's of A1.
- 0. And that on this whole list of 78 companies, operating companies, there were only five A1 companies with issuer ratings and none above A1?

CHAIR MITCHELL: All right.

Mr. Grantmyre, we need to put the document in front of the witness. Mr. Grantmyre, identify the document for DEC counsel so he can find it and put it in front of his witness.

MR. GRANTMYRE: Public Staff Number 96, rebuttal -- potential rebuttal witness in 1219. MR. MEHTA: Mr. Grantmyre, is that in

Page 105 the consolidated hearing section or --1 2 MR. GRANTMYRE: This is in the Duke 3 Energy Progress section. 4 MR. MEHTA: Duke Energy Progress Public Staff Number 96 Rebuttal? 5 MR. GRANTMYRE: 6 Yes. 7 MR. MEHTA: Chair Mitchell, I'll try to 8 locate it. Thank you. (Pause.) Now, we'll come back to that. But on page 9 10 0. 11 of your testimony --12 Α. I'm there. 13 Now, on pages 15 and 16, you talk about 0. 14 volatility and capital markets and the 2008, 2009 15 recession. Some people call it the great recession. 16 You're not implying that this an ordinary 17 circumstance that happens frequently, are you? 18 I'm not. But I think, since I filed this 19 testimony and before I filed the Progress testimony, we 20 had COVID-19 arise. Which, if the 2008, 2009 was a 21 once-in-60- or 80-year event, COVID-19 appears to be 22 the first such pandemic since 1918. So we're talking more than a -- in fact, the pandemic occurred even 23 24 before prudent investment was an issue in cases.

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

Page 106

Session Date: 9/16/2020

That is why I will acknowledge Duke Energy Carolinas has a strong credit rating. My concern comes, we don't know how COVID-19 will play out over I read an article that Dominion in Virginia, on time. June 30th when the stimulus was still going on -- you know, the extraordinary stimulus from the federal government was going on -- they had \$116.6 million in uncollectibles. I know that Duke Energy Carolinas and I think Progress have made a filing about what -- how their uncollectibles are going. I think, until we know about how COVID-19 plays out, my advice to every utility and every regulator, whether utility has a strong rating, or even more importantly a weak rating, not to drive a downgrade. And that would be my position here.

I acknowledge that there was a strong rating, but I think it would be a mistake to just take as a given that a downgrade doesn't matter.

- 0. Now, you read portions of North Carolina General Statute 62-133; did you not?
 - Α. I read it?
- Didn't you read -- just read it into the 0. record?
 - Α. Yeah, I read it out to you, yes.

- Q. Yeah. Now, you will admit that nowhere in the statute does it say that rates have to be set to avoid a downgrade, do you?
 - A. No, it does not.
- Q. And nowhere in it does it say that rates have to be set to increase the stock price of utilities or maintain stock prices of utilities?
 - A. No, it does not say that.
- Q. Now, you understand that Duke Energy
 Corporation has a great deal of liquidity, don't you,
 in case they needed to borrow during the 60-day
 downturn of the COVID?
- A. I read the testimony of Mr. Young and Mr. Newlin, so I will accept what they say on the record with regard to liquidity. I haven't studied it.
- Q. Now, you also talk on that same page at the bottom about timely recovery of associated costs. And isn't it true that rating agencies look very favorably upon riders?
- A. Yes, riders are viewed positively by the rating agency.
- Q. And I'm going to read to you four riders that Duke Energy Carolinas has, and if you would acknowledge or not acknowledge whether these -- each of these would

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

Session Date: 9/16/2020

Page 108

1 be positive for Duke Energy Carolinas.

Annual fuel costs adjustment rider?

- A. Virtually every utility in the U.S. has that, so it's a positive.
- Q. Annual renewable energy adjustment rider, frequently called REPS?
- A. I think, for utilities that are faced with having to meet renewable goals within a certain time frame, I think that's popular among the utilities that are in that situation.
- Q. Annual demand-side management in energy efficiency rider; are you familiar with that?
- A. Has it frozen for everyone or just on my screen?
- Q. I think you're up and running again. We can hear you.

CHAIR MITCHELL: Mr. Fetter, we're able to hear you. Would you please answer the question?

THE WITNESS: My screen just went blank for about 15 seconds. Could I hear the question again?

Q. Yeah. The rider I was talking about is the annual demand-side management and energy efficiency rider.

Page 109

A. That would be a positive. And like I said with regard to renewables, for those utilities that have that as a target, many of them have that kind of rider.

Q. And also the last of the four is the annual competitive procurement of renewable energy rider.

A. I would say it's a positive. I'm less familiar with that kind of rider. I do know that, over the last 10 years, rider -- riders are much more popular as regulatory policy across the country.

Q. Now, it also -- on line 22 of your testimony, same page, page number 9, you talk about timely recovery.

And are you aware that there was an agreement for, I believe, \$1.6 billion to go into a deferred account for grid improvements in this case between the Public Staff and Duke Energy Carolinas, although it has not yet been approved by the Commission? Are you aware of that?

A. I reviewed the settlement terms, so I would have read that there was a grid component.

Q. Now, wouldn't that be credit positive?

A. I would say the settlement overall would be viewed positively by the rating agency.

Page 110

Session Date: 9/16/2020

Q. And --

- A. But the big issue, of course, is the coal ash decision. That would lead the rating agencies to await the conclusion of this whole proceeding.
- Q. Now, when you said the overall settlement was positive, that would include the 9.6 percent ROE that Company agreed to with the Public Staff?
- A. The rating agencies give great deference to decision-making made by a utility with regard to a settlement.
- Q. And also the 52 percent common equity that was part of the agreement?
- A. It would be the same answer, that to the extent that the remaining portions of this case come in in a positive direction in the eyes of the rating agencies, they would view that settlement agreement, once approved, as a positive element as well.
- Q. Now, with regard to also Duke Energy
 Carolinas and Duke Energy Progress, there was enacted
 in the legislature securitization of storm costs. And
 Duke Energy Carolinas has stated they intend to file a
 securitization petition.

Now, would you agree that that is a -- credit agency's like securitization and view it favorably,

THE WITNESS: I'm here.

