

NORTH CAROLINA PUBLIC STAFF UTILITIES COMMISSION

November 5, 2021

Ms. A. Shonta Dunston, Chief Clerk North Carolina Utilities Commission 4325 Mail Service Center Raleigh, North Carolina 27699-4300

Re: Docket No. W-354, Sub 384 – Application by Carolina Water Service, Inc. of North Carolina, 4944 Parkway Plaza Boulevard, Suite 375, Charlotte North Carolina 28217 for Authority to Adjust and Increase Rates for Water and Sewer Utility Service in All of Its Service Areas

in North Carolina

Dear Ms. Dunston:

Attached for filing on behalf of the Public Staff in the above-referenced docket are the testimony and exhibits of John R. Hinton, Director, Public Staff Economic Research Division.

By copy of this letter, I am forwarding a copy to all parties of record by electronic delivery.

Sincerely,

Electronically submitted s/John D. Little Staff Attorney john.little@psncuc.nc.gov

Attachments

Executive Director (919) 733-2435

Accounting (919) 733-4279

Consumer Services (919) 733-9277 Economic Research (919) 733-2267

Energy (919) 733-2267 Legal (919) 733-6110 Transportation (919) 733-7766

Water/Telephone (919) 733-5610

BEFORE THE NORTH CAROLINA UTILITIES COMMISSION DOCKET NO. W-354, SUB 384

In the Matter of
Application by Carolina Water Service,
Inc. of North Carolina, 4944 Parkway
Plaza Boulevard, Suite 375, Charlotte,
North Carolina 28217 for Authority to
Adjust and Increase Rates for Water
and Sewer Utility Service in All of Its
Service Areas in North Carolina

TESTIMONY OF
JOHN R. HINTON
PUBLIC STAFF – NORTH
CAROLINA UTILITIES
COMMISSION

CAROLINA WATER SERVICE, INC. OF NORTH CAROLINA DOCKET NO. W-354, SUB 384

TESTIMONY OF JOHN R. HINTON ON BEHALF OF THE PUBLIC STAFF NORTH CAROLINA UTILITIES COMMISSION

NOVEMBER 5, 2021

1	Q.	PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME, POSITION, AND BUSINESS
2		ADDRESS FOR THE RECORD.
3	A.	My name is John R. Hinton and my business address is 430 North
4		Salisbury Street, Raleigh, North Carolina. I am the Director of the
5		Economic Research Division of the Public Staff. My qualifications
6		and experience are provided in Appendix A.
7	Q.	WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF YOUR TESTIMONY IN THIS
8		PROCEEDING?
9	A.	The purpose of my testimony is to present to the North Carolina
10		Utilities Commission (Commission) the results of my analysis and
11		my recommendations as to the fair rate of return to be used in
12		establishing rates for water and sewer utility service provided by
13		Carolina Water Service, Inc. of North Carolina (CWSNC or
14		Company).
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1 Q. WHAT IS THE CURRENTLY APPROVED COST OF C	PITAL
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2 **FOR CWSNC?**

- 3 A. In the last CWSNC general rate case, Docket No. W-354, Sub 364,
- 4 the Commission approved a capital structure of 50.90% long-term
- 5 debt, 49.10% common equity, a cost rate of long-term debt of
- 5.36%, and a cost rate of common equity of 9.50% for an overall
- 7 weighted cost of capital of 7.39%.

8 Q. WHAT IS THE COST OF CAPITAL REQUESTED BY CWSNC IN

9 THIS PROCEEDING?

- 10 A. Company witness Drennan's Supplemental Testimony filed on
- October 8, 2021 proposes an overall weighted cost of capital of
- 12 7.60%. This applied for rate of return is based on a updated capital
- structure as of March 31, 2021, that is comprised of 50.57% long-
- term debt, 49.43% common equity. The Company has requested a
- 15 cost rate of long-term debt of 4.76%, and a cost rate for common
- equity of 10.50% as testified to by witness D'Ascendis.

17 Q. HOW DOES CWSNC WITNESS D'ASCENDIS DEVELOP HIS

18 **RECOMMENDATION?**

- 19 A. CWSNC witness Dylan D'Ascendis utilizes three cost of equity
- 20 methods: (1) Discounted Cash Flow (DCF); (2) the Risk Premium
- 21 Model which relies on the Predictive Risk Premium method (PRPM)

and the Total Market Approach RPM; and (3) Capital Asset Pricing
Model (CAPM). He applies these methodologies to a proxy group of
six publically traded water companies. D'Ascendis' first method relies
on the DCF model which produces an 8.63% estimated cost of equity.
For his other cost of equity models, he produced two cost of equity
estimates that rely on either current interest rates and projected
interest rates.
Mr. D'Ascendis' second method employs the Risk Premium model,
which produces an 11.03% estimated cost of equity using projected
interest rates and 10.53% using current interest rates.
Mr. D'Ascendis' third method employs the mean and medium results
of his traditional and empirical capital asset pricing model (CAPM),
which produces a 10.68% estimated cost of equity using projected
interest rates and 10.24% using current interest rates.
His fourth method applies the above three models to a group of non-
price regulated companies that he selected with the use of Value
Line's beta coefficients along with the residual standard errors. This
method resulted in cost of equity estimates that range from 10.13% to
10.42% using projected interest rates and 9.81% to 10.05% using
current interest rates.

Given that the witness believes that CWSNC's small size relative to his proxy groups is riskier, he increases the baseline cost of equity by 0.40% using projected interest rates and using current interest rates. As such, his overall recommended cost of common equity of 10.50% is based on cost rates that range from 10.53% to 10.82% using projected interest rates 10.21% to 10.45% using current interest rates.

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Q. WHAT IS THE OVERALL RATE OF RETURN RECOMMENDED BY THE PUBLIC STAFF?

The Public Staff recommends an overall rate of return of 6.90%, based on the updated capital structure as of September 30, 2021 that consists of 49.80% long-term debt and 50.20% common equity. The recommended overall cost of capital incorporates the updated September 30, 2021 capital structure for Corix Regulated Utiltiies, Inc. (Corix) a recommended debt cost rate of 4.85%, and an 8.93% return on common equity (ROE). Relative to the Company's last rate case, Sub 364, the reduction in the Public Staff's recommended ROE represents a 17 basis point reduction from the 9.10% cost rate for common equity. Based on the Public Staff's recommended rate base, capital structure, recommended cost of debt, the proposed 10.50% ROE as compared to the Public Staff's recommended 8.93% ROE leads to an approximate \$1.5 million increase in CWSNC's revenue

1		requirements.
2	Q.	HOW IS THE REMAINDER OF YOUR TESTIMONY
3		STRUCTURED?
4	A.	The remainder of my testimony is presented in the following six
5		sections:
6		I. Legal and Economic Guidelines for Fair Rate of Return.
7		II. Present Financial Market Conditions.
8		III. Appropriate Capital Structure and Cost of Long-Term Debt.
9		IV. The Cost of Common Equity Capital.
10		V. Concerns with Company Witness D'Ascendis' Testimony.
11		VI. Summary and Recommendations.
12		I. LEGAL AND ECONOMIC GUIDELINES FOR
13		FAIR RATE OF RETURN
10		TAIN NATE OF NETONIA
14	Q.	PLEASE BRIEFLY DESCRIBE THE ECONOMIC AND LEGAL
15		FRAMEWORK OF YOUR ANALYSIS.
16	A.	Public utilities possess certain characteristics of natural
17		monopolies. For instance, it is more efficient for a single firm to
18		provide a service such as water production and distribution or
19		wastewater collection and treatment than for two or more firms
20		offering the same service in the same area to do so. Therefore,
21		regulatory bodies have assigned franchised territories to public

1		utilities to provide services more efficiently and at a lower cost to
2		consumers.
3	Q.	WHAT IS THE ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RISK
4		AND THE COST OF CAPITAL?
5	A.	The cost of equity capital to a firm is equal to the rate of return
6		investors expect to earn on the firm's securities given the securities'
7		level of risk. Investors will require a higher expected return from an
8		investment with a greater risk. In Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope
9		Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 603 (1944) (Hope), the United
10		States Supreme Court stated:
11 12 13 14 15 16		[T]he return to the equity owner should be commensurate with returns on investments in other enterprises having corresponding risks. That return, moreover, should be sufficient to assure confidence in the financial integrity of the enterprise, so as to maintain its credit and to attract capital.
17		In Bluefield Waterworks & Impr. Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 262
18		U.S. 679, 692-93 (1923) (Bluefield) the United States Supreme
19		Court stated:
20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28		A public utility is entitled to such rates as will permit it to earn a return on the value of the property which it employs for the convenience of the public equal to that generally being made at the same time and in the same general part of the country on investments in other business undertakings which are attended by corresponding risks and uncertainties, but it has no constitutional right to profits such as are realized or anticipated in highly profitable enterprises or

The speculative ventures. return should reasonably sufficient to assure confidence in the financial soundness of the utility and should be adequate, under efficient and economical management, to maintain and support its credit and enable it to raise the money necessary for the proper discharge of its public duties. A rate of return may be reasonable at one time and become too high or too low by changes affecting opportunities for investment, the money market, and business conditions.

