# CAROLINA WATER SERVICE, INC. OF NORTH CAROLINA DOCKET NO. W-354, SUB 360

# TESTIMONY OF JOHN R. HINTON ON BEHALF OF THE PUBLIC STAFF NORTH CAROLINA UTILITIES COMMISSION

# October 4, 2018

1	Q.	PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME, POSITION, AND BUSINESS
2		ADDRESS FOR THE RECORD.
3	A.	My name is John R. Hinton and my business address is 430 North
4		Salisbury Street, Raleigh, North Carolina. I am the Director of the
5		Economic Research Division of the Public Staff. My qualifications
6		and experience are provided in Appendix A.
7	Q.	WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF YOUR TESTIMONY IN THIS
8		PROCEEDING?
9	A.	The purpose of my testimony is to present to the North Carolina
10		Utilities Commission (Commission) the results of my analysis and
11		my recommendations as to the fair rate of return to be used in
12		establishing rates for water and sewer utility service provided by
13		Carolina Water Service, Inc. of North Carolina, Inc. (CWSNC or
14		Company).

1	Q.	WHAT IS THE CURRENTLY APPROVED COST OF
2		CAPITAL FOR CWSNC?
3	A.	In the last CWSNC general rate case, Docket No. W-354, Sub 356,
4		the Commission approved a capital structure of 48.00% long-term
5		debt, 52.00% common equity, a cost rate of long-term debt of
6		5.93%, and a cost rate of common equity of 9.60% for an overall
7		weighted cost of capital of 7.84%.
8	Q.	WHAT IS THE COST OF CAPITAL REQUESTED BY CWSNC IN
9		THIS PROCEEDING?
10	A.	CWSNC has requested an overall rate of return or cost of capital of
11		8.91%. This applied for rate of return is based on a capital structure
12		of 47.11% long-term debt, 52.89% common equity, a cost rate of
13		long-term debt of 6.00%, and a cost rate for common equity of
14		11.50%.
15	Q.	HOW DOES CWSNC WITNESS D'ASCENDIS DEVELOP HIS
16		RECOMMENDATION?
17	A.	CWSNC witness D'Ascendis utilizes three cost of equity methods: (1)

Discounted Cash Flow (DCF); (2) the Predictive Risk Premium method

(PRPM); and (3) Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). He applies

these methodologies to a proxy group of six publically-traded water

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companies. His first method relies on the DCF model which produces
a cost of equity of 9.10%. The second method is the Predictive Risk
Premium Model (PRPM) that relies on predicted bond yields produces
a 13.43% cost of equity. The witness includes a second risk premium
analysis that he characterizes as a "total market approach" which
produces a 10.80% cost of equity for his utility proxy group. The
witness concludes by averaging the 13.43% PRPM result with the
10.80 total market result to derive his overall risk premium result of
12.12% cost of equity. His third method incorporates the capital asset
pricing model (CAPM) that is based on a risk-free rate of return, beta
coefficient, and the expected return on the market. To derive the
expected return on the market, the witness relies on one historical
arithmetic return on the S&P 500 of 11.97% and two forecasted based
returns on the S&P 500 of 14.59% and 15.73%. With these and other
inputs, he estimated the cost of equity by averaging the traditional
CAPM result of 11.25% and with his empirical CAPM result of 11.37%
for a 11.31% cost of equity. He also applies the DCF method, Risk
Premium methods, and CAPM to a group of comparable risk non-price
regulated companies and derives cost of equity estimates of 14.15%,
12.46%, and 11.78%, respectively. He averages these three non-
utility results to arrive at 12.63% cost of equity for his non-price
regulated group of companies. His final conclusion for the cost of

- equity using his three methods as applied to a utility and a non-utility groups of companies is 11.50%. Given that the witness believes that CWSNC's small size relative to his proxy groups has added risks, he increases the baseline cost of equity by 0.40%, which raises his recommended cost to 11.90%. However, the Companies Schedule D-1 of the Item 10 shows a proposed cost rate of 11.50% for common equity.
- 8 Q. WHAT IS THE OVERALL RATE OF RETURN RECOMMENDED
- 9 **BY THE PUBLIC STAFF?**

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- 10 A. The Public Staff recommends an overall rate of return of 7.37%,
  11 based on the June 30, 2018, capital structure and cost of debt
  12 consisting of 54.92% long-term debt at a cost rate of 5.87% and
  13 45.08% common equity. As such, the disagreement between the
  14 Company and the Public Staff is the capital structure, the
  15 embedded debt cost rate, pre-tax interest coverage and
  16 recommended cost rate of common equity of 9.20%.
- 17 Q. HOW IS THE REMAINDER OF YOUR TESTIMONY
- 18 **STRUCTURED?**
- 19 A. The remainder of my testimony is presented in the following five sections:

1		I. Legal and Economic Guidelines for Fair Rate of Return
2		II. Present Financial Market Conditions
3		III. Appropriate Capital Structure and Cost of Long-Term Debt
4		IV. The Cost of Common Equity Capital
5		V. Concerns with Company Witness D'Ascendis' Testimony
6		VI. Summary and Recommendations
7		I. LEGAL AND ECONOMIC GUIDELINES FOR FAIR RATE OF
8		<u>RETURN</u>
9	Q.	PLEASE BRIEFLY DESCRIBE THE ECONOMIC AND LEGAL
10		FRAMEWORK OF YOUR ANALYSIS.
11	A.	Public utilities possess certain characteristics of natural
12		monopolies. For instance, it is more efficient for a single firm to
13		provide a service such as water production and distribution or
14		wastewater collection and treatment than for two or more firms
15		offering the same service in the same area to do so. Therefore,
16		regulatory bodies have assigned franchised territories to public
17		utilities to provide services more efficiently and at a lower cost to
18		consumers.
19	Q.	WHAT IS THE ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RISK
20		AND THE COST OF CAPITAL?

The cost of equity capital to a firm is equal to the rate of return
investors expect to earn on the firm's securities given the securities'
level of risk. An investment with a greater risk will require a higher
expected return by investors. In Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope
Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 603 (1944) (Hope), the United
States Supreme Court stated:

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[T]he return to the equity owner should be commensurate with returns on investments in other enterprises having corresponding risks. That return, moreover, should be sufficient to assure confidence in the financial integrity of the enterprise, so as to maintain its credit and to attract capital.