Mr. Grantmyre.

23

| 1 | |
|---|--|
| | |

Q. Mr. Fetter, if we could go to --

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

10

11

12 13

14

15

16 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

MR. MEHTA: Chair Mitchell, this is
Kiran Mehta. Sorry to interrupt, Mr. Grantmyre,
but I did want you to know, Mr. Grantmyre, that
Mr. Fetter does have now available the -- I think
it was PS 90 that we were searching for. To the
extent that you have any questions regarding that
document, he should have it.

CHAIR MITCHELL: All right.

- Mr. Grantmyre, you may proceed.
- Q. Yes. It would be Public Staff 96.

And would you accept, subject to check, that Duke Energy Carolinas, by Moody's, is only one of five A1-rated companies out of the 78?

- A. I haven't looked across it, but I'll accept that it's one of five on this list.
- Q. And there were no companies listed higher than A1 on this list consisting of two pages?
- A. Yeah. I mean, the list speaks for itself, but I'll accept your description.
- Q. Now, if we could turn to page 11 of your testimony, I believe you're already there.
 - A. I'm there.
 - Q. When you talk about predictability in line

Page 113

6 --

- A. Yes.
- Q. Now, wouldn't you agree that the Commission's February 2020 Dominion Energy North Carolina rate decision -- rate case decision provides predictability?
- A. Well, I would point out what the investment community looked at was the 2018 decision in which the Commission spoke and said:

"The Commission will address the appropriate amortization period in DEC's next general rate case.

And unless future imprudence is established, will permit earning a full return on the unamortized balance."

I must say, when the Dominion order came out talking about a smaller utility in the North Carolina utility universe, it has caused some concern on the part of the financial community, and that's why they are watching so closely this case, apart from the settlement, to see how the coal ash issues come out.

- Q. Now, you've heard of BofA Securities, have you not, the former Merrill Lynch?
 - A. I have heard of them.
- Q. And Mr. Young, in his direct testimony -- I'm sorry, his rebuttal testimony, included an exhibit by

Session Date: 9/16/2020

Page 114

1 BofA Securities; are you aware of that?

- A. I didn't notice what exhibits Mr. Young put in. I just reviewed some of his -- either -- I think I mostly listened to his testimony.
- Q. Okay. But you would agree, then, that BofA Securities is a reputable securities company dealing with particularly Duke Energy?
- A. I would say they're a reputable entity within the financial community.
- Q. Now, would you accept, subject to check, that on September 9th of 2020, BofA Securities issued a paper -- a research paper stating -- and I'll give it to you before you testify --

MR. MEHTA: Chair Mitchell, again,
Mr. Grantmyre is reading from a document that he
has not put in front of the witness, and I object.

CHAIR MITCHELL: All right.

Mr. Grantmyre, where are you going with your question?

MR. GRANTMYRE: I'm just going to give a quick summary of what it says.

MR. MEHTA: Well, I mean, a quick summary of what it says for Mr. Grantmyre doesn't substitute for the witness being able to review the

Page 115

Session Date: 9/16/2020

document, review the context and whatever is being said in the document for himself. And I do not believe that it is appropriate for Mr. Grantmyre, particularly in the circumstances in which we find ourselves in, operating remotely, to proceed in this fashion, and I object.

CHAIR MITCHELL: All right. Let me -
let me hear the question before I rule on the

objection. Mr. Grantmyre, ask the question so I

can determine how to rule on Mr. Mehta's objection.

MR. GRANTMYRE: Well, first of all, this was just issued last Thursday, so it could not be part of our cross examination exhibits, but --

MR. MEHTA: I understand that. But again, Chair Mitchell, there's a process for that which the Public Staff has not followed.

CHAIR MITCHELL: All right. Mr. Mehta,

MR. GRANTMYRE: Where -- where's the

Commission order saying we have to provide it?

CHAIR MITCHELL: All right. Gentlemen,

I need you to not talk over one another. We have a

court reporter who is transcribing this

conversation, and she cannot do so when you guys

are talking over one another.

All right. Mr. Grantmyre, let me know what your question is for the witness so I can determine how to rule on Mr. Mehta's objection.

MR. GRANTMYRE: Are you aware that BofA
Securities updated Duke Energy Corporation to a buy
for its stock from a neutral citing the expected
outcome of this case being similar to the Dominion
North -- Energy North Carolina decision by the
North Carolina Utilities Commission?

CHAIR MITCHELL: All right. I'm going to overrule Mr. Mehta's objection as to this specific question. Mr. Grantmyre, if you go beyond this question, I'll have to ask that you put the document in the witness' hands.

MR. GRANTMYRE: This is my last question on the document.

CHAIR MITCHELL: All right. Mr. Fetter, you may answer the question, please, sir.

THE WITNESS: Until I read everything that that document says about coal ash decision-making, I cannot offer an opinion on the one sentence that counsel read.

Q. Mr. Fetter, we will agree that, before you

Session Date: 9/16/2020

Page 117

testify next time, you'll have a full copy. Okay?

- A. I appreciate that, Counsel.
- Q. Now, on line 12 of page 11, you state that Duke Energy Carolinas is likely to suffer a detriment or downgrade, but there's no certainty, is there, that there's going to be any credit downgrade?
- A. I'm going to read the paragraph to myself, if that's okay.
 - Q. Okay. That's fine.
 - A. (Witness peruses document.)
- Okay. I've read it to myself. It's my generalized description of the utility industry and as it relates to financial issues. And if you'll ask your question again, I'm ready to answer.
- Q. The question is really there's no certainty whatsoever that, if the Commission rules as they did in Duke -- Dominion Energy North Carolina, that there would be any downgrade to Duke Energy Carolinas' credit rating; is that correct?
- A. Okay. Let me say, if they rule like they did in the Dominion case, a downgrade would be possible.

 But what would be certain is that Duke Energy

 Carolinas' credit profile will weaken. So it will move towards a negative outlook or a downgrade. And one or

profile, would be weaker than it is as we sit here today.