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These two decisions recognize that utilities are competing for the capital of investors and provide legal guidelines as to how the allowed rate of return should be set. The decisions specifically speak to the standards or criteria of capital attraction, financial integrity, and comparable earnings. The <u>Hope</u> decision, particular, recognizes that the cost of common equity is commensurate with the risk relative to investments in other enterprises. In competitive capital markets, the required return on common equity will be the expected return foregone by not investing in alternative stocks of comparable risk. Thus, in order for the utility to attract capital, possess financial integrity, and exhibit comparable earnings, the return allowed on a utility's common equity should be that return required by investors for stocks with comparable risk. As such, the return requirements of debt and equity investors, which is shaped by expected risk and return, is paramount in attracting capital.

It is widely recognized that a public utility should be allowed a rate
of return on capital, which will allow the utility, under prudent
management, to attract capital under the criteria or standards
referenced by the <u>Hope</u> and <u>Bluefield</u> decisions. If the allowed rate
of return is set too high, consumers are burdened with excessive
costs, current investors receive a windfall, and the utility has an
incentive to overinvest. Likewise, customers will be charged prices
that are greater than the true economic costs of providing these
services. Consumers will consume too few of these services from a
point of view of efficient resource allocation. If the return is set too
low, then the utility stockholders would suffer because a declining
value of the underlying property will be reflected in a declining value
of the utility's equity shares. This could happen because the utility
would not be earning enough to maintain and expand its facilities to
meet customer demand for service, cover its operating costs, and
attract capital on reasonable terms. Lenders will shy away from the
company because of the increased risk that the utility will default on
its debt obligations. Because a public utility is capital intensive, the
cost of capital is a very large part of its overall revenue requirement
and is a crucial issue for a company and its ratepayers.

The <u>Hope</u> and <u>Bluefield</u> standards are embodied in N.C. Gen. Stat.

§ 62-133(b)(4), which requires that the allowed rate of return be

1	sufficient to enable	a utility b	y sound	management
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"to produce a fair return for its shareholders,
considering changing economic conditions and other
factors, to maintain its facilities and services in
accordance with the reasonable requirements of its
customers in the territory covered by its franchise, and
to compete in the market for capital funds on terms
that are reasonable and are fair to its customers and
to its existing investors."

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 62-133(b)(4) (2017).

On April 12, 2013, the North Carolina Supreme Court decided State ex rel. Utils. Comm'n v. Cooper, 366 N.C. 484, 739 S.E. 2d 541 (2013) (Cooper). In that decision, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the Commission's January 27, 2012, Order in Docket No. E-7, Sub 989, approving a stipulated return on equity of 10.50% for Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC. In its decision, the Supreme Court held (1) that the 10.50% return on equity was not supported by the Commission's own independent findings and analysis as required by State ex rel. Utils. Comm'n v. Carolina Util. <u>Customers Ass'n</u>, 348 N.C. 452, 500 S.E.2d 693 (1998) (<u>CUCA I</u>), in cases involving nonunanimous stipulations, and (2) that the Commission must make findings of fact regarding the impact of changing economic conditions on consumers when determining the proper return on equity for a public utility. In Cooper, the Court's holding introduced a new factor to be considered by the

1 Commission regardless of whether there is a stipulation.

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In considering this new element, the Commission is guided by ratemaking principles laid down by statute and interpreted by a body of North Carolina case law developed over many years. According to these principles, the test of a fair rate of return is a return on equity that will provide a utility, by sound management, the opportunity to (1) produce a fair profit for its shareholders in view of current economic conditions, (2) maintain its facilities and service, and (3) compete in the marketplace for capital. State ex rel. <u>Utils. Comm'n v. General Tel. Co.</u>, 281 N.C. 318, 370, 189 S.E.2d 705, 738 (1972). Rates should be set as low as reasonably possible consistent with constitutional constraints. State ex rel. Utils. Comm'n v. Pub. Staff-N. Carolina Utils. Comm'n, 323 N.C. 481, 490, 374 S.E.2d 361, 366 (1988). The exercise of subjective judgment is a necessary part of setting an appropriate return on equity. Id. Thus, in a particular case, the Commission must strike a balance that (1) avoids setting a return so low that it impairs the utility's ability to attract capital, (2) avoids setting a return any

- higher than needed to raise capital on reasonable terms, and (3) considers the impact of changing economic conditions on
- 3 consumers.

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4 Q. WHAT IS A FAIR RATE OF RETURN?

5 Α. The fair rate of return is simply a percentage, which, when 6 multiplied by a utility's rate base investment will yield the dollars of 7 net operating income, a utility should reasonably have the 8 opportunity to earn. This dollar amount of net operating income is 9 available to pay the interest cost on a utility's debt capital and a 10 return to the common equity investor. The fair rate of return 11 multiplied by the utility's rate base yields the dollars a utility needs 12 to recover in order to earn the investors' required return on capital.

13 Q. HOW DID YOU DETERMINE THE FAIR RATE OF RETURN THAT 14 YOU RECOMMEND IN THIS PROCEEDING?

To determine the fair rate of return, I performed a cost of capital study consisting of three steps. First, I determined the appropriate capital structure for ratemaking purposes, i.e., the proper proportions of each form of capital. Utilities normally finance assets with debt and common equity. Because each of these forms of capital have different costs, especially after income tax considerations, the relative amounts of each form employed to

finance the assets can have a significant influence on the overall cost of capital, revenue requirements, and rates. Thus, the determination of the appropriate capital structure for ratemaking purposes is important to the utility and to ratepayers. Second, I determined the cost rate of each form of capital. The individual debt issues have contractual agreements explicitly stating the cost of each issue. The embedded annual cost rate of debt is generally calculated with the annual interest cost divided by the debt outstanding. The cost of common equity is more difficult to determine because it is based on the investor's opportunity cost of capital. Third, by combining the appropriate capital structure ratios for ratemaking purposes with the associated cost rates, I calculate an overall weighted cost of capital or fair rate of return.

II. PRESENT FINANCIAL MARKET CONDITIONS

Q. CAN YOU BRIEFLY DESCRIBE CURRENT FINANCIAL MARKET

CONDITIONS?

A.

Yes. The cost of financing is much lower today than in the more inflationary period of the 1990s. While current CPIU-base inflation rates have been over 5% since May 2021, the average for the first 6 months was 3.4%. Relatively low rates of inflation and expectations of future low inflation rates have contributed to even lower interest

rates. According to Moody's <u>Bond Survey</u>, yields on long-term monthly "A" rated public utility bond yields have fallen 54 basis points from 3.50% for March 31, 2020 Order in Docket No. W-354, Sub 364 to 2.96% for September, 2021. By the close of this proceeding, the Company will have received six rate increases over the last eight eight years (Docket Nos. W-354, Sub 360, Sub 356, Sub 344, Sub 336 and Sub 364). Relative to the filing of the 9.75% cost of equity settlement in the January 2014 rate case in Docket No. W-354, Sub 336, yields on Moody's A-rated utility bonds are 167 basis points lower than the average 4.63% yield observed during January 2014, as illustrated in my Exhibit 1.

12 Q. HOW DO INTEREST RATES AFFECT THE FINANCING COSTS

OF A COMPANY?

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The lower interest rates, especially for longer-term securities, indicate that borrowers are paying less for the time value of money. This is significant since utility stocks and utility capital costs are highly interest rate-sensitive relative to most industries within the securities markets. Furthermore, given that investors often view purchases of the common stocks of utilities as substitutes for fixed income investments, the reductions in interest rates observed over the past ten or more years has generally followed the decreases in investor required rates of return on common equity.

Q. WITH THE DECREASES IN INTEREST RATES, DO YOU RELY ON INTEREST RATE PREDICTIONS IN YOUR INVESTIGATION?

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
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No. I do not rely on interest rate forecasts to determine the cost of equity. Rather, I believe that relying on current interest rates, especially in relation to yields on long-term bonds, is more appropriate for ratemaking. In that, it is reasonable to expect that as investors are pricing bonds in the marketplace, their pricing is based on expectations on the domestic and international demand and supply of capital, future interest rates, future inflation rates, and other relevant factors. While I have a healthy respect for forecasting, I am aware of the risk of relying on predictions of rising interest rates to determine utility rates. A case can be observed in the testimony of witness Ahern in the 2013 Aqua rate case, Docket W-218, Sub 363. In that proceeding, she identified several interest rate forecasts by Blue Chip Financial Forecasts of 30-year Treasury Bonds yields that were predicted to rise to 4.3% in 2015, 4.7% in 2016, 5.2% in 2017, and 5.5% for 2020 – 2024₁. As illustrated in the graph below, these forecasts significantly over-estimated actual interest rates for 30-year Treasury Bonds. Similar over-estimated forecasts can be identified in witness D'Ascendis' Exhibit DWD-4 in the Company's 2018 rate case, where the Blue Chip Consensus Forecasts predicted the 30-

¹ Docket W-218 Sub 363, T. Vol. 2, page 171, lines 8-9.

year Treasury Bonds would rise to 3.8% by the third quarter of 2019. According to the Federal Reserve, the highest observed yield on 30-year Treasury Bonds for the third quarter of 2019 is 2.65%, and the average for the quarter was 2.29%, a forecasting error between 115 to 151 basis points. In my opinion, these types of errors make these forecasts inappropriate for ratemaking.