In <u>Bluefield Waterworks & Impr. Co. v. Public Service Comm'n</u>, 262 U.S. 679, 692-93 (1923) (<u>Bluefield</u>) the United States Supreme Court stated: A public utility is entitled to such rates as will permit it to earn a return on the value of the property which it employs for the convenience of the public equal to that generally being made at the same time and in the same general part of the country on investments in other business undertakings which are attended by corresponding risks and uncertainties, but it has no constitutional right to profits such as are realized or anticipated in highly profitable enterprises or speculative ventures. The return should be reasonably sufficient to assure confidence in the financial

soundness of the utility, and should be adequate, under efficient and economical management, to maintain and support its credit and enable it to raise the money necessary for the proper discharge of its public duties. A rate of return may be reasonable at one time and become too high or too low by changes affecting opportunities for investment, the money market, and business conditions generally.

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These two decisions recognize that utilities are competing for the capital of investors and provide legal guidelines as to how the allowed rate of return should be set. The decisions specifically speak to the standards or criteria of capital attraction, financial integrity, and comparable earnings. The Hope decision, in particular, recognizes that the cost of common equity is commensurate with risk relative to investments in other enterprises. In competitive capital markets, the required return on common equity will be the expected return foregone by not investing in alternative stocks of comparable risk. Thus, in order for the utility to attract capital, possess financial integrity, and exhibit comparable earnings, the return allowed on a utility's common equity should be that return required by investors for stocks with comparable risk. As such the return requirements of debt and equity investors, which is shaped by expected risk and return, is paramount in attracting capital.

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It is widely recognized that a public utility should be allowed a rate of return on capital which will allow the utility, under prudent management, to attract capital under the criteria or standards referenced by the Hope and Bluefield decisions. If the allowed rate of return is set too high, consumers are burdened with excessive costs, current investors receive a windfall, and the utility has an incentive to overinvest. Likewise, customers will be charged prices that are greater than the true economic costs of providing these services. Consumers will consume too few of these services from a point of view of efficient resource allocation. If the return is set too low, then the utility stockholders would suffer because a declining value of the underlying property will be reflected in a declining value of the utility's equity shares. This could happen because the utility would not be earning enough to maintain and expand its facilities to meet customer demand for service, cover its operating costs, and attract capital on reasonable terms. Lenders will shy away from the company because of increased risk that the utility will default on its debt obligations. Because a public utility is capital intensive, the cost of capital is a very large part of its overall

2	ratepayers.	
3	The Hope and Bluefield standards are embodied in N.	C. Gen. Stat.
4	§ 62-133(b)(4), which requires that the allowed rate	

revenue requirement and is a crucial issue for a company and its

5 sufficient to enable a utility by sound management

to produce a fair return for its shareholders, considering changing economic conditions and other factors, . . . to maintain its facilities and services in accordance with the reasonable requirements of its customers in the territory covered by its franchise, and to compete in the market for capital funds on terms that are reasonable and are fair to its customers and to its existing investors.

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 62-133(b)(4) (2017).

On April 12, 2013, the North Carolina Supreme Court decided <u>State ex rel. Utils. Comm'n v. Cooper</u>, 366 N.C. 484, 739 S.E. 2d 541 (2013) (<u>Cooper</u>). In that decision, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the Commission's January 27, 2012, Order in Docket No. E-7, Sub 989, approving a stipulated return on equity of 10.50% for Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC. In its decision, the Supreme Court held (1) that the 10.50% return on equity was not supported by the Commission's own independent findings and analysis as required by <u>State ex rel. Utils. Comm'n v. Carolina Util.</u> Customers Ass'n, 348 N.C. 452, 500 S.E.2d 693 (1998) (CUCA I),

in cases involving nonunanimous stipulations, and (2) that the Commission must make findings of fact regarding the impact of changing economic conditions on consumers when determining the proper return on equity for a public utility. In <u>Cooper</u>, the Court's holding introduced a new factor to be considered by the Commission regardless of whether there is a stipulation.

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In considering this new element, the Commission is guided by ratemaking principles laid down by statute and interpreted by a body of North Carolina case law developed over many years. According to these principles, the test of a fair rate of return is a return on equity that will provide a utility, by sound management, the opportunity to (1) produce a fair profit for its shareholders in view of current economic conditions, (2) maintain its facilities and service, and (3) compete in the marketplace for capital. State ex rel. Utils. Comm'n v. General Tel. Co., 281 N.C. 318, 370, 189 S.E.2d 705, 738 (1972). Rates should be set as low as reasonably possible consistent with constitutional constraints. State ex rel. Utils. Comm'n v. Pub. Staff-N. Carolina Utils. Comm'n, 323 N.C. 481, 490, 374 S.E.2d 361, 366 (1988). The exercise of subjective judgment is a necessary part of setting an appropriate return on equity. Id. Thus, in a particular case, the Commission must strike

1 a balance that (1) avoids setting a return so low that it impairs the 2 utility's ability to attract capital, (2) avoids setting a return any 3 higher than needed to raise capital on reasonable terms, and (3) 4 considers the impact of changing economic conditions on 5

#### 6 WHAT IS A FAIR RATE OF RETURN? Q.

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The fair rate of return is simply a percentage, which, when Α. multiplied by a utility's rate base investment will yield the dollars of net operating income a utility should reasonably have the opportunity to earn. This dollar amount of net operating income is available to pay the interest cost on a utility's debt capital and a return to the common equity investor. The fair rate of return multiplied by the utility's rate base yields the dollars a utility needs to recover in order to earn the investors' required return on capital.

#### 15 Q. HOW DID YOU DETERMINE THE FAIR RATE OF RETURN THAT 16 YOU RECOMMEND IN THIS PROCEEDING?

To determine the fair rate of return, I performed a cost of capital Α. study consisting of three steps. First, I determined the appropriate capital structure for ratemaking purposes, i.e., the proper proportions of each form of capital. Utilities normally finance assets

with debt and common equity. Because each of these forms of especially capital have different costs, after income considerations, the relative amounts of each form employed to finance the assets can have a significant influence on the overall cost of capital, revenue requirements, and rates. Thus, the determination of the appropriate capital structure for ratemaking purposes is important to the utility and to ratepayers. Second, I determined the cost rate of each form of capital. The individual debt issues have contractual agreements explicitly stating the cost of each issue. The embedded annual cost of debt may be calculated by simply considering these agreements and the utility's books and records. The cost of common equity is more difficult to determine, because it is based on the investor's opportunity cost of capital. Various economic and financial models or methods are available to measure the cost of common equity. Third, by combining the appropriate capital structure ratios for ratemaking purposes with the associated cost rates, I calculated an overall weighted cost of capital or fair rate of return.