Q. Now, you may or may not have been listening, but earlier there was an exhibit which showed that, by

both of those might occur, but the certainty is that

Duke Energy Carolinas' financial profile, credit

but earlier there was an exhibit which showed that, by adopting the Public Staff position of a 25- or 27-year amortization with no return, versus Duke's position of a five-year amortization with a return, that over three years, the difference between the increased interest cost and the reduction in the revenue requirement was going to be \$241 million to the benefit of the customers.

Now, how is it to the customer -- you say that to the detriment of ratepayers. How is it to the detriment of ratepayers that they have a \$241 million revenue requirement reduction over a period of three years?

A. Because investors would look at the sentence I read for the 2018 decision, and they would say the Commission has gone completely in the opposite direction. And so even though you describe the impact of \$241 million, I think you said, investors will say, what can we rely on with regard to this Commission in

1
 2
 3

4

5

6 7

8

10

1112

1314

15

16

17 18

19

20

21

22

2324

the future. And as you've heard already this week from some of the Company's financial people and included in my testimony, the qualitative aspects of the credit rating process are just as important as the quantitative aspects. And this would strike a severe blow to the financial community relying on the words of this Commission in 2018.

- Q. But you will agree, on pages 14 of 15, you talk about constructive regulation; is that correct?
 - A. I do, yes.
- Q. And would you agree that when the Wall Street analysis and rating agencies talk about constructive regulation, they're talking about constructive from the perspective of investors and not customers; is that correct?
- A. But when I'm talking about it, it's from the perspective of everyone who is involved in my regulatory experience in Michigan, which would be utilities, other stakeholders, and consumers.
- Q. Okay. But the Wall Street, Moody's, and S&P as I read it, and Wall Street analysts, they're talking about the perspective of investors as far as the credit rating, isn't it?
 - A. Well, let me divide what you just said.

Page 120

Session Date: 9/16/2020

Credit rating agencies don't have a dog in that fight.

Credit rating agencies don't make more money if Duke

Energy or any of its subsidiaries does well, or lose

money if a decision comes down that harms the utility

stockholders. Credit rating agencies' credibility

comes from offering their views on the current

financial credit profile of its various utility

industry issuers and the things that could happen

either positively or negatively.

what Moody's and S&P are doing. They -- I view -- as I said, they don't have a dog in this fight. I view them as umpires calling balls and strikes. And if the Commission were to go back from its 2018 statement and go full bore towards its Dominion treatment that it did a couple months ago, a few months ago, the rating agencies won't lose any money. They will write a report talking about how that affects their view of regulation in North Carolina and the impact on the utilities that are regulated by that body in North Carolina.

Q. But aren't the rating agencies, S&P and Moody's, they're paid by Duke and all the companies they rate; isn't that correct?

1

2

3 4

5

6

7

8

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

The structure is that they have a rating Α. relationship. And so they receive fees, but it's not based on a success fee or a negative fee. They are paid to do independent research and put out accurate information to investors. And if they just took the money and said what the companies wanted them to say, their insights would be worthless.

0. Now, in your testimony on page 18, you talk about prudently incurred costs.

And aren't you aware that this Commission, in multiple cases, has decided that some prudently incurred costs should be shared between ratepayers and investors?

- Α. Which cases are you talking about?
- Q. Various cases before the North Carolina Utility Commission. I'll give you an example. Executive compensation. In this case, it's going to be shared between the top five executives between ratepayers and the shareholders; are you aware of that?
- Well, I'm very much aware of the executive Α. compensation issues, I'm on the -- I chair the Governance and Human Resources Committee at Central Hudson Gas & Electric board. When a regulator does not allow full compensation to be charged against

ratepayers, whether you call it imprudent or unreasonable, they are making a determination that they don't think that amount of money is fair. And that's why even, under your statute here, where fair to utilities and consumers, they're making a judgment that, you know, a utility executive that makes X millions of dollars, it's not fair. And so they're following the specific language of Section A of that of that statute.

- Q. Now, you'd also agree that there's many times a sharing of the costs of board of directors' compensation and board of directors' expenses between shareholders and customers?
- A. And I think it's a very similar reason where they feel that the board has activities that are outside the regulatory sphere, and so they feel that if -- that fairness calls for it to be shared between ratepayers and shareholders.
- Q. And you're aware that this Commission, on some nuclear construction abandonment cases whereby the construction was abandoned, the Commission has ordered that the Company amortize the balance and recover it over a number of years but not earn a return?
 - A. Well, let me note something. During my six

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

years at the Michigan Commission, every day of those six years, we were dealing with the Midland nuclear plant abandonment in Midland, Michigan. And we ended up, despite the fact that it was abandoned three years before I went on the Commission, that we made our best judgment as to what was prudent in what they did and what was imprudent in what they did. And we gave a partial recovery with a very substantial disallowance for imprudent behavior.

And so I think my understanding of the nuclear abandonment cases here, the court did review and consider each concept. And I'd also note that, unlike Michigan, my understanding here in North Carolina is that there's a used and useful concept, which complicates the issue greatly compared to our prudency determination with regards to the Midland plant abandonment.

- Q. Now, I'll ask you to turn to Public Staff
 Rebuttal Exhibit -- I mean Cross Examination Exhibit
 Number 78. Do you happen to have that? It's the one that says stock price close.
- A. Would it be in -- let me see. Did you provide it in advance?
 - Q. Yes. It was provided as -- it was in our

have the document in front of me open.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

Session Date: 9/16/2020

| Q. | And I'll read the it says, "Stock price | |
|-----------|--|--|
| cl ose. " | And would you agree that one column has Duke | |

- Energy Corporation and the S&P 500 Index?
 - A. Yes.
- Q. And I'll call your attention to

 February 24th. And there's a footnote at the bottom
 basically saying that's the date that the

 North Carolina Commission issued the Dominion Energy

 North Carolina order. Do you see that?
 - A. Yes.
- Q. And I call your attention to March 3rd. You know, on February 24th, Duke was selling for \$102, closed at \$102.30. And on March 3rd it was down to \$95.61 --
 - A. Yup.
- Q. -- do you see that? And I know -- lawyer's math, I would represent that that's a drop of \$6.69 or a 6.5 percent drop in price.
 - A. Yes.
- Q. And over there on the other column, S&P 500, on February 24th it was \$3,226, and then on March 3rd it was down to \$3,003; do you see that?
- A. Yup.
 - Q. And again with lawyer's math, it's 223 points

Page 127 and it comes out to 6.9 percent.