In addition, the tendency of economists to make poor interest rate predictions in the last ten years was addressed in a December 14, 2019 Wall Street Journal article entitled, "Economists Got the Decade All Wrong. They're Trying to Figure Out Why," and attached as Hinton Exhibit 2. The foregoing examples illustrate why I tend to place more weight in current market interest rates that are inherently forward looking as they reflect investor expectations of both current

1		and future returns on bonds, and to an extent, future rates of
2		inflation.
3		III. APPROPRIATE CAPITAL STRUCTURE AND
4		COST OF LONG-TERM DEBT
5	Q.	WHY IS THE APPROPRIATE CAPITAL STRUCTURE
6		IMPORTANT FOR RATEMAKING PURPOSES?
7	A.	For companies that do not have monopoly power, the price that an
8		individual company charges for its products or services is set in a
9		competitive market, and that price is generally not influenced by the
10		company's capital structure. However, the capital structure that is
11		determined to be appropriate for a regulated public utility has a
12		direct bearing on the fair rate of return, revenue requirement, and,
13		therefore, the prices charged to captive ratepayers.
14	Q.	PLEASE EXPLAIN THE TERM CAPITAL STRUCTURE AND
15		HOW THE CAPITAL STRUCTURE APPROVED FOR
16		RATEMAKING PURPOSES AFFECTS RATES.
17	A.	The capital structure is simply a representation of how a utility's
18		assets are financed. It is the relative proportions or ratios of debt
19		and common equity to the total of these forms of capital, which
20		have different costs. Common equity is far more expensive than
21		debt for ratemaking purposes for two reasons. First, as mentioned

earlier, there are income tax considerations. Interest on debt is deductible for purposes of calculating income taxes. The cost of common equity, on the other hand, must be "grossed up" to allow the utility sufficient revenue to pay income taxes and to earn its cost of common equity on a net or after-tax basis. Therefore, the amount of revenue the utility must collect from ratepayers to meet income tax obligations is directly related to both the common equity ratio in the capital structure and the cost of common equity. A second reason for this cost difference is that the cost of common equity must be set at a marginal or current cost rate. Conversely, the cost of debt is set at an embedded rate because the utility is incurring costs that are previously established in contracts with security holders.

Because the Commission has the duty to promote economic utility service, it must decide whether or not a utility's requested capital structure is appropriate for ratemaking purposes. An example of the cost difference can be seen in the Company's filing. Based upon the Company's requested capital cost rates, each dollar of its common equity, and long-term debt that supports the retail rate base has the following approximate annual costs (including income tax, regulatory fee, and gross receipts tax expense) to ratepayers:

1	(1)	Each	\$1	of	common	equity	costs	а	ratepaye
2		approx	ximat	tely 1	2 cents per	year.			

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(2) Each \$1 of long-term debt costs a ratepayer approximately 5 cents per year.

6 Q. DO YOU SUPPORT THE CAPITAL STRUCTURE PROPOSED BY

7 THE COMPANY IN THIS CASE?

While the Corix's proposed capital structure is reasonable, I recommend that the Company update its proposed capital structure as of September 30, 2021. As compared to the proposed capital structure as of March 31, 2021, my recommended capital structure contains slightly more common equity. This increase is largly due to the parent company's infusion of common equity in August 2021, a significant increase in paid in capital, the additional growth of retained earnings, which contributed to the increase in the balance of common equity, and a debt repayment in September 2021. I believe that the updated capital structure with 49.80% long-term debt and 50.20% common equity is both representative and reasonable for ratemaking. The support for the recommended balances of long-term debt and common equity in the capital structure that underlie the proposed ratios is shown in my Exhibit 3.

22 Q. WHAT IS YOUR RECOMMENDED COST OF LONG-TERM

1 **DEBT?**

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A.

I recommend the use of the embedded cost of debt as of September 30, 2021, of 4.85%. The reduction in the embedded cost rate from the 2019 rate case in Docket No. W-354, Sub 364 reflects the addition of \$200,000,000 of other long-term issuances at significantly lower interest rates relative to the 6.58% cost of debt. This series of debt is associated with a Master Note Purchase Agreement of Collateral Trust Notes totaling \$180,000,000 with \$9,000,000 annual payments that began 2017 and continuethrough 2035. The Company maintains that the make whole provisions contained in these Notes make it uneconomical for refinancing. The Public Staff continues to urge the Company to investigate sources of capital that minimize the embedded cost rate for long-term debt. My recommended capital structure and cost of debt are as follows:

CORIX REGULATED UTILTIES AND SUBSIDIARY COMPANIES

17		as of September 30, 2021						
18		Item	Ratio	Cost Rate				
19	Long-Term Debt	\$ 341,467,855	49.80%	4.85%				
20	Common Equity	\$ 344,152,953	50.20%					
21	Total	\$ 658,620,808	100.00%					

IV. THE COST OF COMMON EQUITY CAPITAL

Q. HOW DID YOU DEFINE THE COST OF COMMON EQUITY?

A. The cost of equity capital for a firm is the expected rate of return on common equity that investors require in order to induce them to purchase shares of the firm's common stock. The return is expected given that when the investor buys a share of the firm's common stock, he does not know with certainty what his returns will be in the future.

A: DCF METHOD

Q. HOW DID YOU DETERMINE THE COST OF COMMON EQUITY

10 **CAPITAL FOR THE COMPANY?**

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- 11 A. I used the discounted cash flow (DCF) model and the Risk
- 12 Premium model to determine the cost of equity for the Company.

13 Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE YOUR DCF ANALYSIS.

A. The discounted cash flow model is a method of evaluating the
expected cash flows from an investment by giving appropriate
consideration to the time value of money. The DCF model is based
on the theory that the price of the investment will equal the
discounted cash flows of returns. The return to an equity investor
comes in the form of expected future dividends and price
appreciation. However, as the new price will again be the sum of

- 1 the discounted cash flows, price appreciation is ignored, and 2 attention focused on the expected stream of dividends. 3 Mathematically, this relationship may be expressed as follows: 4 Let D_1 = expected dividends per share over the next twelve months; 5 g = expected growth rate of dividends; 6 k = cost of equity capital; and 7 P = price of stock or present value of the future income
- 9 Then,

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$$P = \frac{D_1 + D_1(1+g) + D_1(1+g)^2 + ... + D_1(1+g)^{t-1}}{1+k} \frac{D_1(1+g)^2 + ... + D_1(1+g)^{t-1}}{(1+k)^3}$$

- This equation represents the amount an investor would be willing to pay for a share of common stock with a dividend stream over the future periods. Using the formula for a sum of an infinite geometric series, this equation may be reduced to:
- 17
 18 $P = \frac{D_1}{k-g}$
- 20 Solving for k yields the DCF equation:

stream.

21 page 22 page 23 page 24 page 21 page 22 page 23 page 24 page 24 page 24 page 24 page 25 page 25

1	Therefore, the rate of return on equity capital required by investors
2	is the sum of the dividend yield (D_1/P) plus the expected long-term
3	growth rate in dividends (g).

4 Q. DID YOU APPLY THE DCF METHOD DIRECTLY TO CWSNC?

A. No, the the common stock of the ultimate owner of CWSNC is the British Columbia Investment Management Corporation (BCIMC) whose common equity shares are not publicly traded; rather, it is a private equity fund. Thus to estimate the investor required rate of return, I applied the DCF method to a risk-comparable investment comprised of seven water utilities followed by Value Line Investment Survey (Value Line). The standard edition of Value Line covers eight water companies. I excluded Consolidated Water Co. from my group because of its significant overseas operations.

14 Q. WHAT MEASURES OF RISK DID YOU REVIEW TO

15 **DETERMINE THE COMPARABILITY OF INVESTING IN**

16 **WATER UTILITIES?**

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17 A. I reviewed standard risk measures that are widely available to
18 investors and are considered by most investors when making
19 investment decisions. The beta coefficient is a measure of the
20 sensitivity of a stock's price to overall fluctuations in the market.
21 The Value Line Investment Survey beta coefficient describes

the relationship between a company's stock price and the New
York Stock Exchange Composite. A beta value of less than 1.0
means that the stock's price is less volatile than the movement
in the market; conversely, a beta value greater than 1.0
indicates that the stock price is more volatile than the market.
I reviewed the Value Line Safety Rank, which is defined as a
measure of the total risk of a stock. The Safety Rank is
calculated by averaging two variables: (1) the stock's index of
price stability and (2) the Financial Strength rating of the
company. In addition, I reviewed the S&P Common Stock
Rating. The stock rating system takes into consideration two
important factors in the determination of a stock's rating: the
stability and growth of earnings and dividends. However, the
stock rating does not consider a company's balance sheet or
other factors. The stock rating system has seven grades, with

I also reviewed Moody's and S&P's Bond Rating, which are assessments of a company's creditworthiness. Credit rating agencies focus on the creditworthiness of the particular bond issuer, which includes a detailed and thorough review of the potential areas of business risk and financial risk of the

A+ being the highest rating possible.

1	company. These and other risk measures for the comparable
2	groups are shown in my Exhibit 4 and are further explained in
3	Appendix B.

4 Q. HOW DID YOU DETERMINE THE DIVIDEND YIELD

5 **COMPONENT OF THE DCF?**

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Α.

I calculated the dividend yield by using the <u>Value Line</u> estimate of dividends to be declared over the next 12 months divided by the price of the stock as reported in the <u>Value Line</u> Summary and Index sections for each week of the 13-week period of July 30, 2021, through October 22, 2021. A 13-week averaging period tends to smooth out short-term variations in the stock prices. This process resulted in an average dividend yield of 1.6% for the comparable group of water utilities.