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# II. PRESENT FINANCIAL MARKET CONDITIONS

## 2 Q. CAN YOU BRIEFLY DESCRIBE CURRENT FINANCIAL MARKET

# CONDITIONS?

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
Yes. The cost of financing is much lower today than in the more inflationary period of the 1990s. More recently, the continued low rates of inflation and expectations of future low inflation rates have contributed to even lower interest rates. According to Moody's <u>Bond Survey</u>, yields on long-term "A" rated public utility bonds as of August, 2018 is 4.26% and 4.27% for July, 2018. By the close of this proceeding, the Company will, most likely, have received four rate increases over the last five years (Docket Nos. W-354, Sub 356, Sub 344, and Sub 336). At the time of the filed cost of capital settlement on January 10, 2014 in Docket No. W-354, Sub 336, Moody's Arated utility bonds yielded 4.63%, which is 37 basis points higher than the current yields on its long-term bonds, as illustrated in Exhibit JRH-1.

# 17 Q. HOW HAVE SHORT-TERM INTEREST RATES CHANGED SINCE

## 18 THE COMPANY'S LAST RATE CASE?

A. They have increased as shown in the graph below as there is a flattening of the yield curves, which can be seen as movement to in

the direction of historical normals. However, there has been little changes in the cost rates for 30-year treasury securities which are indicators of the interest rates for long-term utility bonds. As illustrated in the graph below, since the time of the last CWSNC stipulation filed on September 19, 2017, yields on 30-year treasury securities have risen 12 basis points; however, the yields on 30-year treasury securities are 60 basis point lower since January 10, 2014, the date that the cost of capital stipulation was filed in Docket W-354, Sub 336.



# 1 Q. HOW DO INTEREST RATES AFFECT THE FINANCING COSTS

# 2 **OF A COMPANY?**

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
- A. In simple terms, the current lower interest rates and stable inflationary environment of today indicate that borrowers are paying less for the time value of money. This is significant since utility stocks and utility capital costs are highly interest rate-sensitive relative to most industries within the securities markets. Furthermore, given that investors often view purchases of the common stocks of utilities as substitutes for fixed income investments, the reductions in interest rates observed over the past ten or more years has paralleled the decreases in investor required rates of return on common equity.
- 13 Q. GIVEN YOUR GRAPH OF YIELD CURVES SHOWS RATES HAVE
- 14 INCREASED, DO YOU RELY ON INTEREST RATE

#### 15 **PREDICTIONS IN YOUR INVESTIGATION?**

16 A. Yes, I will review predictions; however, I generally do not rely on
17 interest rate forecasts to determine the cost of equity. Rather, I
18 believe that relying on current interest rates, especially in relation to
19 yields on long-term bonds, is more appropriate for ratemaking in that,
20 it is reasonable to expect that as investors are pricing bonds, they
21 are based on expectations on future interest rates, inflation rates,

etc. While I have a healthy respect for forecasting, I'm aware of the
risk of relying on predictions of rising interest rates in rate cases. A
case can be observed in the supplemental testimony of Company
witness Ahern in the Aqua rate case in Docket W-218, Sub 363.
Here the witness identified several interest rate forecasts by Blue
Chip Financial Forecasts of 30-year Treasury Bonds yields that were
predicted to rise to 4.3% in 2015, 4.7% in 2016, 5.2% in 2017, and
5.5% for 2020-2024. The graph below, reveals how these forecasts
significantly over-estimated actual interest rates for 30-year Treasury
Bonds. As such, I tend to place more weight in current market
interest rates which are inherently forward looking as they reflect
investor expectations of current and future returns.

<sup>1</sup> Docket W-218 Sub 363, T. Vol. 2, page 171, lines 8-9



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# III. APPROPRIATE CAPITAL STRUCTURE AND COST OF LONG-TERM DEBT

# 2 Q. WHY IS THE APPROPRIATE CAPITAL STRUCTURE

# IMPORTANT FOR RATEMAKING PURPOSES?

A. For companies that do not have monopoly power, the price that an individual company charges for its products or services is set in a competitive market and that price is generally not influenced by the company's capital structure. However, the capital structure that is determined to be appropriate for a regulated public utility has a

- direct bearing on the fair rate of return, revenue requirement, and,
  therefore, the prices charged to captive ratepayers.
- Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN THE TERM CAPITAL STRUCTURE AND
  HOW THE CAPITAL STRUCTURE APPROVED FOR
  RATEMAKING PURPOSES AFFECTS RATES.

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Α. The capital structure is simply a representation of how a utility's assets are financed. It is the relative proportions or ratios of debt and common equity to the total of these forms of capital, which have different costs. Common equity is far more expensive than debt for ratemaking purposes for two reasons. First, as mentioned earlier, there are income tax considerations. Interest on debt is deductible for purposes of calculating income taxes. The cost of common equity, on the other hand, must be "grossed up" to allow the utility sufficient revenue to pay income taxes and to earn its cost of common equity on a net or after-tax basis. Therefore, the amount of revenue the utility must collect from ratepayers to meet income tax obligations is directly related to both the common equity ratio in the capital structure and cost of common equity. A second reason for this cost difference is that the cost of common equity must be set at a marginal or current cost rate. Conversely, the cost of debt is set at an embedded rate because the utility is incurring

1 costs that are previously established in contracts with security 2 holders.

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- Because the Commission has the duty to promote economic utility service, it must decide whether or not a utility's requested capital structure is appropriate for ratemaking purposes. An example of the cost difference can be seen in the Company's filing. Based upon the Company's requested capital cost rates, each dollar of its common equity, and long-term debt that supports the retail rate base has the following approximate annual costs (including income tax, regulatory fee, and gross receipts tax expense) to ratepayers:
- 11 (1) Each \$1 of common equity costs a ratepayer 12 approximately 12 cents per year.
- (2) Each \$1 of long-term debt costs a ratepayer less than 6
   cents per year.

# 15 Q. WHAT CAPITAL STRUCTURE HAS THE COMPANY 16 REQUESTED IN THIS CASE?

17 A. The Company's application requests to use a capital structure of 18 47.11% long-term debt and 52.89% common equity as of 19 December 31, 2017.

# 1 Q. DO YOU SUPPPORT THE CAPITAL STRUTURE PROPOSED BY

# 2 THE COMPANY IN THIS CASE?

3 Α. No. I recommend that the Company update its capital structure as 4 of June 30, 2018. Secondly, I recommend that the capital structure 5 include the June 30, 2018 balance of the Company's Revolving 6 Credit Facility of \$80 million that was entered into on October 23, 7 2015 that contains a maturity date of October 23, 2020. I believe 8 that the updated capital structure that includes the Revolving Credit 9 Facility of 54.92% debt and 45.08% common equity is both 10 representative and reasonable for ratemaking.