A. Okay.

- Q. Now, in previous testimony before the Commission in this case, it was that the Dominion case caused a drop in the Duke Energy Corporation's stock price. Are you aware of that testimony?
 - A. Can you say that again, please, sir?
- Q. There was testimony that the Duke -- that the Dominion Energy North Carolina, or the VEPCO order caused a downgrade in the Duke Energy Corporation stock price.
 - A. You mean --

MR. MEHTA: Chair Mitchell, again,
Mr. Grantmyre is referring to testimony that he is
not putting in front of the witness.

MR. GRANTMYRE: It was verbal testimony by your chief financial officer.

MR. MEHTA: Which has been transcribed.

CHAIR MITCHELL: All right. Mr. Mehta,

I'm not sure I heard you object, but I'm going to

overrule the objection. I'm going to allow the

question to proceed. Go ahead, Mr. Grantmyre.

Q. Are you aware there was testimony that it caused a drop in the stock price of Duke Energy

1

Corporation?

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

| Α. | I | list | tened | to | Mr. | Υοι | ıng' s | test | i mor | ٦y, | and | he |
|--------|------|-------|-------|----|-----|------|--------|--------|-------|-----|-----|----|
| mi ght | have | sai d | that. | I | COL | al d | not | pi npc | i nt | it. | | |

- And would you say that the 6.5 percent drop 0. in the Duke price over those nine days or eight days, whatever it is, is less than the 6.9 percent drop in the S&P 500?
- Okay. Here's a problem with just looking at Α. numbers like this. As you -- as you said to me about 10 minutes ago and pulled out a BofA report, and they -- you indicate -- I guess I'll see it by next week, but you indicate that they're not real worried. And all during these days as these days go on, some people -- some analyst put out a report saying I'm very worried about the Dominion order. Others will put out a report saying I'm not worried about the Dominion order because it's a very small piece of North Carolina landscape. And I think the Commission will live up to what it said in 2018.

And so that's just examples of two or three factors that could influence a stock price. At the same time, Mr. Young talked about a collapse of the bond market leading up in early to mid-March, which has an impact on stocks. So it's hard to pinpoint any one

Page 129

Session Date: 9/16/2020

1

2

3

4

time.

5

6

7

8

7

10 11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

against what they said as recently as two years ago.

So it's what makes the market. You know, some

So I'm sure that the Dominion order would

people -- every time a share of stock is sold, someone sold it and someone bought it. So if everyone had the

investors. I'm sure others thought how could they go

factor with regard to just taking stock price closures,

comparing it to the S&P. There's also a utility index;

I don't know what that would have said during this

have caused concern for some analysts and some

same opinion, the stock market would not operate.

Q. And you would agree that, on this exhibit, on March 4th Duke closed at \$101.65, which was only \$0.65 lower than the February 24th price?

A. I mean, that's what the number says. We don't know what drove the stock up that day. I have a pretty strong feeling that a portion of the drop towards March 20 was the volatility in the bond market. But it also might have been an analyst report coming out and saying, you know, we've given the Dominion opinion more analysis, and we're beginning to get very much concerned about that decision.

So there are 50 or 100 factors that enter

. •

into impacting a stock price on any one day, and I think it's hard to just pinpoint one factor.

- Q. But as we mentioned before, the volatility in the bond market was only in the months of March and April, and wouldn't it be true that, if Duke Energy Progress could borrow \$600 million in first mortgage bonds at 30 years at 2.5 percent, that they're not affected by the volatility in the bond market, that there is none right now?
- A. Well, I'm not the person to describe that, but I believe Mr. Young described the commercial paper market was a concern during that period, because the bond market just fell like a knife through butter, and there was concern across the whole industry about the ability to deal with commercial paper and other short-term instruments.
- Q. But that was a very short period of 60 days or less; isn't that approximately correct?
- A. Well, you can see what happened in the span of 14 days here.
- Q. Thank you. I have no further questions, and I look forward to chatting with you in two weeks.
- A. I'll look forward to that, Counsel. Thank you.

- 1
- Α. That's my understanding.
- 2
- Q. Because they were abandoned?
- 3
- Α. That's the same as our plant being abandoned.

4 5

0. Now, coal ash, for example, Mr. Fetter, is the byproduct of coal combustion which generated

6

electricity for decades in North Carolina, correct?

7

Α. That is my understanding.

8 9

Mr. Grantmyre asked you questions concerning executive and board compensation, and at least his

10

questions implied that the Commission had disallowed

11

50 percent of the compensation for -- I'm not quite

12 13 sure why, but I think the implication was that

14

ratepayers.

0.

15

16

17

18

19

- 21
- 22
- 23
- 24

- 50 percent was disallowed. Did you get that implication as well? That appeared to be what he was saying, but I offered my view that it would appear the regulators, not only in North Carolina but across the entire country, make a determination in their -- back of their head about a fair allocation of what costs should go to
- 0. Would it affect your answer at all, Mr. Fetter, if I told you that the Company voluntarily reduces compensation for the top five executives and for the board members in that fashion in order to take

care of that fairness issue that you raised?

A. Well, if they do that, and it's accepted by regulators, then certainly that's fairness. And as I said, even if the regulator were to think, you know, we

could be a little more fair, I would not call it an

imprudent action on the part of the Company.

- Q. Mr. Grantmyre was asking you questions concerning, you know, a bunch of riders that he listed: fuel, REPS, demand-side management, other riders; do you recall those questions?
 - A. Yes.
- Q. And I think your answer was many, many, many jurisdictions have similar riders or other riders, correct?
- A. And, in fact, in my answer I think over the last 10 years, and upon further reflection sitting here, I recall being invited to Indiana to talk about trackers in 2007. So trackers have proliferated probably over the past 15 to 20 years in a way that have not been seen before. And when structured properly to take into account fairness to the utility and, also its customers, and also any other stakeholders, like environmentalists that have a stake in the issue, I think when structured properly, it's a

Q. And it's a positive development within utility regulation that impacts, maybe not uniformly, but impacts across the entire industry all utilities, because all utilities have some form of rider embedded into their rate structures; is that fair?

positive development within utility regulation.