14 Q. HOW DID YOU DETERMINE THE EXPECTED GROWTH RATE

COMPONENT OF THE DCF?

I employed the growth rates of the comparable group in earnings per share (EPS), dividend per share (DPS), and book value per share (BPS) as reported in <u>Value Line</u> over the past ten and five years. I also employed the forecasts of the growth rates of the comparable groups in EPS, DPS, and BPS, as reported in <u>Value</u> Line. The historical and forecasted growth rates are prepared by

analysts of an independent advisory service that is widely available
to investors and should also provide an estimate of investor
expectations. I include both known, historical growth rates and
forecasted growth rates because it is reasonable to expect that
investors consider both sets of data in deriving their expectations.

Finally, I incorporated the consensus of various analysts' forecasts of five-year EPS growth rate projections, as reported in Yahoo Finance. The dividend yields and growth rates for each of the companies and for the average for the comparable group are shown in my Exhibit 5.

11 Q. WHAT IS YOUR CONCLUSION REGARDING THE COST OF

COMMON EQUITY TO THE COMPANY BASED ON THE DCF

METHOD?

A. Based upon the DCF analysis for the comparable group of water utilities, I determined that a reasonable expected dividend yield is 1.6%. Based on the average historical growth rate of the group, I believe a 6.98% expected growth rate is reasonable for investors. Assuming that investors give weight to forecasted growth rates, I believe that a 6.68% expected growth rate is also reasonable. Lastly, based on the average historical and forecasted growth rates, it is reasonable to expect investors to consider the 6.86% growth

rate. The combination of expected dividend yield and the expected growth rate yields a range of of 8.3% to 8.6% cost of equity.

B: REGRESSION ANALYSIS METHOD

4 Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE YOUR RISK PREMIUM ANALYSIS.

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The equity risk premium method can be defined as the difference between the expected return on a common stock and the expected return on a debt security. The differential between the two rates of return is indicative of the return investors require in order to compensate them for the additional risk involved with an investment in the Company's common stock over an investment in the Company's bonds, which involves less risk.

In order to quantify the risk premium, I need estimates of the cost of equity and the cost of debt at contemporaneous points in time. This method relies on approved returns on common equity for water utility companies from various public utility commissions that are published by the Regulatory Research Associates, Inc. (RRA), within SNL Global Market Intelligence. In order to estimate the relationship with a representative cost of debt capital, I have regressed the average annual allowed equity returns with the average Moody's A-rated yields for Public Utility bonds from 2006 through 2021. The regression analysis quantifies the historical

- relationship of approved ROEs and A-rated public utility bond yields,
 which is combined with recent monthly yields to provide an estimate
 of the current cost of common equity.
- 4 Q. WHAT ARE THE STRENGTHS OF USING ALLOWED RETURNS?
- 5 Α. The use of allowed returns as the basis for the expected equity 6 return has strengths over other approaches that involve models that 7 subtract a cost rate of debt from the estimated equity return. One 8 strength of my approach is that authorized returns on equity are 9 generally arrived at through lengthy investigations by various parties 10 with opposing views on the rate of return required by investors. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that the approved allowed returns are 11 12 good estimates for the cost of equity.

13 Q. WHAT WERE THE RESULTS OF YOUR RISK PREMIUM 14 ANALYSIS?

The summary data of risk premiums shown on my Exhibit 6, page 1 of 2 indicates that the average risk premium is 5.17%, which, when combined with the average of the last six months of A-rated bond yields of 3.11%, produces yields with an average cost of equity of 8.28%. However, I believe a better estimate of the current cost of equity is determined through a regression equation shown in my Exhibit 6, page 2 of 2. The equation indicates a significant statistical

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relationship exists with the allowed equity returns and bond costs, such that a one percent decrease in the bond cost corresponds to an increase of approximately 27 basis points in the equity risk premium.^{2.} While various studies on the cost of equity capital have differed on the level of the negative relationship of interest rates and risk premiums, there has been agreement that as interest rates fall, there is an increase in the premium.³ Applying this relationship to the current utility bond cost of 3.11%⁴ resulted in a current estimate of the cost of equity of 9.41%.

10 Q. GIVEN YOUR STUDY ON THE COST OF EQUITY, WHAT IS YOUR

11 **RECOMMENDED COST OF EQUITY?**

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A. All of the results of my DCF model indicate a cost of equity estimate of 8.28%, 8.46%, and 8.56%, with a central estimate of 8.44%. The Risk Premium Method indicates a cost of equity of 9.41%. Relying on the average of those two methods, I determined that the investor required rate of return for CWSNC is 8.93%, as shown in my Exhibit 7.

18 Q. TO WHAT EXTENT DOES YOUR RECOMMENDED RATE OF

 $^{^2}$ The regression indicated a significant statistical relationship of ROE=0.08599 + 0.261495, with an adjusted R²=0.8322.


³ Eugene F. Brigham, Dilip K. Shome, and Steve R. Vinson, "The Risk Premium Approach to Measuring a Utility's Cost of Equity." <u>Financial Management</u>, Spring 1985, pp. 33-45

⁴ The 3.11% current bond yield was determined using the most recent six-month average yield-to-maturity rate of Moody's A-rated Utility Bond Yields.

1		RETURN ON COMMON EQUITY TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION
2		THE IMPACT OF A WATER/SEWER SYSTEM IMPROVEMENT
3		MECHANISM PURSUANT TO N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-133.12 ON
4		THE COMPANY'S FINANCIAL RISK?
5	A.	In my opinion, the water and sewer improvement charge
6		mechanism (WSIC and SSIC) offers enhanced cost recovery of
7		eligible capital improvements, thereby reducing regulatory lag
8		through incremental and timely rate increases. I believe this
9		mechanism is seen by debt and equity investors as supportive
10		regulation that mitigates business and regulatory risk. As such, I
11		believe that this mechanism is noteworthy and is supportive of my
12		recommendation. However, I do not believe that its enhancement to
13		Company's revenues are at a level that warrant an explicit
14		reduction in the cost of equity.
15	Q.	WHAT OTHER EVIDENCE DID YOU CONSIDER IN YOUR
16		ASSESSMENT OF THE REASONABLENESS OF YOUR
17		RECOMMENDED RETURN?
18	A.	In regard to my reasonableness assessment with financial risk, I
19		considered the pre-tax interest coverage ratio produced by my cost
20		of capital recommendation. Based on the recommended capital
21		structure, cost of debt, and return on equity, the pre-tax interest
22		coverage ratio is approximately 3.4 times. This level of pre-tax

interest coverage and funds flow coverage should allow CWSNC to qualify for a single "A" bond rating.

Another supportive reason is the strong and relatively stable growth of the Company's retained earnings over the last three years. The graph of its retained earnings reveals an annual growth rate that is in excess of 10%. Furtjhermore, over this time period, the Company paid \$10,000,000 in dividends. Lastly, the red dotted trend line shows the stability of its retained earnings which indicate the relative lower investment risks associated with water utilities.



- Q. TO WHAT EXTENT DOES YOUR RECOMMENDED RATE OF
 RETURN ON EQUITY TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THE
 IMPACT OF CHANGING ECONOMIC CONDITIONS ON
- 4 CWSNC'S CUSTOMERS?

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I am aware of no clear numerical basis for quantifying the impact of changing economic conditions on customers in determining an appropriate return on equity in setting rates for a public utility. Rather, the impact of changing economic conditions nationwide is inherent in the methods and data used in my study to determine the cost of equity for utilities that are comparable to CWSNC. I have reviewed certain information on the economic conditions from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) for the counties served by CWSNC, specifically the 2017 and 2018 data on total personal income and per capita income for North Carolina up through the second quarter of 2021. In addition, I reviewed the 2019 Development Tier Designations published by the North Carolina Department of Commerce for the counties. The BEA data indicates that total personal income weighted by the number of water customers by county grew at a 2019 compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of approximately 3.5%. At this time, county-wide BEA data only extends through 2019; however, the BEA has published updated reports on income per capita for North Carolina that show

an annual growth rate between 4.4% and 5.2% from 2016 through the second quarter of 2020. In addition, North Carolina per capita income from the second quarter of 2020 through the second quarter of 2021 has shown 0.3% annual growth, which is notable given the COVID-19 pandemic.

The North Carolina Department of Commerce annually ranks the state's 100 counties based on economic well-being and assigns each a Tier designation. The most distressed counties are rated a "1," and the most prosperous counties are rated a "3." The rankings examine several economic measures such as household income, poverty rates, unemployment rates, population growth, and per capita property tax base. For 2019, the average Tier ranking that has been weighted by the number of water customers by county is 2.2. Both of these economic measures indicate that there have been improvements in the economic conditions for CWSNC's service area relative to the four previous rate increases in Docket Nos. W-354, Subs 364, 360, 356, and 344 that were approved in 2020, 2018, 2017, and 2015, respectively.

As discussed above, it is the Commission's duty to set rates as low as reasonably possible consistent within constitutional constraints.

This duty exists regardless of the customers' ability to pay.