# 11 Q. WHAT IS YOUR RECOMMENDED COST OF LONG-TERM

# 12 **DEBT?**

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I recommend the use of the Company's proposed cost of debt that has been updated as of June 30, 2018 to 5.87%. The Company maintains that the make whole provisions contained in their existing Notes make it uneconomic for refinancing. CWSNC and Utilities, Inc. have a history of making private placements of debt at relatively higher interest rates relative to public offerings by other water and sewer utilities, such as with Aqua North Carolina. Unlike Aqua North Carolina, CWSNC does not have any loans that are associated with the rehabilitation of water infrastructure that were

enabled through the North Carolina State Revolving Fund Program authorized by the Safe Drinking Water Act. The Public Staff urges the Company to continue to investigate this source of funding which are at cost rates that are typically significantly lower than available in the market. My recommended capital structure and cost of debt is as follows:

7 **CWSNC** 8 as of June 30, 2018 9 **Debt Cost** Ratio Long-Term Debt 10 54.92% 5.87% 11 Common Equity 45.08% 12 100.00% Total

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# IV. THE COST OF COMMON EQUITY CAPITAL

# Q. HOW DID YOU DEFINE THE COST OF COMMON EQUITY?

15 A. The cost of equity capital for a firm is the expected rate of return on
16 common equity that investors require in order to induce them to
17 purchase shares of the firm's common stock. The return is
18 expected given that when the investor buys a share of the firm's
19 common stock, he does not know with certainty what his returns will
20 be in the future.

# 1 Q. HOW DID YOU DETERMINE THE COST OF COMMON EQUITY

#### 2 **CAPITAL FOR THE COMPANY?**

- 3 A. I used the discounted cash flow (DCF) model and the Risk
- 4 Premium model to determine the cost of equity for the Company.

#### 5 Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE YOUR DCF ANALYSIS.

- 6 Α. The discounted cash flow model is a method of evaluating the 7 expected cash flows from an investment by giving appropriate 8 consideration to the time value of money. The DCF model is based 9 on the theory that the price of the investment will equal the 10 discounted cash flows of returns. The return to an equity investor 11 comes in the form of expected future dividends and price 12 appreciation. However, as the new price will again be the sum of 13 the discounted cash flows, price appreciation is ignored and 14 attention focused on the expected stream of dividends. 15 Mathematically, this relationship may be expressed as follows:
- Let  $D_1$  = expected dividends per share over the next twelve months;
- 17 g = expected growth rate of dividends;
- 18 k = cost of equity capital; and
- 19 P = price of stock or present value of the future income
- 20 stream.

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$$P = \frac{D_1 + D_1(1+g) + D_1(1+g)^2 + ... + D_1(1+g)^{t-1}}{1+k} \frac{1}{(1+k)^2} \frac{1}{(1+k)^3} \frac{1}{(1+k)^t}$$

- This equation represents the amount an investor would be willing to

  pay for a share of common stock with a dividend stream over the

  future periods. Using the formula for a sum of an infinite geometric

  series, this equation may be reduced to:
- 9 10  $P = \frac{D_1}{k-g}$

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- 13 Solving for k yields the DCF equation:
- 15  $D_1 + g$ 16  $k = \frac{D_1 + g}{P}$
- Therefore, the rate of return on equity capital required by investors is the sum of the dividend yield (D<sub>1</sub>/P) plus the expected long-term growth rate in dividends (g)

## 21 Q. DID YOU APPLY THE DCF METHOD DIRECTLY TO CWSNC?

- 22 A. No. I applied the DCF method to a comparable group of water
- 23 utilities followed by Value Line Investment Survey (Value Line).
- The standard edition of Value Line covers nine water companies.
- 25 However, I excluded Connecticut Water Service, Inc. and The SJW

1		Group because of a merger of the two companies. I also excluded
2		Consolidated Water Co. because of its significant overseas
3		operations.
4	Q.	WHAT MEASURES OF RISK DID YOU REVIEW TO
5		DETERMINE THE COMPARABILITY OF INVESTING IN
6		CWSNC TO INVESTING IN OTHER WATER UTILITIES?
7	A.	I reviewed standard risk measures that are widely available to
8		investors that are considered by most investors when making
9		investment decisions. The beta coefficient is a measure of the
10		sensitivity of a stock's price to overall fluctuations in the market.
11		The Value Line Investment Survey beta coefficient describes
12		the relationship of a company's stock price with the New York
13		Stock Exchange Composite. A beta value of less than 1.0
14		means that the stock's price is less volatile than the movement
15		in the market; conversely, a beta value greater than 1.0
16		indicates that the stock price is more volatile than the market.
17		I reviewed the <u>Value Line</u> Safety Rank, which is defined as a
18		measure of the total risk of a stock. The Safety Rank is
19		calculated by averaging two variables (1) the stock's index of

1		price stability, and (2) the Financial Strength rating of the
2		company.
3		In addition, I reviewed the S&P Common Stock Rating. The
4		stock rating system takes into consideration two important
5		factors in the determination of a stock's rating: the stability and
6		growth of earnings and dividends. However, the stock rating
7		does not consider a company's balance sheet or other factors.
8		The stock rating system has seven grades with A+ being the
9		highest rating possible.
10		I also reviewed S&P's Bond Rating, which is an assessment of
11		the creditworthiness of a company. Credit rating agencies focus
12		on the creditworthiness of the particular bond issuer, which
13		includes a detailed and thorough review of the potentials areas
14		of business risk and financial risk of the company. These and
15		other risk measures for the comparable group are shown in
16		Exhibit JRH-2 and are further explained in Appendix B.
17	Q.	HOW DID YOU DETERMINE THE DIVIDEND YIELD
18		COMPONENT OF THE DCF?
19	A.	I calculated the dividend yield by using the Value Line estimate of
20		dividends to be declared over the next 12 months divided by the

price of the stock as reported in the <u>Value Line</u> Summary and Index sections for each week of the 13-week period June 29, 2018 through September 21, 2018. A 13-week averaging period tends to smooth out short-term variations in the stock prices. This process resulted in an average dividend yield of 2.1% for the comparable group of water utilities.

# 7 Q. HOW DID YOU DETERMINE THE EXPECTED GROWTH RATE

# COMPONENT OF THE DCF?

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I employed the growth rates of the comparable group in earnings per share (EPS), dividend per share (DPS), and book value per share (BPS) as reported in <u>Value Line</u> over the past ten and five years. I also employed the forecasts of the growth rates of the comparable groups in EPS, DPS, and BPS as reported in <u>Value Line</u>. The historical and forecast growth rates are prepared by analysts of an independent advisory service that is widely available to investors and should also provide an estimate of investor expectations. I include both historical known growth rates and forecast growth rates, because it is reasonable to expect that investors consider both sets of data in deriving their expectations.