- A. Yeah. I'd say all -- I'd say all. You know, maybe one or two drop out because of a certain circumstance. But the intent of a rider is for costs that are expected to occur not to require rate case to get those costs, often with a true-up to make sure, if the prediction is wrong, neither side suffers unfairness.
- Q. And then Mr. Grantmyre went through the DEC's stipulation of settlement with the Public Staff, and he pointed out to you various revisions and features of that settlement, and he asked you whether they were credit positive, and essentially most of them, I think, you answered were credit positive, correct?
- A. I did on this last one about the five-year return. As part of an overall settlement, it probably comes out as credit positive. If the big issue that looms and which we have various language from 2018 and 2020, that is the issue that will determine whether the

1 2

rating agencies come to a conclusion that the final decision in this case is credit positive, credit neutral, or credit negative.

4

5

3

0. And when you say "the big issue that looms," what are you talking about, Mr. Fetter?

6

Α. That would be the coal ash remediation issue and the large dollar figures attached to it.

8

7

0. Now, Mr. Fetter, is it fair to say that investors who contemplate where they're going to -- if they're going to invest in the utility sector, for example, what they're contemplating where they are going to invest, in what companies they're going to

9 10

11

12

13

invest, I guess we could say they vote with their wallets; is that right?

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

Α. They do. And they have an incredible amount of information that enters into their decision-making. I held up my book on the process of ratemaking earlier. Nowadays, investors -- institutional investors carry around an iPhone that's about 6 inches tall that has pretty much all information dating from the dawn of history right up until a few seconds ago. So they factor all of those issues in to whether they're going to pull the lever on buying or selling a stock or bond in the next 10 minutes.

| | 1 |
|---|---|
| | 2 |
| | 3 |
| | 4 |
| | 5 |
| | 6 |
| | 7 |
| | 8 |
| | 9 |
| 1 | 0 |
| 1 | 1 |
| 1 | 2 |
| 1 | 3 |
| 1 | 4 |
| 1 | 5 |
| | 6 |
| 1 | 7 |
| 1 | 8 |
| | 9 |
| 2 | 0 |
| 2 | 1 |
| 2 | 2 |
| 2 | 3 |

24

| Q. And utilities across the country are havin | g |
|--|---|
| to deal with the implications of the federal EPA CCR | |
| rule and any state-specific legislation in their | |
| particular jurisdictions dealing with coal ash, | |
| correct? | |

- A. Yes, definitely. And, in fact, I testified in Georgia Power's last rate case a year ago, and while I was not involved on the coal ash issue, like here, I got to hear a lot of testimony, I got to read a lot of testimony, and ultimately the decision came out that there would be a return of and on the coal ash remediation expenditures by Georgia Power.
- Q. And the -- did the testimony that you heard in the Georgia Power case involve, for example, the historical practices of Georgia Power --

MR. GRANTMYRE: I would object that I don't remember any questions on Georgia Power or the case. It's beyond the scope of cross examination.

CHAIR MITCHELL: Mr. Mehta?

MR. MEHTA: Chair Mitchell, the cross examination that Mr. Grantmyre proceeded with involved a number of questions regarding Duke Energy credit ratings, Duke Energy Carolinas'

1 2

3

4 5

6

7

8

10

11

12

13 14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

credit ratings, how strong they are and things of that nature. These -- this line of questioning goes directly to that line of questioning to demonstrate what might happen to those credit ratings and the financial position of the Company in terms of a potential outcome in this case.

CHAIR MITCHELL: All right. Well, I'm going to allow your question to -- I'm going to overrule Mr. Grantmyre's objection. I'm going to allow your question to proceed, and I'm going to ask you to move on and stick to redirect examination here. Help us -- as you question your witness, help us understand and stay on the same page with you with respect to from where your redirect examination flows, Mr. Mehta.

MR. MEHTA: Thank you, Chair Mitchell. Chair Mitchell, we've lost -- okay. You're back. Thank you. Looked like a moment of instability in the video right there.

0. All right. Mr. Fetter, I think the question was in the -- on the evidence that you heard in the Georgia Power case, was there evidence of historical practices of Georgia Power much like there has been in this case?

Page 138

- A. As I recall, it was very similar to types of evidence put in.
 - Q. And nevertheless, the Georgia Commission, the public service Commission came to a decision that allowed a return of and on the coal ash costs at issue in that case, correct?
 - A. Yes, they did.
 - Q. So, Mr. Fetter, if an investor is going to vote with its wallet, and has in front of it a choice with respect to a utility that received a return of and on its coal ash costs versus a utility that did not receive similar treatment, which one is the investor likely to pick and vote for with his wallet?
 - A. Well, as I said, many factors go in, but this would be a very big factor. And if they place great weight on it, they would prefer to go to a jurisdiction that would provide return of and on as opposed to one if they provided just return of, or even cut back the return of with no return.
 - Q. And, Mr. Fetter, I think last question.

 The -- you indicated, I think in your testimony -prefiled testimony and in answer to Mr. Fetter's [sic]
 questions, the potential for a negative outlook or
 downgrade of the Company's credit ratings.

Page 139

1

3

What impact do those kinds of rating agency actions have on the cost of capital for Duke Energy Carolinas?

A. Well, if there's -- if there's a downgrade, of course, there would be an immediate impact in the markets. An outlook negative may be less of an impact but also an impact. And as I said, when this decision comes out, the rating agencies will study it, and they may determine there is some negative aspects to this decision, or the regulatory climate in North Carolina is not quite as strong as it was in 2018. And the Company's credit profile may weaken, which, while it does not have an immediate impact on its outlook or rating, but it makes it more susceptible to a negative action later on because its credit profile would be weaker than as we sit here today.

17

16

Q. Thank you, Mr. Fetter.

Commissioner Brown-Bland.

18 19 MR. MEHTA: Chair Mitchell, I have no further questions of Mr. Fetter at this time.