Moreover, the rate of return on common equity is only one component of the rate established by the Commission. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 62-133 sets out an intricate formula for the Commission to follow in determining a utility's overall revenue requirement. It is the combination of rate base, expenses, capital structure, cost rates for debt and equity capital, and capital structure that determines how much customers pay for utility service and how much investors receive in return for their investment. The Commission must exercise its best judgment in balancing the interests of both groups. My analysis indicates that my recommended rate of return on equity will allow the Company to properly maintain its facilities, provide adequate service to its customers, attract capital on terms that are fair and reasonable to its customers and investors, and will result in rates that are just and reasonable.

V. <u>CONCERNS WITH COMPANY WITNESS</u> <u>D'ASCENDIS' TESTIMONY</u>

17 Q. DO YOU HAVE CONCERNS ABOUT COMPANY WITNESS 18 D'ASCENDIS' TESTIMONY?

A. Yes. I have identified several areas of concern with his testimony.

Interest Rate Forecasts for Ratemaking

As noted, I have concerns with the use of interest rate forecasts to determine the cost of equity. In this proceeding, Mr. D'Ascendis relies on the Blue Chip Consensus Forecasts of 30-year treasury yields of 2.73% in his CAPM analysis, as shown in his Exhibit 1, Schedule DWD-5. However, it is worth noting that the witness relied on similar forecasts for 30-year yields in his predictive CAPM analysis in the Company's last rate case, Sub 364. A comparision of the Blue Chip predictions of forecasts through thethird quarter of 2020 and the maximum observed daily yields on 30-year Treasury Securities revealed an average overestimation of approximately 127 basis points. As observed in prior rate cases, interest rate forecasts have a tendency to over-estimate the future level of interest rates by a significant degree, which I maintain are inappropriate for ratemaking.

Risk Adjustment for Small Size

Another concern with his testimony is his 40 basis point adjustment for the size of CWSNC. I do not believe that it is appropriate to add a risk premium to the cost of equity due to the size of a regulated utility. CWSNC is owned by the Corix, which is owned by BCIMC. As such, Corix and BCIMC have a significant influence over the

balances of common equity and long-term debt of CWSNC. BCIMC
determines the amount of dividend payments paid by Corix and the
frequency of those payments. My reasons are as follows: first, from
a regulatory policy perspective, ratepayers should not be required
to pay higher rates because they are located in the franchise area
of a utility of a size which is arbitrarily considered to be small.
Further, if such adjustments were routinely allowed, an incentive
would exist for large existing utilities to form subsidiaries when
merging or even to form smaller subsidiaries to obtain higher
allowed returns. Lastly, CWSNC operates in a franchise
environment that insulates the Company from competition, and it
operates with procedures in place that allow for rate adjustments
for eligible capital improvements and other unusual circumstances
that impact its earnings.
Furthermore, CWSNC operates in the water and sewer industry,
where expensive bottled water provides the only alternative to utility
service. It is factually correct that rating agencies and investors add
a risk factor for small companies with relatively limited capital
resources; however, the inherent protection from competition and
the ability to recover its capital costs and operating costs removes

this risk, which would otherwise be a concern to investors.

I testified to these same concerns in the last CWSNC rate case,
Docket No. W-354, Sub 360, where the Commission found that a
size adjustment was not warranted. Similar arguments have been
made in a 1997 CWS System, Inc., rate case, Docket No. W-778,
Sub 31, where witness Hanley of AUS Consultants relied on similar
cost of capital methods as witness D'Ascendis, as noted on pages
824-825 in the Commission's Eighty-Seventh Report of Orders and
Decisions. In a 1994 CWSNC rate case, the Commission was not
persuaded to accept an adjustment for small size and elevated risk,
as noted in on page 520 in its Eighty-Fourth Report of Orders and
Decisions. The explicit consideration of the small size of a regulated
utility has been argued before this Commission in a rate case
involving North Carolina Natural Gas, Inc. (NCNG), Docket No. G-
21, Sub 293. In an Order dated December 6, 1991, the
Commission disagreed with the Company witness who testified that
the Company's small size warranted the selection of other small
sized companies in his proxy group. The Commission stated on
page 563 in its Eighty-First Report of Orders and Decisions:
"Dr. Andrews selected a group of 16 companies, including NCNG, in his DCF model (and his CAPM)

"Dr. Andrews selected a group of 16 companies, including NCNG, in his DCF model (and his CAPM) because they are all publicly traded, they are all small in size, and they are all principally in the local gas distribution business. He testified that these companies were the "best available" in terms of being comparable to NCNG. In contrasting his comparable group to those of

witness Hinton, Dr. Andrews stated that it was better to have some similarity in size among the companies even if this meant some dissimilarity in financial attributes. The Commission disagrees. If a group of companies is to be screened for comparability in terms of investor expectations, financial attributes are far more relevant than size."

While there are published studies that address how the small size of a company relates to higher risks, I am aware of only one study by Dr. Annie Wong⁵ that focuses on the size of regulated utilities and risk. Whereas, published journal articles generally rely on company size and return data for a multitude of privately held companies covered by the Center for Research in Security Prices⁶ (CRSP), any correlation with the smaller size of a company and higher stock returns is dominated by industrial firms as Dr. Wong notes in her published article. Dr. Wong has tested the data for a size premium in utilities and concluded the following:

[U]nlike industrial stocks, utility stocks do not exhibit a significant size premium. As explained, there are several reasons why such a size premium would not be attributable to utilities because they are regulated closely by state and federal agencies and commissions, and hence, their financial performance is monitored on an ongoing basis by both the state and federal governments.

⁵ Annie Wong, "Utility Stocks and the Size Effect: An Empirical Analysis," Journal of the Midwest Finance Association, pp. 95-101, (1993).

 $^{^{\}rm 6}$ Center for Research in Security Prices, University of Chicago, Booth School of Business, Chicago, IL.

CAPITAL STRUCTURE OF A PARENT CORPORATION AS COMPARED TO THAT OF A REGULATED UTILITY

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have concerns with Mr. D'Ascendis's comparison of the ratemaking capital structure of Corix and that of his water utility proxy group. Page 2 of his Schedule DWD-2 displays the 49.39% average equity ratio for his eight corporate parent or holding companies. While the 49.39% equity ratio for his comparable group of water utilties is reasonable, I have similar concerns with his group as noted in the prior rate case, Sub 364, where the equity ratio for a similar group of publically traded companies was 55.57%. The key difference for the lower equity ratio in this rate case is the addition of Global Water Resources, Inc., which has a 16.48% fiveyear average equity ratio. However, I still believe that this comparison is deficient, in that, it is better to contrast recently Commission approved common equity ratios for regulated water and wastewater utilities than it is to make comparisons with equity ratios of a corporate parent or a holding company. Often, parent corporations are invested in other non-regulated businesses that involve higher risks and higher rates of returns as compared to the regulated operations of a water and wastewater utility. Secondly, the acquisition policies of large corporate utilities may result in equity ratios that may not be comparable to CWSNC or Corix. As

such, I believe a better comparison of financial risk in connection with an equity ratio is demonstrated in my Exhibit 8, which has the average annual approved common equity ratios for water and wastewater utilities of 50.90% and 51.10% for 2014 through 2021, as compiled by the Regulatory Research Associates of S&P Global Market Intelligence.

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- 7 Q. DO YOU AGREE WITH CONCERNS TO ADD BASIS POINTS TO
 8 THE DCF BASED COST OF EQUITY TO ACCOUNT FOR
 9 MARKET TO BOOK RATIOS SIGNIFICANTLY GREATER THAN
 10 1.0?
 - No. Witness D'Ascendis's Rebuttal Testimony filed in Docket No. W-354, Sub 360, argued that the market to book ratios of the water utility proxy group was approximately 2.25 times and that the high ratio was causing inaccuracies in the DCF model. Furthermore, one needed to de-leverage the implied cost of equity with the use of the Modigliani/Miller equation, which would increase his 8.70% cost of equity to 9.91% cost of equity⁷. This argument presumes that the value of assets prescribed by regulated accounting methods and market valuation are in lock-step with each other, which I do not accept. Secondly, FERC and the FCC have ruled in prior cost of capital investigations on claims that market-to-book valuations greater than 1.0 leads to the DCF model understating the cost of

equity⁷. FERC found that during periods of falling interest rates, the cost of equity falls; however, the result is a tendency for utilities to earn more than their shareholders require, with market values exceeding book values. FERC went on to say there is a similar tendency with rising interest rates and rising costs of equity. In that, utilities will file frequent rate cases in order to protect their shareholders, and the result will be that utilities will maintain their market-to-book ratios during periods of rising equity costs. Furthermore, in 1988, the FERC noted that this argument "is an old one, and the problem of circularity inherent in that approach has been long and widely recognized."

Α.

VI. <u>SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS</u>

13 Q. WOULD YOU PLEASE SUMMARIZE YOUR RECOMMEND14 ATIONS CONCERNING THE COST OF CAPITAL?

Based upon the results of this study, it is my recommendation that the appropriate capital structure to employ for ratemaking purposes in this proceeding consists of 49.80% long-term debt and 50.20% common equity. The appropriate embedded cost of long-term debt associated with this capital structure is 4.85%, and the recommended cost of common equity of 8.93%. My recommended,

TESTIMONY OF JOHN R. HINTON
PUBLIC STAFF – NORTH CAROLINA UTILITIES COMMISSION
DOCKET NO. W-354, SUB 384

⁷ Federal Communications Commission Record 91-389, p. 7196 and Federal Register, Vol 53, No. 24, pages 3,347 and 3,348.