Finally, I incorporated the consensus of various analysts' forecasts

of five-year EPS growth rate projections as reported in Yahoo
Finance. The dividend yields and growth rates for each of the
companies and for the average for the comparable group are

shown in Exhibit JRH-3.

**METHOD?** 

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- 5 Q. WHAT IS YOUR CONCLUSION REGARDING THE COST OF
  6 COMMON EQUITY TO THE COMPANY BASED ON THE DCF
- 8 Based upon the DCF analysis, I determined that a reasonable Α. 9 expected dividend yield is 2.1% with an expected growth rate of 10 6.1% to 7.1%. While I consider historical growth rates in making 11 my recommendations, I often place the greatest weight on 12 predicted growth rates. In this case, the average growth is 6.6% 13 which produces a 8.7% mid-point result for my DCF analysis. As 14 such, the analysis produces a cost of common equity estimate for 15 CWSNC that is within the range of 8.20% to 9.20%.

#### 16 Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE YOUR RISK PREMIUM ANALYSIS.

17 A. The equity risk premium method can be defined as the difference
18 between the expected return on a common stock and the expected
19 return on a debt security. The differential between the two rates of
20 return are indicative of the return investors require in order to

compensate them for the additional risk involved with an investment in the Company's common stock over an investment in the Company's bonds that involves less risk.

In order to quantify the risk premium, I need estimates of the cost of equity and the cost of debt at contemporaneous points in time. In that, my method relies on approved returns on common equity for water utility companies from various public utility commissions that is published by the Regulatory Research Associates, Inc. (RRA), within SNL Global Market Intelligence. In order to estimate the relationship with a representative cost of debt capital, I have regressed the average annual allowed equity returns with the average Moody's A-rated yields for Public Utility bonds from 2006 through 2018. The regression analysis which incorporates years of historical data is combined with recent monthly yields to provide an estimate of the current cost of common equity.

## Q. WHAT ARE THE STRENGTHS OF USING ALLOWED RETURNS?

A. The use of allowed returns as the basis for the expected equity return has two strengths over other approaches that involve various models that estimate the expected equity return on common stocks and subtracting a representative cost of debt. One strength of my

approach is that authorized returns on equity are generally arrived at through lengthy investigations by various parties with opposing views on the rate of return required by investors. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that the approved allowed returns are good estimates for the cost of equity.

# 6 Q. WHAT WERE THE RESULTS OF YOUR RISK PREMIUM

## ANALYSIS?

Α.

The summary data of risk premiums shown on Exhibit JRH-4, page 1 of 2 indicates that the average risk premium is 4.95% with a maximum premium of 5.78% and minimum premium of 3.73%, which when combined with the last six months of A-rated bond yields produces yields with an average cost of equity of 9.11%, a maximum cost of equity of 9.94%, and a minimum cost of equity of 7.89%. As noted, a statistical regression was performed in order to quantify the relationship of allowed equity returns and bond costs. Exhibit JRH-4, page 2 of 2 displays a regression analysis of the data that indicates a significant statistical relationship of the allowed equity returns and bond costs, such that a one percent decrease in the bond cost corresponds to an increase of approximately 26 basis

points in the equity risk premium.<sup>2</sup> While various studies on the cost of equity capital have differed on the level of the negative relationship of interest rates and risk premiums there has been agreement that as interest rates fall, there is an increase in the premium.<sup>3</sup> Applying this relationship to the current utility bond cost of 4.22%<sup>4</sup> resulted in a current estimate of the cost of equity of 9.70% which reflects a risk premium of 5.48%.

# 8 Q. GIVEN YOUR STUDY ON THE COST OF EQUITY, WHAT IS YOUR

# 9 RECOMMEDNED COST OF EQUITY?

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A. Based on all of the results of my DCF model that indicate a cost of equity from 8.2% to 9.2% with a central point estimate of 8.70% and Risk Premium model that indicates a cost of equity of 9.70%, I determined that the investor required rate of return for CWSNC is between 8.70% and 9.70%. I further conclude that 9.20% is my single best estimate of the Company's cost of common equity.

 $<sup>^2</sup>$  The regression indicated a significant statistical relationship of ROE=0.08603 + 0.26086, with an adjusted R<sup>2</sup>=0.74952.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Eugene F. Brigham, Dilip K. Shome, and Steve R. Vinson, "The Risk Premium Approach to Measuring a Utility's Cost of Equity." <u>Financial Management</u>, Spring 1985, pp. 33-45.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> The 4.22% current bond yield was determined using the most recent six-month average yield-to-maturity rate of Moody's A-rated Utility Bond Yields.

1	Q.	WHAT OTHER EVIDENCE DID YOU CONSIDER IN YOUR
2		ASSESMENT OF THE REASONABLENESS OF YOUR
3		RECOMMENDED RETURN?
4	A.	In regard to reasonableness assessment with financial risk, I
5		considered the pre-tax interest coverage ratio produced by my cost
6		of capital recommendation. Based on the recommended capital
7		structure, cost of debt, and equity return of 9.20%, the pre-tax
8		interest coverage ratio is approximately 3.7 times. This level of pre-
9		tax interest coverage should allow CWSNC to qualify for a single
10		"A" bond rating.
11	Q.	TO WHAT EXTENT DOES YOUR RECOMMENDED RATE OF
12		RETURN ON COMMON EQUITY TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION
13		THE IMPACT OF A WATER/SEWER SYSTEM IMPROVEMENT
14		MECHANISM PURSUANT TO N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-133.12 ON
15		THE COMPANY'S FINANCIAL RISK?
16	A.	In my opinion, the water and sewer improvement charge
17		mechanism (WSIC and SSIC) provides the ability for enhanced
18		cost recovery of the eligible capital improvements which reduces

regulatory lag through incremental and timely rate increases. I

believe this mechanism is seen by debt and equity investors as

supportive regulation that mitigates business and regulatory risk.

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- 1 As such, I believe that this mechanism is noteworthy and is 2 supportive of my recommendation.
- Q. TO WHAT EXTENT DOES YOUR RECOMMENDED RATE OF
  RETURN ON EQUITY TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THE
  IMPACT OF CHANGING ECONOMIC CONDITIONS ON

**CWSNC'S CUSTOMERS?** 

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Α.

I am aware of no clear numerical basis for quantifying the impact of changing economic conditions on customers in determining an appropriate return on equity in setting rates for a public utility. Rather, the impact of changing economic conditions nationwide is inherent in the methods and data used in my study to determine the cost of equity for utilities that are comparable to Aqua. I have reviewed certain information on the economic conditions in the areas served by CWSNC, specifically, the 2014, 2015, and 2016 data on total personal income from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) and the Development Tier Designations published by the North Carolina Department of Commerce for the counties in which Aqsa's systems are located. The BEA data indicates that from 2014 to 2016, total personal income weighted by the number of water customers by county grew at a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of approximately 3%.