20

going to move to questions on the Commission's --

CHAIR MITCHELL: All right.

22

21

questions from the Commissioners. I'll begin with

23

COMMISSIONER BROWN-BLAND: I have no

We are

Page 140

| Q | uesti | ons. |
|---|-------|------|
| - | | |

1

3

4

5

6

7

8

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

2 CHAIR MITCHELL: 0kay.

Commissioner Gray?

COMMISSIONER GRAY: No questions.

CHAIR MITCHELL: Commissioner

Clodfel ter?

COMMISSIONER CLODFELTER: Very briefly.

EXAMINATION BY COMMISSIONER CLODFELTER:

- Q. Good afternoon, Mr. Fetter.
- Α. Good afternoon, Commissioner.
- Q. Mr. Fetter, I assume -- would I be correct in assuming that the investment community and rating agencies fully understand that the 2018 order of the Commission is on appeal in the North Carolina Supreme Court?
- Α. Yes. In fact, Moody's had voted in -- I think in a May issuance that the appeals and also the Dominion order would be viewed as changing their credit positive view of the situation, depending on how the appeals turn out.
- 0. And in those appeals, the rating agencies and the investment community are aware that the parties who have taken the appeal contend that the Commission committed errors of law in its 2018 order. I assume

Do you remember that line of questioning?

And what would -- hypothetically, what would

Yes, I do.

Α.

Q.

22

23

Page 142

Session Date: 9/16/2020

1

3

5

6

7

8

10

11

12 13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

a creation of a coal ash rider, would that have a similar positive effect?

- A. Could you just give me a little description of what you would envision within such a tracker?
- Q. So just on a forward-going basis, having a rider set up like other riders, where there would be -- like a fuel cost rider. Let's say it's set up similar to a fuel cost rider.
- A. Commissioner, if I could just try to describe what it might be. So on an ongoing basis, it would compensate the Company for prudent coal ash expenditures with a true-up along the way to make sure that there was not unfairness in either direction.
 - Q. Yes. Use that example of the rider.
- A. And that would obviate -- to the extent it would be done on a timely basis with very little lag between expenditure and recovery, then there would be less of a need for a return on those investments.

 They'll get the money back much quicker.
 - Q. Okay. And can you think of --
- A. Is that -- that was my description. And if that's what you're envisioning, then a tracker or a rider could help in provide -- in getting rid of regulatory lag, obviating the need for a return because

of very long lag time.

Q. So my question to you is, as I hear your testimony, you are saying that there's the potential downgrade if the Commission ruled in this case similar to the Dominion rate case with respect to coal ash. And then I also heard you state that -- in the testimony today, that -- and I just want to clarify this. That if the Commission doesn't rule the same way as in 2018, that there would be a downgrade.

And so I just want to make sure; is that an accurate description of your testimony? Or -- well, go ahead and answer that.

A. If the Commission were to alter in this decision what it said in 2018, it could alter it substantially; it could alter it a little bit. And so there has to be some kind of quantitative analysis and qualitative analysis. So I'm not one of these witnesses who said -- who goes in and tells a Commissioner or a Commission if you don't follow the letter -- exactly every letter you wrote 2 years or 10 years ago, then the financial community is going to come down on you, you know, with a hammer.

There'll be an analysis as to investor expectation flowing from the 2018 decision, and then

the decision will be read certainly by the credit rating agencies as far as the explanation that the Commission gives if it moves a little bit or a lot off of what it said before. It -- as a bond rater, I didn't look at regulation as a strict liability standard. That there never could be a factor that might alter the situation from before.

And so my one piece of advice to the Commission, if you're going to move away from what you said so strongly 2018, provide the best explanation that you can, because that would benefit the credit rating agencies and the financial community to understand what has occurred and what might occur in the future.

- Q. Okay. Thank you for that answer. I don't have any further questions.
 - A. Thank you, Commissioner.

CHAIR MITCHELL: Commissioner Hughes?

COMMISSIONER HUGHES: Yes, just one

EXAMINATION BY COMMISSIONER HUGHES:

Q. Thank you very much for your testimony. I'm one of the new kids on the block, relatively new regulator. So appreciated your perspective, you know.

questi on.

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

And you've said you've worked for lots of the different agencies and states. So you mentioned, like I hear this term constructive regulation a lot, you mentioned sort of with all your experience what your definition of that is. So -- and then you mentioned used and useful and kind of I saw you sort of -- body language, like that's a heavy duty topic. You know, it's made things complicated.

Can you just share some of your experience with how you would define used and useful, or how you've seen it defined in places you've worked?

A. Well, as I said, I consider it a gift that we didn't have that in the Michigan statute. So when we looked at our nuclear abandonment case, it was a pure prudent versus imprudent decision. A bright line rule on prudency. Across the country, used -- you know, used and useful does vary from state to state depending on the specific language in the law. I think it complicates things because if a -- like I'll give an example, and not taking it outside of North Carolina and putting it in a mythical state.

A Company starts down -- and it kind of relates to what happened in Michigan. A Company starts down the path to build a nuclear plant, and then Three

24

1

2

3 4

5

6

7

8

10

11 12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

federal government. And so no matter how much planning they put in and how they were moving along with construction, everything changed and their old plans don't apply anymore. And as a regulator, you know, I was in a nonused or useful state, it was darn tough for us to figure out what the impact of Three Mile Island was on the Midland nuclear plant. So we factored that into our decision-making.

Mile Island occurs, and everything changes in the

For a state that has used and useful, if that plant never comes to completion and does not provide power, how do you factor in these external forces that the utility could not expect and had difficulty reacting to. And I think from state -- some states, it might be hard and fast, if it doesn't produce electricity, you know, they don't get anything. I don't think there are many states like that.

Other states like yours, perhaps you can factor in the pros and cons and come to a decision on what the used and useful law means in that defined set of circumstances.

- 0. 0kay. Thank you. Appreciate that.
- Α. Thank you.

COMMISSIONER HUGHES: No further

1

questi ons.

2

3

Commissioner McKissick?

4

5 6

7

8

10

11

12 13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

CHAIR MITCHELL: All right.