- 1 overall weighted cost of capital produced is 6.90%, as shown in my
- 2 Exhibit 9.
- 3 Q. DOES THIS CONCLUDE YOUR TESTIMONY?
- 4 A. Yes.

Appendix A Page 1 of 3

QUALIFICATIONS AND EXPERIENCE

JOHN ROBERT HINTON

I received a Bachelor of Science degree in Economics from the University of North Carolina at Wilmington in 1980 and a Master of Economics degree from North Carolina State University in 1983. I joined the Public Staff in May of 1985. I filed testimony on the long-range electrical forecast in Docket No. E-100, Sub 50. In 1986, 1989, and 1992, I developed the long-range forecasts of peak demand for electricity in North Carolina. I filed testimony on electricity weather normalization in Docket Nos. E-7, Sub 620, E-2, Sub 833, and E-7, Sub 989. I filed testimony on customer growth and the level of funding for nuclear decommissioning costs in Docket No. E-2, Sub 1023. I filed testimony on the level of funding for nuclear decommissioning costs in Docket Nos. E-7, Sub 1026 and E-7, Sub 1146. I have filed testimony on the Integrated Resource Plans (IRPs) filed in Docket No. E-100, Subs 114 and 125, and I have reviewed numerous peak demand and energy sales forecasts and the resource expansion plans filed in electric utilities' annual IRPs and IRP updates.

I have been the lead analyst for the Public Staff in numerous avoided cost proceedings, filing testimony in Docket No. E-100, Subs 106, 136, 140, 148, and Sub 158. I have filed a Statement of Position in the arbitration

case involving EPCOR and Progress Energy Carolinas in Docket No. E-2, Sub 966. I have filed testimony in avoided cost related to the cost recovery of energy efficiency programs and demand side management programs in Dockets Nos. E-7, Sub 1032, E-7, Sub 1130, E-2, Sub 1145, and E-2, Sub 1174.

I have filed testimony on the issuance of certificates of public convenience and necessity (CPCN) in Docket Nos. E-2, Sub 669, SP-132, Sub 0, E-7, Sub 790, E-7, Sub 791, and E-7, Sub 1134.

I filed testimony on the merger of Dominion Energy, Inc. and SCANA Corp. in Docket Nos. E-22, Sub 551, and G-5, Sub 585.

I have filed testimony on the issue of fair rate of return in Docket Nos. E-22, Subs 333 412, and 532; P-26, Sub 93; P-12, Sub 89; G-21, Sub 293; P-31, Sub 125; P-100, Sub 133b; P-100, Sub 133d (1997 and 2002); G-21, Sub 442; G-5, Subs 327, 386; and 632; G-9, Subs 351, 382, and 722, ,W-778, Sub 31; W-218, Subs 319, 497, 526; W-354, Sub 360; 364, and in several smaller water utility rate cases. I have filed testimony on credit metrics and the risk of a downgrade in Docket No. E-7, Sub 1146.

Appendix A Page 3 of 3

I have filed testimony on the hedging of natural gas prices in Docket No. E-2, Subs 1001 and 1018. I have filed testimony on the expansion of natural gas in Docket No. G-5, Subs 337 and 372. I performed the financial analysis in the two audit reports on Mid-South Water Systems, Inc., Docket No. W-100, Sub 21. I testified in the application to transfer the CPCN from North Topsail Water and Sewer, Inc. to Utilities, Inc., in Docket No. W-1000, Sub 5. I have filed testimony on rainfall normalization with respect of water sales in Docket No. W-274, Sub 160.

With regard to the 1996 Safe Drinking Water Act, I was a member of the Small Systems Working Group that reported to the National Drinking Water Advisory Council of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. I have published an article in the National Regulatory Research Institute's Quarterly Bulletin entitled Evaluating Water Utility Financial Capacity.

Appendix B Page 1 of 4

RISK MEASURES

VALUE LINE SAFETY RANK

The Safety Rank is a measure of the total risk of a stock. It includes factors unique to the company's business such as its financial condition, management competence, etc. The Safety Rank is derived by averaging two variables: the stock's Price Stability Index, and the Financial Strength Rating of the company. The Safety Rank ranges from 1 (Highest) to 5 (Lowest).

VALUE LINE BETA (B)

The Beta is derived from a regression analysis between weekly percent changes in the price of a stock and weekly percent price changes in the New York Stock Exchange Composite Index over a period of five years.

There has been a tendency over the years for high Beta stocks to become lower and for low Beta stocks to become higher. This tendency can be measured by studying Betas of stocks in five consecutive intervals. The Betas published in the <u>Value Line Investment Survey</u> are adjusted for this tendency and hence are likely to be better predictors of future Betas than those based exclusively on the experience of the past five years.

The New York Stock Exchange Composite Index is used as the basis for calculating the Beta because this index is a good proxy for the complete equity portfolio. Since Beta's significance derives primarily from its usefulness in portfolios rather than individual stocks, it is best constructed by relating to an overall market portfolio. The <u>Value Line</u> Index, because it weights all stocks equally, would not serve as well.

The security's return is regressed against the return on the New York Stock Exchange Composite Index over the past five years so that 259 observations of weekly price changes are used. <u>Value Line</u> adjusts its estimate of Beta (\$\mathbb{G}_i\$) for regression described by Blume (1971). The estimated Beta is adjusted as follows:

Adjusted $\&inspace{1mu} = 0.35 + 0.67 \&inspace{1mu}$

Appendix B Page 2 of 4

VALUE LINE FINANCIAL STRENGTH RATING

The Financial Strength Ratings are primarily a measure of the relative financial strength of a company. The rating considers key variables such as coverage of debt, variability of return, stock price stability, and company size. The Financial Strength Ratings range from the highest at A++ to the lowest at C.

VALUE LINE PRICE STABILITY INDEX

The Price Stability Index is based upon a ranking of the standard deviation of weekly percent changes in the price of a stock over the last five years. The top 5% carry a Price Stability Index of 100; the next 5%, 95; and so on down to an Index of 5.

VALUE LINE EARNINGS PREDICTABILITY INDEX

The Earnings Predictability Index is a measure of the reliability of an earnings forecast. The most reliable forecasts tend to be those with the highest rating (100), the least reliable (5).

S&P BETA (ß)

The Beta is derived from a regression analysis between 60 months of price changes in a company's stock price (plus corresponding dividend yield) and the monthly price changes in the S&P 500 Index (plus corresponding dividend yield). Prices and dividends are adjusted for all subsequent stock splits and stock dividends.

Appendix B Page 3 of 4

S&P BOND RATING

The S&P Bond Ratings is an appraisal of the credit quality based on relevant risk factors. S&P reviews both the company's financial and business profiles. Shown below are the rankings:

- AAA An extremely strong capacity to pay interest and repay principal.
- AA+ A very strong capacity to pay interest and repay principal.
- AA There is only a small degree of difference between "AAA" or "AA."
- AA- debt issues.
- A+ A strong capacity to pay interest and repay principal. These
- A these ratings indicate the obligor is more susceptible to
- A- changes in economic conditions than AAA" or "AA" debt issues.
- BBB+ An adequate capacity to pay interest and repay principal.
- BBB economic conditions or changing circumstances are more likely to
- BBB- lead to a weakened capacity to pay interest and repay principal.
- BB+ "BB" indicates less near-term vulnerability to default than other
- BB speculative issues. However, these bonds face major ongoing
- BB- uncertainties or exposure to adverse conditions that could lead to inadequate capacity to meet timely interest and principal payments.

S&P STOCK RANKING

The S&P Stock Rankings is an appraisal of the growth and stability of the company's earnings and dividends over the past 10 years. The final score for each stock is measured against a scoring matrix determined by an analysis of the scores of a large and representative sample of stocks. Shown below are the rankings:

- A+ Highest
- A High
- A- Above average
- B+ Average
- B Below Average
- B- Lower
- C Lowest
- D In Reorganization
- NR Not rated

Appendix B Page 4 of 4

MOODY'S BOND RATING


Moody's Bond Ratings assign a rating on the creditworthiness of an obligor. Such ratings reflect both the likelihood of default and any financial loss suffered in the event of a default. Shown below are the rankings:

- Aaa Obligations rated Aaa are judged to be of the highest quality with minimal risk.
- Aa Obligations rated Aa are judged to be of the high quality and are subject to low credit risk.
- A Obligations rated A are considered upper-medium-grade and are subject to low credit risk.
- Baa Obligations rated Baa are subject to moderate credit-risk. They are considered medium-grade and are subject to substantial credit risk.
- Ba Obligations rated Baa are subject to have speculative and are subject to substantial credit risk.
- B Obligations rated B are considered speculative and are subject to high credit risk.
- Caa Obligations rated Caa are judged to be of poor standing and are subject to very high credit risk.
- Ca Obligations rated Ca are highly speculative and are likely in, or very near default with some prospect of recovery in principle and interest.
- C Obligations rated C are the lowest-grade class of bonds and are typically in default, with little prospect of recovery in principle and interest.

- ^{1.} Value Line Investment Analyzer, Version 3.0.15a, New York, NY.
- ² Standard & Poor's, Utility Compustat II, September 15, 1993, New York, NY.

Moody's A-Rated Utility Bond Yields

(averaged over a quarter)



Public Staff
Hinton Exhibit I

THE WALL STREET JOURNAL.