The North Carolina Department of Commerce annually fanks the
state's 100 counties based on economic well-being and assigns
each a Tier designation. The most distressed counties are rated a
"1" and the most prosperous counties are rated a "3." The rankings
examine several economic measures such as, household income,
poverty rates, unemployment rates, population growth, and per
capita property tax base. For 2017, the average Tier ranking that
has been weighted by the number of water customers by county is
2.6. Both these economic measures indicate that there have been
improvement in the economic conditions for CWSNC's service area
relative to the three previous rate increases in Docket Nos. W-354,
Subs 356, 344, and 336 that were approved in 2017, 2015, and
2014, respectively.
As discussed above, it is the Commission's duty to set rates as low
as reasonably possible consistent within constitutional constraints.
This duty exists regardless of the customers' ability to pay.
Moreover, the rate of return on common equity is only one
component of the rate established by the Commission. N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 62-133 sets out an intricate formula for the Commission to

follow in determining a utility's overall revenue requirement. It is the

combination of rate base, expenses, capital structure, cost rates for

debt and equity capital, and capital structure that determines how much customers pay for utility service and how much investors receive in return for their investment. The Commission must exercise its best judgment in balancing the interests of both groups. My analysis indicates that my recommended rate of return on equity will allow the Company to properly maintain its facilities, provide adequate service to its customers, attract capital on terms that are fair and reasonable to its customers and investors, and will result in rates that are just and reasonable.

# V. CONCERNS WITH COMPANY WITNESS D'ASCENDIS'

# 11 <u>TESTIMONY</u>

# 12 Q. DO YOU HAVE CONCERNS ABOUT COMPANY WITNESS

#### **D'ASCENDIS' TESTIMONY?**

Α.


Yes, my first concern is his adjustment for business risk. I do not believe that it is appropriate to add a risk premium to the cost of equity due to the size of a regulated utility company. My reasons are as follows: first, from a regulatory policy perspective, ratepayers should not be required to pay higher rates because they are located in the franchise area of a utility of a size which is arbitrarily considered to be small. Further if such adjustments were routinely


allowed, an incentive would exist for large existing utilities to form subsidiaries when merging or even to split-up into subsidiaries as to obtain higher allowed returns. Lastly, CWSNC operates in a franchise environment that insulates the company from competition and it operates with procedures in place that allow for rate adjustments for eligible capital improvements, cost increases, and other unusual circumstances that impact its earnings.

Furthermore, CWSNC operates in an industry where bottled water provides the only alternative to utility service. Thus, the industry is often considered less risky from an investor's perspective relative to natural gas industry, which competes with electric service, propane, and other alternative fuel sources. As such, I have compared the quarterly operating revenue and the quarterly operating income before interest and income taxes of CWSNC, Aqua North Carolina, Inc., Public Service Company of North Carolina, Inc. (PSNC) and the North Carolina operations of Piedmont Natural Gas Company, Inc. (Piedmont) over the last couple of years. As expected, the operating revenue and the operating income<sup>5</sup> of CWSNC and Aqua


<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> The operating revenue and income data is from monthly and quarterly reports provided to the Public Staff. Operating income includes general taxes; but, excludes interest charges and state and federal income taxes.

- 1 are more predictable and stable overtime relative to PSNC and
- 2 Piedmont, as shown in the following graphs:






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# 2 Q. DO YOU KNOW OF STUDUES THAT QUESTION THE 3 ADDITIONAL RISK TO UTILITIES AS IT RELATES TO SIZE?

A. Yes, I am aware of a study by Dr. Annie Wong<sup>6</sup> that focuses on the size of regulated utilities and risk. Dr. Wong has tested for a size premium in utilities and concluded that, unlike industrial stocks, utility stocks do not exhibit a significant size premium. As explained by Professor Wong, there are several reasons why such a size premium would not be attributable to utilities; in that, utilities are

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Annie Wong, "Utility Stocks and the Size Effect: An Empirical Analysis," Journal of the Midwest Finance Association, pp. 95-101, (1993).

- regulated closely by state and federal agencies and commissions, and hence, their financial performance is monitored on an ongoing basis by both the state and federal governments.
  - I believe that size premiums as advocated by witness D'Ascendis cannot be applied to regulated utilities in the same manner as they are applied for non-price regulated companies. In that, regulated water companies do not face the same operating and financing risks of other companies that have to compete for business. The above counter arguments to a size premium were persuasive to the NC Commission in a previous 1997 decision involving CWS Systems, Inc.<sup>7</sup> that were made by Frank J. Hanley of AUS Consultants, Inc.

#### **VI. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

- 14 Q. WOULD YOU PLEASE SUMMARIZE YOUR RECOMMEND15 ATIONS CONCERNING THE COST OF CAPITAL?
- A. Based upon the results of this study, it is my recommendation that the appropriate capital structure to employ for ratemaking purposes in this proceeding consists of 54.92% long-term debt and 45.08%

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> NCUC Order Granting Partial Rate Increase, Docket No. W-778, Sub 31, issued November 26, 1997, Finding of Fact No. 43, pages 61-62.

1	common equity. The appropriate embedded cost of long-term debt
2	associated with this capital structure is 5.87% and the
3	recommended cost of common equity of 9.20%. My recommended
4	overall weighted cost of capital produced is 7.37%, as shown on
5	Exhibit JRH-5.

# 6 Q. DOES THIS CONCLUDE YOUR TESTIMONY?

7 A. Yes.

Appendix A Page 1 of 3

#### QUALIFICATIONS AND EXPERIENCE

#### JOHN ROBERT HINTON

I received a Bachelor of Science degree in Economics from the University of North Carolina at Wilmington in 1980 and a Master of Economics degree from North Carolina State University in 1983. I joined the Public Staff in May of 1985. I filed testimony on the long-range electrical forecast in Docket No. E-100, Sub 50. In 1986, 1989, and 1992, I developed the long-range forecasts of peak demand for electricity in North Carolina. I filed testimony on electricity weather normalization in Docket Nos. E-7, Sub 620, E-2, Sub 833, and E-7, Sub 989. I filed testimony on customer growth and the level of funding for nuclear decommissioning costs in Docket No. E-2, Sub 1023. I filed testimony on the level of funding for nuclear decommissioning costs in Docket Nos. E-7, Sub 1026 and E-7, Sub 1146. I have filed testimony on the Integrated Resource Plans (IRPs) filed in Docket No. E-100, Subs 114 and 125, and I have reviewed numerous peak demand and energy sales forecasts and the resource expansion plans filed in electric utilities' annual IRPs and IRP updates.