COMMISSIONER McKISSICK: Thank you,

Madam Chair, just one or two questions.

EXAMINATION BY COMMISSIONER McKISSICK:

Mr. Fetter, I know when you were responding 0. to Commissioner Duffley a few minutes ago about what provides certainty to the market, you talked about having some predictability. And you began your testimony today speaking about the word "culpability" and how that departed from a traditional imprudence -imprudence type of evaluation or assessment, the criteria would be traditionally used.

If there were a somewhat clearly defined way of defining the term culpability, I mean, there were standards attached where it would perhaps be a brighter line than what it is today where it appears to be subjective -- and, of course, I'm not here to say what that would consist of or what those standards might be, but they might be standards that could be used not only for, say, this case, and the facts that are present today, but that could be used in other cases in the future -- do you think it would provide a framework and

1
 2
 3

structure that would offer more predictability where markets might potentially feel more comfortable, even if the decision made by our Commission deviated from the traditional prudence/imprudence evaluation assessment?

A. Okay. Here's my reaction. If you were going to go based on a -- if the Commission is going to decide based on a new standard called culpability, my advice would be write as much as you can to explain it and explain how it affects these particular circumstances and how it would impact other potential circumstances.

The difficulty will be -- I mentioned the idea of prudent investment started in a dissent written by Justice Brandeis in 1923 and developed over decades. And so I think the biggest barrier you'll have is, no matter how well you delineate in your decision, if the financial community reads that decision and becomes uncertain and uncomfortable about the future, you know, there's another 180 utilities they could invest in across the country outside North Carolina.

The one thing you don't want to do is to put yourself out on an island as either they accept those 50 pages that you wrote, or they say it's just too

1

2

3

4 5

6

7

8

10

11

12 13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

uncertain for us to invest major institutional dollars on North Carolina utilities.

- 0. And I guess the follow-up would simply be Let's say, hypothetically, there was a this: definition and a structure and a way of evaluating culpability, as the term might be used. Would that not perhaps have been helpful to you in Michigan if you were assessing what occurred there with the nuclear power plant? I think it was Midland --
 - Α. Mi dl and.
- Q. -- where you employed kind of the traditional prudence/imprudence type of evaluation and disallowed certain components of cost as being imprudent, and then allowed a partial recovery on other costs.

Would it not be helpful if that type of structure or framework were available in a situation such as the one you confronted?

I think we would have faced back then the very issues you're going to face now, which is that it will be brought up on appeal through the North Carolina courts, and there's a very strong potential it will go to the federal courts up to the U.S. Supreme Court on whether it represents a confiscation or taking. I described, even within your own statute, the language

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

about fairness in both directions and reasonable and just, and I read reasonable and just as applying both to the utility and also the customer, and so it's difficult to create a new standard that has not been tested el sewhere.

You know, like I said, prudent investment did not exist before 1923, and over the course of 10 or 20 years, it became the defining standard. And it's the one I lived with every day of my six years on the Michigan Commission. Someone started it, it took hold, it was found to be appropriate, and it withstood legal That is what you would face. And I'm not attack. saying you and your colleagues are not up to the challenge, but it would be a substantial challenge, and one where you would have to continue to attract the interest of the financial community to fund the state's utilities.

One additional follow-up. I believe it was Steve Young when he was testifying, and he was discussing Moody's, and credit ratings, and the way they might view what we might do in light of the -- in our decision dealing with coal ash and what direction we might take, if it might be more of like what occurred in the Dominion case. And was question was

raised -- and I raised that question -- suppose there was a decision made that was not consistent with what Duke would prefer, without saying what that might consist of, let's say it was more consistent with what occurred in Dominion; and if that were to occur, if it were to bump Moody's credit rating down one notch, what impact would it make? His assessment was that one notch would probably be tolerable, but two notches would be problematic. Would you concur with that assessment?

A. I would concur with what Mr. Young said, except to the extent as I answered Mr. Grantmyre. There is a possibility, notwithstanding what everyone in Washington is saying, that there will not be a vaccine. You know, in the worst case there will never be a vaccine. I mean, just think about how life in this country will change. You know, when people can't pay rent, the legislators or the city councils put in a moratorium on evictions for those individuals. What they don't factor in is there are landlords who also have mortgages, who also pay utility bills.

And so, in the current environment, my advice across the board would be don't weaken the credit profile of any utility. There will be plenty of time

. •

to do that down the road. But I'm concerned about what -- I mean, COVID-19 has already changed the way we live, and I think -- you know, my wife said to me the other day, why didn't we wear masks during flu season in the past. And overseas in some countries they used to wear masks, they do wear masks. I think life in this country is going to be different for a very long time.

So I would argue for a status quo with regard to -- I mean, not only utilities. I think 25 percent of restaurants are going to go out of business. I think to the extent -- in Seattle, Amazon and Microsoft, they're all doing remote working. Do you know who's suffering the most in the city of Seattle? The small sandwich shops. There are no workers downtown anymore.

And so I don't think anyone can predict the financial fallout coming from what we're going through on a public health societal basis right now. And that's why what I said to Mr. Grantmyre, you can't measure a one-notch downgrade purely on the dollar figure. It's unclear what is going to happen. You know, I'm on the board of Central Hudson Gas & Electric, we get an update every week about how COVID

.

- -

is impacting and the potential deferred costs of uncollectible.

So my advice, let's see if we survive the virus before we create complications with regard to our essential services like utilities.

- Q. So I take from your response that you would concur with Mr. Young's assessment, but that, based upon the overall state of the economy in a very global sense and the impact of COVID-19, that there are probably many other variables that introduce uncertainty that could have even a more profound and significant impact than anything that we might decide to do with coal ash as a Commission here in North Carolina; would that be a correct restatement?
- A. Yes. There are -- you know, if there was an effective vaccine a month from now, then it kind of clears the decks. We'll get out of it pretty quickly. But if there's not, I don't know what society looks like a year or two from now if it's spreading from, you know, 6 percent of the country to 10. You know, I guess Sweden tried this herd immunity where they don't take any steps, and it was -- it had very negative impacts on the amount of people catching it and the amount of people dying. And if we don't get it under

control with a vaccine, you know, it's going to march through the populous of this country and even worse overseas, you know.