Economists Got the Decade All Wrong. They're Trying to Figure Out Why.

The U.S. has enjoyed its longest economic expansion on record without triggering inflation as interest rates remain historically low

by Greg Ip
Dec. 14, 2019 1:00 pm ET



In the fall of 2009, the global financial crisis had only just ended, and interest rates were a mere 0.1%. Peering ahead, economists assumed the recovery would resemble previous recoveries, though a tad slower, and thus rates would start rising the next year and plateau at 4.2% by 2015.

But by the fall of 2010, rates hadn't budged. Like Charlie Brown taking another run at the football, economists gamely made the same forecast that year, and the year after that and the year after that. Rates remained stuck near zero until 2015, a stretch of free money unseen since the 1940s.

When rates started to rise, they didn't come close to levels once considered normal, ending the decade between 1.5% and 1.75%. Private-sector economists now expect them to average 2.4% over the long term, according to Blue Chip Economic Indicators. Judging by the bond market, they might have guessed high again: Ten-year Treasury note yields are just 1.8%—roughly zero, adjusted for inflation.

How could economists have gotten something so basic so spectacularly wrong? What was it about this past decade that made all their predictions go awry?



Fed Chairman Jerome Powell and former chairmen Janet Yellen and Ben Bernanke. The financial crisis was followed by a stretch of free money

Economists have been casting around for the answer, a theory to explain their inability to peer accurately into the months ahead, let alone the years. Such a theory must do more than say "The Federal Reserve did it." It must explain why growth was the most subdued of any expansion since the 1940s and inflation consistently ran below the Fed's 2% target, the reasons the Fed kept rates so low.

And, no less difficult, it would have to explain why, in spite of that subdued growth, the U.S. has enjoyed its longest economic expansion on record, one marked by a record-breaking bull market in stocks and unemployment falling to a 50-year low.

One explanation is the "debt hangover" theory popularized by Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff, whose history of financial crises, "This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly," was a sleeper hit in 2009. They found that in the wake of financial crises, households, banks, businesses and sometimes governments are fixated on paying down debts and wary that another crisis is around the corner, so they avoid borrowing and investing. This holds down growth, inflation and interest rates.


The U.S. initially tracked this model. It had barely exited its own crisis when another erupted in the eurozone, pushing Greece into default and others to the brink of it.

But as those crises faded from view, low growth, inflation and rates persisted.

A Confounding Decade

Since 2009 economists' projections of interest rates and unemployment (shown with year made) have consistently proved too high.

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Sources: Blue Chip Economic Indicators (forecasts); Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (actual T-bill, unemployment rates)

So in 2013 Larry Summers, a former top adviser to Presidents Bill Clinton and Barack Obama and now an economist at Harvard University, advanced an alternative explanation: "secular stagnation." He borrowed the phrase from an earlier Harvard economist, Alvin Hansen who used it in 1938 to describe the Great Depression's persistently weak growth and high unemployment. Mr. Hansen tied it to weak investment due to slow population growth: Businesses had less need to invest when there were fewer new workers and customers and when aging households bought fewer big-ticket products like houses.

Slow population growth is once again weighing on growth and interest rates, Mr. Summers noted, and he added several other factors: the fastest-growing businesses, such as social-media platforms, invest little of their rich profits. Higher inequality meant more income flows to the high-saving, low-spending rich.

Though initially skeptical of Mr. Summers's thesis, many economists have since warmed to it, at least for other parts of the world, if not the U.S. In some countries like Germany a persistent

excess of savings manifests itself as a trade surplus which flows into other countries' bonds, holding down interest rates around the world.

Secular stagnation has several profound implications. First, with interest rates closer to zero, central banks are less able to combat future recessions. Second, a structural shortage of private borrowing means governments can run big deficits without pushing up interest rates. Indeed, given central banks' lack of ammunition, governments should run deficits, or the economy will stagnate. Reducing entitlements such as future Social Security benefits in the name of fiscal prudence may worsen the problem by encouraging households to save more.

Secular stagnation also increases the risk of protectionism. Any country with too little domestic demand to achieve full employment and 2% inflation will be tempted to foist the problem on its neighbors by cheapening its currency or erecting tariffs so as to export more and import less.

Yet in key respects the past decade doesn't conform to the gloomy prognosis of secular stagnation: The stock market has romped to one record after another, and job growth has remained consistently strong.

As with interest rates, economists have been surprised by unemployment, which peaked at almost 10% in 2010. Year after year, they expected it to bottom out around 5%. It's now down to 3.5%, a 50-year low, and likely headed lower.

The expansion is now the longest since records begin in the mid-1800s. It bears little resemblance to the 1930s, which Mr. Hansen described as "sick recoveries which die in their infancy and…leave a hard and seemingly immovable core of unemployment."



Job seekers and recruiters at a fair in Los Angeles. Economists have been surprised by the continued decline of unemployment.

This points to a third possible theory. The so-called natural rate of unemployment, the lowest the U.S. can sustain without running out of workers or pushing up inflation (called u* or "u-star" in economists' equations) is much lower than previously thought. So the recovery has had more ground to cover than many realized, and as a result the economy has spent much of the past decade operating well below capacity.

Jan Hatzius, chief economist at Goldman Sachs, says there isn't a lot of mystery about the behavior of inflation and interest rates: "We fell into a deep hole so we had a lot of spare capacity, and it took a long time to climb out."

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The U.S. may have finally climbed out, but until Europe has as well, interest rates may remain low, he says. "How secular is it? How cyclical? Until you've seen economies really normalize from a cyclical perspective it's going to be hard to fully distinguish between those two things."

In other words, it might take the next decade to answer what really happened in the last.

Mr. Ip is The Wall Street Journal's chief economics commentator, in Washington. He can be reached at greg.ip@wsj.com.

CORIX REGULATED UTILITIES (US) INC. AND SUBSIDIARY COMPANIES CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF CAPITALIZATION

FOR THE NINE MONTHS ENDED SEPTEMBER 30, 2021 AND 2020

	Unaudited September 30, 2021	December 31, 2020
Common Shareholders' Equity		
Common shares, \$.10 par value; authorized		
and issued 1,100 shares	\$110	\$110
Paid-in capital	237,265,034	223,265,034
Retained earnings	106,887,809	88,719,030
Total Common Equity	\$344,152,953	\$311,984,174
Long-Term Debt Collateral trust notes- 6.58%, \$9,000,000 due in annual installments beginning in 2017 through 2035 Collateral trust notes-	134,372,198	143,340,372
4.37%, Series 2018, due 10/4/2033 Collateral trust notes-	99,582,255	99,556,146
3.15%, Series 2020, due 5/26/30 Collateral trust notes-	49,762,783	49,781,241
3.35%, Series 2020, due 5/26/35	49,750,618	49,776,724
Revolving Loan Balance	8,000,000	9,000,000
Total Debt	341,467,855	351,454,483
Total Capitalization	\$685,620,808.09	\$663,438,657.39

Source: Company Data Request No. 44, Item 8.

Investment Risk Measures

Group of Water Utility Companies

	Value Line ¹						S&P ²	S&P ³	Moody's ³
	Safety		Price	Earnings	Financial	S&P ²	Quality	Bond	Bond
Company	Rank	Beta	Stability	Predict.	Strength	Beta	Ranking	Rating	Rating
1 American States Water	2	0.65	100	90	Α	0.08	Α	A+	A2
2 American Water Works	3	0.90	80	90	B++	0.22	A-	Α	Baa1
3 Essential Util.	3	0.70	85	60	B+	0.54	Α	Α	Baa2
4 California Water	3	1.00	95	60	B++	0.17	A-	A+	NA
5 Middlesex Water	2	0.70	85	85	B++	0.35	Α	Α	NA
6 SJW Group	3	0.80	80	50	B+	0.42	B+	A-	NA
7 York Water	3	0.85	80	100	B+	0.32	Α	A-	NA
Average	2.7	0.80	86	76		0.30			

¹ Value Line Investment Survey, Standard Edition, October 8, 2021

² CRFA Stock Report, October 29 - November 1, 2021.

^{3.} S&P Global Market Intelligence, downloaded on October 12, 2021.

DCF ANALYSIS

Group of Water Utility Companies

											Yahoo
			Val	ue Line	² Histoı	rical		Value L	₋ine ² Fo	orecast	Forecast ³
	•	EPS	DPS	BPS	EPS	DPS	BPS	EPS	DPS	BPS	EPS
Company Name	Yield ¹	10-Yr	10-Yr	10-Yr	5-Yr	5-Yr	5-Yr	5-Yr	5-Yr	5-Yr	5-Yr
1 Amer. States Water	1.7	9.0	8.5	5.5	5.5	7.5	5.0	6.5	9.5	5.5	7.4
2 Amer. Water Works	1.4	10.5	11.0	3.5	8.0	11.5	4.5	8.5	8.5	5.0	8.6
3 Essential Util.	2.2	5.5	7.5	9.5	-1.5	7.5	11.5	10.0	7.5	6.5	6.4
4 California Water	1.5	5.0	3.0	5.0	8.0	4.0	5.0	7.0	6.5	3.5	11.7
5 Middlesex Water	1.1	9.0	3.0	5.5	12.5	5.0	8.0	5.0	5.5	2.5	2.7
6 SJW Group	2.0	7.0	6.0	8.5	-0.5	10.0	12.5	13.0	6.0	4.5	7.0
7 York Water Co.	1.6	6.0	3.5	4.5	5.5	4.0	4.5	6.5	6.0	4.0	4.9
Average	1.6	7.4	6.1	6.0	7.9	7.1	7.3	8.1	7.1	4.5	7.0
Estimated Cost of	Equity	9.1	7.7	7.6	9.5	8.7	8.9	9.7	8.7	6.1	8.6

^{1.} Value Line Investment Survey, Summary and Index from July 16, 2021 to October 08, 2021.