I have been the lead analyst for the Public Staff in numerous avoided cost proceedings, filing testimony in Docket No. E-100, Subs 106, 136, 140,

and 148. I have filed a Statement of Position in the arbitration case involving EPCOR and Progress Energy Carolinas in Docket No. E-2, Sub 966. I have filed testimony in applications of avoided cost for cost recovery of energy efficiency programs and demand side management programs in Dockets Nos. E-7, Sub 1032, E-7, Sub 1130, E-2, Sub 1145, and E-2, Sub 1174.

I have filed testimony on the issuance of certificates of public convenience and necessity (CPCN) in Docket Nos. E-2, Sub 669, SP-132, Sub 0, E-7, Sub 790, E-7, Sub 791, and E-7, Sub 1134.

I filed testimony on the merger of Dominion Energy, Inc. and SCANA Corp. in Docket Nos. E-22, Sub 551 and G-5, Sub 585.

I have filed testimony on the issue of fair rate of return in Docket Nos. E-22, Sub 333; E-22, Sub 412; P-26, Sub 93; P-12, Sub 89; G-21, Sub 293; P-31, Sub 125; G-5, Sub 327; G-5, Sub 386; G-9, Sub 351; P-100, Sub 133b; P-100, Sub 133d (1997 and 2002); G-21, Sub 442; W-778, Sub 31; and W-218, Sub 319, E-22, Sub 532, and W-218, Sub 497 and in several smaller water utility rate cases.. I have filed testimony on credit metrics and the risk of a downgrade in Docket No. E-7, Sub 1146.

I have filed testimony on the hedging of natural gas prices in Docket No. E-2, Subs 1001 and 1018. I have filed testimony on the expansion of natural gas in Docket No. G-5, Subs 337 and 372. I performed the financial analysis in the two audit reports on Mid-South Water Systems, Inc., Docket No. W-100, Sub 21. I testified in the application to transfer of the CPCN from North Topsail Water and Sewer, Inc. to Utilities, Inc., in Docket No. W-1000, Sub 5. I have filed testimony on rainfall normalization with respect of water sales in Docket No. W-274, Sub 160.

With regard to the 1996 Safe Drinking Water Act, I was a member of the Small Systems Working Group that reported to the National Drinking Water Advisory Council of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. I have published an article in the National Regulatory Research Institute's Quarterly Bulletin entitled Evaluating Water Utility Financial Capacity.

Appendix B Page 1 of 3

#### RISK MEASURES

#### VALUE LINE SAFETY RANK

The Safety Rank is a measure of the total risk of a stock. It includes factors unique to the company's business such as its financial condition, management competence, etc. The Safety Rank is derived by averaging two variables: the stock's Price Stability Index, and the Financial Strength Rating of the company. The Safety Rank ranges from 1 (Highest) to 5 (Lowest).

#### VALUE LINE BETA (B)

The Beta is derived from a regression analysis between weekly percent changes in the price of a stock and weekly percent price changes in the New York Stock Exchange Composite Index over a period of five years.

There has been a tendency over the years for high Beta stocks to become lower and for low Beta stocks to become higher. This tendency can be measured by studying Betas of stocks in five consecutive intervals. The Betas published in the <u>Value Line Investment Survey</u> are adjusted for this tendency and hence are likely to be better predictors of future Betas than those based exclusively on the experience of the past five years.

The New York Stock Exchange Composite Index is used as the basis for calculating the Beta because this index is a good proxy for the complete equity portfolio. Since Beta's significance derives primarily from its usefulness in portfolios rather than individual stocks, it is best constructed by relating to an overall market portfolio. The <u>Value Line</u> Index, because it weights all stocks equally, would not serve as well.

The security's return is regressed against the return on the New York Stock Exchange Composite Index over the past five years, so that 259 observations of weekly price changes are used. <u>Value Line</u> adjusts its estimate of Beta (ß<sub>i</sub>) for regression described by Blume (1971). The estimated Beta is adjusted as follows:

Adjusted  $\&inspace{1mu} = 0.35 + 0.67 \&inspace{1mu}$ 

Appendix B Page 2 of 3

#### VALUE LINE FINANCIAL STRENGTH RATING

The Financial Strength Ratings are primarily a measure of the relative financial strength of a company. The rating considers key variables such as coverage of debt, variability of return, stock price stability, and company size. The Financial Strength Ratings range from the highest at A++ to the lowest at C.

### VALUE LINE PRICE STABILITY INDEX

The Price Stability Index is based upon a ranking of the standard deviation of weekly percent changes in the price of a stock over the last five years. The top 5% carry a Price Stability Index of 100; the next 5%, 95; and so on down to an Index of 5.

#### VALUE LINE EARNINGS PREDICTABILITY INDEX

The Earnings Predictability Index is a measure of the reliability of an earnings forecast. The most reliable forecasts tend to be those with the highest rating (100); the least reliable (5).

#### <u>S&P BETA (ß)</u>

The Beta is derived from a regression analysis between 60 months of price changes in a company's stock price (plus corresponding dividend yield) and the monthly price changes in the S&P 500 Index (plus corresponding dividend yield). Prices and dividends are adjusted for all subsequent stock splits and stock dividends.

#### **S&P BOND RATING**

The S&P Bond Ratings is an appraisal of the credit quality based on relevant risk factors. S&P reviews both the company's financial and business profiles. Shown below are the rankings:

- AAA An extremely strong capacity to pay interest and repay principal.
- AA+ A very strong capacity to pay interest and repay principal.
- AA There is only a small degree of difference between "AAA" or "AA"
- AA- debt issues.
- A+ A strong capacity to pay interest and repay principal. These
- A these ratings indicate the obligor is more susceptible to
- A- changes in economic conditions than AAA" or "AA" debt issues.

Appendix B Page 3 of 3

- BBB+ An adequate capacity to pay interest and repay principal.
- BBB economic conditions or changing circumstances are more likely to
- BBB- lead to a weakened capacity to pay interest and repay principal.
- BB+ "BB" indicates less near-term vulnerability to default than other
- BB speculative issues. However, these bonds face major ongoing
- BB- uncertainties or exposure to adverse conditions that could lead to inadequate capacity to meet timely interest and principal payments.

#### **S&P STOCK RANKING**


The S&P Stock Rankings is an appraisal of the growth and stability of the company's earnings and dividends over the past 10 years. The final score for each stock is measured against a scoring matrix determined by an analysis of the scores of a large and representative sample of stocks. Shown below are the rankings:

- A+ Highest
- A High
- A- Above average
- B+ Average
- B Below Average
- B- Lower
- C Lowest
- D In Reorganization
- NR Not rated

#### Sources:

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1.</sup> Value Line Investment Analyzer, Version 3.0.15a, New York, NY.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Standard & Poor's, <u>Utility Compustat II</u>, September 15, 1993, New York, NY.