Right now we're worse because half the country is not taking it seriously. But I think, as it got worse and worse, eventually the whole country would realize that there are steps to take to try to protect oneself.

- Q. And I believe from what I gather, I remember asking Mr. Young also about the potential for a coal ash rider, I take it from your response to Commissioner Duffley's question that, based upon the hypothetical that was structured, that, in your opinion, that would likely work. Is there a way that it could be structured that you would see as being problematic?
- A. Well, the only problematic would be if there were expenditures and, under the tracker, a relatively extended period of time went forward so that the financial measures would be fading towards the negative even though a tracker is in place. You know, when I talked about earlier with Mr. Grantmyre and Commissioner Duffley, a tracker properly structured I think is positive because it avoids the need -- I mean,

Session Date: 9/16/2020

Page 155

| look at the cost of this rate case for all parties. | |
|---|----|
| You know, it's huge. To the extent you can avoid ra | te |
| cases, there's a benefit to all sides. | |

- Q. In terms of potential for a run rate, how do you think that might be utilized as a tool to deal with the coal ash situation?
- A. Well, as I understand run rate, it would be expenditure and compensation on a relatively tight basis. And I think some of the Duke people put in numbers on potential impacts, and I think, to the extent it's structured in a way that avoids some of the negative, it's the use -- it could be useful.

COMMISSIONER McKISSICK: Thank you,

Madam Chair. I don't have any further questions.

THE WITNESS: Thank you, Commissioner.

CHAIR MITCHELL: All right. Questions

on the Commissioners' questions beginning with the Public Staff.

MR. GRANTMYRE: The Public Staff has none.

CHAIR MITCHELL: All right. Attorney
General's Office?

(No response.)

CHAIR MITCHELL: Okay. Any other

Session Date: 9/16/2020

Page 157

All right. Mr. Fetter, you may step down. We appreciate your being here with us today, sir.

THE WITNESS: And I'll be back. Thank you.

CHAIR MITCHELL: See you soon.

MS. FORCE: Chair Mitchell?

CHAIR MITCHELL: Yes, ma'am.

MS. FORCE: Margaret Force. Before we go to the next witness, I have a couple of questions, or one motion and a question. One is that I'd ask through the Chair, if it's going to be the practice from now on for the Company to go through extensive questions about the credentials of the new witnesses coming up, or if that's something that's more properly addressed through summary. We refrained from similar questions, and I noticed that there were quite a few questions asked of Mr. Fetter before he began.

CHAIR MITCHELL: Well, I mean, it's the expectation that we'll follow sort of the typical and traditional litany, Ms. Force. I don't know if I'm responding to your question. But just in the interest of judicial economy and keeping these

that?

Session Date: 9/16/2020

2

1

hearings moving along, we'd ask that the parties follow the traditional litany that we always observe.

MS. FORCE: Thank you. We all have

4 5

6

7

8

3

experts in the case, and I think that is something that's typically addressed through the summary from the witnesses. I also wanted to ask, yesterday I indicated that I would give a list of orders that we would ask the Commission to take

judicial notice of. Is this a good time to do

10 11

CHAIR MITCHELL: Yes, you may proceed.

It's the order approving stipulation

The Commission's

12 13

Docket Number E-7, Sub 408, the Commission issued

MS. FORCE: Okay.

1415

an order on second remand adjusting rate of return

16

and requiring rate reductions and refunds. That

1718

was issued October 26, 1992, from an application

19

The second one is in Docket Number

for general rate increase by March 27, 1986.

2021

and deciding nonsettled issues issued

22

December 20, 2007, from an investigation of

23

existing rates and charges initiated -- excuse me,

24

and the order on reconsideration issued

E-7, Sub 828.

February 18, 2008. I guess that's two orders but they're two different dockets.

The third one is Docket E-7, Sub 909, order granting general rate increase and approving amended stipulation issued December 7, 2009.

The fourth is Docket Number
E-7, Sub 989, order granting general rate increase issued January 27, 2012. And there was also an order on remand in that docket issued
October 23, 2013.

Next is Docket Number E-7, Sub 1026, the order granting general rate increase issued September 24, 2013.

And finally, Docket Number E-7, Sub 790, the order granting certificate of public convenience and necessity with conditions, issued March 21, 2007.

CHAIR MITCHELL: All right. Ms. Force, I'm going to read back these orders just so that the record is clear.

The Commission will take judicial notice of its order issued in Docket Number E-7, Sub 408 on October 26, 1992.

The Commission will take judicial notice

23

24

Kiran Mehta, and I'm sorry. I was having difficulty getting off of mute. But if we are at the end of the day, and the next panel is the panel of Marcia Williams and Jim Wells, and they're the last panel of witnesses to be -- or last witnesses in this particular proceeding, so hopefully we will, in fact, finish tomorrow. Ms. Williams, as you might know, is a resident of Los Angeles, California, and when we start 9:00 in the morning, it's pretty early out in California. It was even darker in California than it was where Commissioner Clodfelter was this morning. That may have something to do with fire smoke, but anyway, it was early. If there is any prospect that we could start a little bit later in the morning, I think that would accommodate Ms. Williams. And plus, I don't believe there's any prospect that we would not finish it even with a delayed start.

thank you, Mr. Mehta. We will begin tomorrow at 10:00 in the morning. So we will be adjourned for today, or we will be in recess for today. Let's -- and we will be back on the record in the morning at 10:00: All right. Thank you very much. We're off

Page 164

Session Date: 9/16/2020

CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER

2

1

3 STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA)

4 COUNTY OF WAKE

5

6

7

8

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

whom the foregoing hearing was taken, do hereby certify that the witnesses whose testimony appear in the foregoing hearing were duly affirmed; that the testimony of said witnesses were taken by me to the best of my ability and thereafter reduced to typewriting under my direction; that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which this hearing was taken, and further that I am not a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties thereto, nor financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of the action.

This the 19th day of September, 2020.

20

21

22

23

24

Soam Ounge

JOANN BUNZE, RPR

Notary Public #200707300112