^{2.} Value Line Investment Survey, Standard Edition, October 08, 2021.

^{3.} Yahoo Earnings Forecast as of October 28, 2021.

^{4.} 5-yr Negative EPS for Essential Util and SJW Group are excluded from analysis

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REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF ALLOWED RETURNS ON EQUITY

	[A] Water Utilities	[B]	[C]=[A]-[B]
	Approved Returns on	Moody's A-Rated	Water Utility Risk
Year	Equity ¹	Bond Yields ²	Premium
2006	10.23%	6.07%	4.16%
2007	10.07%	6.05%	4.02%
2008	10.24%	6.51%	3.73%
2009	10.18%	6.04%	4.15%
2010	10.18%	5.47%	4.71%
2011	10.04%	5.04%	5.00%
2012	9.90%	4.13%	5.77%
2013	9.73%	4.48%	5.25%
2014	9.59%	4.28%	5.31%
2015	9.76%	4.12%	5.65%
2016	9.71%	3.93%	5.78%
2017	9.56%	4.00%	5.56%
2018	9.43%	4.25%	5.18%
2019	9.63%	3.77%	5.86%
2020	9.36% ⁴	3.02%	6.35%
2021	9.40% ⁵	3.12% ³	6.28%
		Average Maximum Minimun	5.17% 6.35% 3.73%
		WIIIIIIIII	3.7370

¹ Regulatory Research Associates, Water Advisory, February 8, 2021 and November 1, 2021

² Moody's Credittrends with yield data as of October 11, 2021.

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REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF APPROVED RETURNS ON EQUITY

SUMMARY OUTPUT

Regression Statistics						
Multiple R	0.918385627					
R Square	0.843432159					
Adjusted R Square	0.832248742					
Standard Error	0.001269348					
Observations	16					

ANOVA

	df	SS	MS	F	Significance F
Regression	1	0.000121517	0.000121517	75.418107	5.20119E-07
Residual	14	2.25574E-05	1.61124E-06		
Total	15	0.000144074			

	Coefficients	Standard Error	t Stat	P-value
Intercept	0.085997269	0.001432806	60.02017775	2.734E-18
X Variable 1	0.261495306	0.030111063	8.684359926	5.201E-07

	A-Rated
	Public Utility
	Bond Yield
Apr-21	3.30%
May-21	3.33%
Jun-21	3.16%
Jul-21	2.95%
Aug-21	2.95%
Sep-21	2.96%
Average	3.11%

Predicted Cost of Equity 9.41%

Note:

Predicted Cost of Equity of 9.41% = 0.085997 + 0.261495 x 3.11%.

Cost of Equity Summary

DCF Method	
Based on Average Historical	8.58%
Based on Historical & Forecasted Growth Rates	8.46%
Based on Predicted Growth Rates	8.28%
Average	8.44%
Risk Premium Method	9.41%
Average of DCF and Risk Premium	8.93%

COMMISSION APPROVED COMMON EQUITY RATIOS

	State	Utility	Order date	Equity Ratio
1	IA	Iowa American Water Co.	2/28/14	52.57%
2	NC	Carolina Water Service of NC	3/10/14	50.27%
3	NC	Aqua North Carolina	5/2/14	50.00%
4	HI	Waikoloa Utilities	5/23/14	50.00%
5	NJ	Middlesex Water Co.	6/18/14	50.71%
6	NY	SUEZ Water New York Inc.	6/24/14	44.00%
7	NY	SUEZ Water Westchester	6/24/14	47.00%
8	DE	Tidewater Utilities, Inc.	8/19/14	50.96%
9	NJ	Aqua New Jersey	8/20/14	52.47%
10	OH	Aqua Ohio Water Co.	9/10/14	51.60%
11	NY	SUEZ Water New Rochelle, Inc.	11/14/14	47.00%
			Average	49.69%
12	HI	Waikoloa Water	2/19/15	50.00%
13	ME	Maine Water	3/11/15	48.50%
14	IL	Agua Illinois	3/25/15	53.26%
15	HI	Kona Water Service	6/29/15	53.00%
16	NJ	SUEZ Toms River	8/19/15	53.00%
17	NJ	Middlesex Water Co.	8/19/15	51.36%
18	NJ	New Jersey American Water Co.	9/11/15	52.00%
19	NC	Carolina Water Service of NC	12/7/15	51.00%
			Average	51.52%
20	VA	Aqua Virginia, Inc.	1/7/16	49.20%
21	DE	Artesian Water	1/19/16	50.54%
22	NV	Utilities, Inc. of Central Nevada		49.45%
23	WV	West Virginia American Water Co.	1/25/16 2/24/16	49.45% 45.84%
	NC	The state of the s		
24		CWS Systems, Inc.	2/24/16	51.00%
25	NJ	SUEZ New Jersey Inc.	4/27/16	53.00%
26	NJ	Aqua New Jersey Hawaii Water Service	8/9/16	52.86% 53.00%
27	HI		9/12/16	49.80%
28	<u>IL</u>	Illinois American Water Co.	12/13/16	
			Average	50.52%
29	NY	SUEZ Water New York	1/27/17	46.00%
30	IA	Iowa American Water	2/27/17	52.04%
31	NY	New York American Water Co.	5/18/17	46.00%
32	VA	Virginia-American Water	5/24/17	46.09%
33	NC	Carolina Water Service, Inc. of NC	11/8/17	52.00%
			Average	48.43%
34	IL	Aqua Illinois	3/7/18	53.22%
35	CA	California American Water Co.	3/22/18	55.39%
36	CA	California Water Service Co.	3/22/18	53.40%
37	CA	Golden State Water Co.	3/22/18	57.00%
38	CA	San Jose Water Co.	3/22/18	53.28%
39	NJ	Middlesex Water Co.	3/24/18	52.75%
40	SC	Carolina Water Service, Inc.	5/2/18	51.89%
41	NY	SUEZ Water Owego-Nicols Inc.	7/13/18	46.00%
42	IL	Utility Services of IL. Inc. Water	9/24/18	52.15%
43	IL	Utility Services of IL. Inc. Water/Water	9/24/18	52.15%
44	RI	Suez Water Rhode Island	10/5/18	53.91%
44 45	NJ	New Jersey American Water	10/5/18	54.00%
	MD	Aguarion Water Co. of Mass.	10/29/16	47.04%
46 47	NJ	SUEZ Water New Jersey		54.00%
47 48	NC NC	<u>ş</u>	11/19/18	
48 49	CA	Aqua North Carolina	12/18/18 12/20/18	50.00% 60.00%
	VA	Suburban Water Systems Massaputten Public Service Corp.	12/21/18	
50	VA	Massanutten Public Service Corp.		52.19% 52.85%
			Average	52.85%
51	HI	Hawaii Water Service	1/7/19	53.40%
52	MD	Maryland American Water	2/5/19	48.66%
53	WV	West Virginia American Water Co.	2/8/19	49.79%
54	NC	Carolina Water Service of NC	2/21/19	50.91%
55	NJ	Aqua New Jersey	5/28/19	53.00%
56	KY	Kentucky American Water Co.	6/27/19	48.76%
			Average	50.75%
57	NC	Carolina Water Service of NC	3/31/20	49.10%
58	NY			
		SUEZ Water of New York ¹	7/162020	48.00%
59	NC	Aqua North Carolina	10/26/20	50.00%
60_	NJ	New Jersey American Water Co.	10/28/20	54.56%
			Average	50.42%
C4	KI I	CLIET Water of New 1	E/40/04	E4.000/
61	NJ	SUEZ Water of New Jersey	5/19/21	54.00%
62	IA	Iowa American Water	6/28/21	52.28%
63_	СТ	Connecticut Water Co.	7/28/21	52.73%
			Average	53.00%

Average of Annual Averages (8 observations) 50.90% Average Across Years (63 obervations) 51.10%

Source: Regulatory Research Assoc., Global Market Intelligence, downloaded on November 2, 2021.

Carolina Water Service, Inc. of North Carolina Cost of Capital as of September 30, 2021

			Cost	Weighted	Pre-Tax Cost
Item	Balance	Ratios	Rate	Cost Rate	of Capital ¹
Long-Term Debt	341,467,855	49.80%	4.85%	2.42%	2.42%
Common Equity	344,152,953	50.20%	8.93%	4.48%	5.82%
Total	\$685,620,808	100.00%		6.90%	8.25%
		Pre-T	3.4		
Funds Flow to Debt ³				22.62	

^{1.} The pre-tax cost of debt and equity is grossed up by tax retention factors.

^{2.} Pre-Tax Interest Coverage: 3.4 = 8.23 / 2.42.

^{3.} Funds Flow to Debt = (Recommended rate base*weighted debt cost rate) / (Net Income for Return + Depreciation + Amortization).

^{22.62 = ((143739820*0.0242)/(9839761+7102774-1566582))*100}