Public Staff Hinton Exhibit JRH-2 Docket No. W-354, Sub 360

# RISK MEASURES Group of Water Companies

			Value Lir	S8	<b>k</b> Ρ			
			Financial	Earnings	Price	Bond	Stock	
Company Name	Safety	Beta	Strength	Predict.	Stability	Rating <sup>2</sup>	Rating <sup>3</sup>	Beta <sup>4</sup>
1 American States Water	2	0.80	Α	95	75	A+	A+	0.27
2 American Water Works	3	0.65	B+	90	100	Α	В	0.17
3 Aqua America	2	0.75	Α	90	95	A+	A+	0.42
4 California Water Service	3	0.80	B++	65	75	A+	A+	0.60
5 Middlesex Water	2	0.80	B++	80	65	Α	A-	0.45
6 York Water	3	0.80	B+	90	60	A-	Α	0.37
Average	2.5	0.77		85	78			0.38

#### Sources:

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4.</sup> ibid.

Connecticut Water	3	0.65	B+	85	85	Α	Α
SJW Corp.	3	0.75	B+	45	65	Α	B+

2. Value Line Reports for March 3, 2017.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1.</sup> Value Line Reports for July 13, 2018.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2.</sup> S&P Global Ratings, various issues.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3.</sup> S&P Global, CFPR Quantitative Stock Report, dated August 17, 2018 and August 18, 2018.

# DCF ANALYSIS Group of Water Utility Companies

											Yahoo <sup>3</sup>	
			\	/alue Line	2			Value	Line For	ecast <sup>2</sup>	Forecast	Average <sup>4</sup>
	•	EPS	DPS	BPS	EPS	DPS	BPS	EPS	DPS	BPS	EPS	Forecast
Company Name	Yield <sup>1</sup>	10-Yr	10-Yr	10-Yr	5-Yr	5-Yr	5-Yr	5-Yr	5-Yr	5-Yr	5-Yr	Growth Rate
1 American States Water	1.9	9.0	7.0	5.0	7.0	10.5	4.5	6.0	8.0	4.0	4.0	5.5
2 American Water Works	2.2	NA	NA	1.0	7.5	8.5	4.0	10.0	10.0	6.0	8.1	8.5
3 Aqua America	2.5	8.5	7.5	6.5	9.5	8.0	7.5	7.5	9.0	5.5	5.0	6.8
4 California Water	1.9	4.5	2.0	4.5	4.0	2.5	5.0	9.5	6.5	3.0	9.8	7.2
5 Middlesex Water	2.1	5.0	2.0	3.5	8.0	2.0	3.5	8.0	5.5	4.0	2.7	5.1
6 York Water	2.1	5.5	3.5	5.0	6.5	3.5	3.5	9.0	8.0	5.0	4.9	6.7
Average	2.1	6.5	4.4	4.3	7.1	5.8	4.7	8.3	7.8	4.6	5.8	6.6
DCF	Result	8.6	6.5	6.4	9.2	7.9	6.8	10.4	9.9	6.7	7.9	8.7

#### Source

Note: Connecticut Water Service, Inc. and the SJW Group were excluded from the Value Line sample due to a merger.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1.</sup> Value Line Summary and Index for June 29, 2018 through September 21, 2018.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2.</sup> July 13, 2018 Value Line Reports.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3.</sup> Yahoo Finance reporting of 5-Yr consensous EPS forecasts, downloaded on September 24, 2018.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4.</sup> The average calculation includes all four measures of predicted growth rate.

Public Staff Hinton Exhibit JRH-4 Docket No. W-354, Sub 360 Page 1 of 2

## REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF ALLOWED RETURNS ON EQUITY

	[A] Water Utilities	[B]	[C]=[A]-[B]
	Approved Returns on	Moody's A-Rated	Water Utility Risk
Year	Equity <sup>1</sup>	Bond Yields <sup>2</sup>	Premium
2006	10.23%	6.07%	4.16%
2007	10.07%	6.05%	4.02%
2008	10.24%	6.51%	3.73%
2009	10.18%	6.04%	4.15%
2010	10.18%	5.47%	4.71%
2011	10.04%	5.04%	5.00%
2012	9.90%	4.13%	5.77%
2013	9.73%	4.48%	5.25%
2014	9.59%	4.28%	5.31%
2015	9.76%	4.12%	5.65%
2016	9.71%	3.93%	5.78%
2017	9.56%	4.00%	5.56%
2018	9.41%	4.17%	5.24%
		Average	4.95%
		Maximum	5.78%
		Minimun	3.73%

#### Sources:

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Regulatory Research Associates, Water Advisory, June 8, 2017 and July 27, 2018.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> <u>Moody's Credittrend</u>s with yield data as of August 31, 2018.

Public Staff Hinton Exhibit JRH-4 Docket No. W-354, Sub 360 Page 2 of 2

### REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF ALLOWED RETURNS ON EQUITY

Regression Statistics						
Multiple R	0.87772					
R Square	0.77039					
Adjusted R Square	0.74952					
Standard Error	0.00142					
Observations	13					

#### **ANOVA**

	df	SS	MS	F	Significance F
Regression	1	7.48492E-05	7.48492E-05	37.952701	7.10034E-05
Residual	11	2.16939E-05	1.97217E-06		
Total	12	9.65431E-05			

	Coefficients	Standard Error	t Stat	P-value
Intercept	0.086038	0.002157	39.885740	0.000000
X Variable 1	0.260653	0.042905	6.075145	0.000080

Moody's

A-Rated **Public Utility** Bond Yield May-18 4.09% Jun-18 4.17% Jul-18 4.28% Aug-18 4.27% Jul-18 4.27% Aug-18 4.26% 4.22% Average

Predicted Cost of Equity 9.70%

Note:

Predicted Cost of Equity of 9.70% = 0.086038 + 0.260653 x 4.22%.

Public Staff Hinton Exhibit JRH-5 Docket No. W-354, Sub 360

# Carolina Water Service, Inc. of North Carolina Cost of Capital as of June 30, 2018

			Weighted	Pre-Tax Cost of
Item	Ratios	Cost Rate	Cost Rate	Capital
Long-Term Debt	54.92%	5.87%	3.22%	3.22%
Common Equity	45.08%	9.20%	4.15%	5.42%
Total	100.00%		7.37%	8.64%

Pre-Tax Interest Coverage 3.7